Directory:Logic Museum/Aquinas Summa-I-22-24
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Jump to navigationJump to searchSUMMA THEOLOGIAE - QUESTIONS XXII - XXIV
- Question 23.1 Of Predestination
- Question 23.2
- Question 23.3
- Question 23.4
- Question 23.5
- Question 23.6
- Question 23.7
- Question 23.8
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| IЄ q. 22 pr. Consideratis autem his quae ad voluntatem absolute pertinent, procedendum est ad ea quae respiciunt simul intellectum et voluntatem. Huiusmodi autem est providentia quidem respectu omnium; praedestinatio vero et reprobatio, et quae ad haec consequuntur, respectu hominum specialiter, in ordine ad aeternam salutem. Nam et post morales virtutes, in scientia morali, consideratur de prudentia, ad quam providentia pertinere videtur. Circa providentiam autem Dei quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Deo conveniat providentia. Secundo, utrum omnia divinae providentiae subsint. Tertio, utrum divina providentia immediate sit de omnibus. Quarto, utrum providentia divina imponat necessitatem rebus provisis. | |
IЄ q. 22 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod providentia Deo non conveniat. Providentia enim, secundum Tullium, est pars prudentiae. Prudentia autem, cum sit bene consiliativa, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., Deo competere non potest, qui nullum dubium habet, unde eum consiliari oporteat. Ergo providentia Deo non competit. |
Objection 1. It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of prudence. But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9,18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never has any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot belong to God. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, quidquid est in Deo, est aeternum. Sed providentia non est aliquid aeternum, est enim circa existentia, quae non sunt aeterna, secundum Damascenum. Ergo providentia non est in Deo. | Objection 2. Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things that are not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29). Therefore there is no providence in God. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, nullum compositum est in Deo. Sed providentia videtur esse aliquid compositum, quia includit in se voluntatem et intellectum. Ergo providentia non est in Deo. | Objection 3. Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence seems to be something composite, because it includes both the intellect and the will. Therefore providence is not in God. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. XIV, tu autem, pater, gubernas omnia providentia. | On the contrary, It is said (Wisdom 14:3): "But Thou, Father, governest all things by providence [Vulg. But 'Thy providence, O Father, governeth it.']." |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere providentiam in Deo. Omne enim bonum quod est in rebus, a Deo creatum est, ut supra ostensum est. In rebus autem invenitur bonum, non solum quantum ad substantiam rerum, sed etiam quantum ad ordinem earum in finem, et praecipue in finem ultimum, qui est bonitas divina, ut supra habitum est. Hoc igitur bonum ordinis in rebus creatis existens, a Deo creatum est. Cum autem Deus sit causa rerum per suum intellectum, et sic cuiuslibet sui effectus oportet rationem in ipso praeexistere, ut ex superioribus patet; necesse est quod ratio ordinis rerum in finem in mente divina praeexistat. Ratio autem ordinandorum in finem, proprie providentia est. Est enim principalis pars prudentiae, ad quam aliae duae partes ordinantur, scilicet memoria praeteritorum, et intelligentia praesentium; prout ex praeteritis memoratis, et praesentibus intellectis, coniectamus de futuris providendis. Prudentiae autem proprium est, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., ordinare alia in finem; sive respectu sui ipsius, sicut dicitur homo prudens, qui bene ordinat actus suos ad finem vitae suae; sive respectu aliorum sibi subiectorum in familia vel civitate vel regno, secundum quem modum dicitur Matt. XXIV, fidelis servus et prudens, quem constituit dominus super familiam suam. Secundum quem modum prudentia vel providentia Deo convenire potest, nam in ipso Deo nihil est in finem ordinabile, cum ipse sit finis ultimus. Ipsa igitur ratio ordinis rerum in finem, providentia in Deo nominatur. Unde Boetius, IV de Consol., dicit quod providentia est ipsa divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quae cuncta disponit. Dispositio autem potest dici tam ratio ordinis rerum in finem, quam ratio ordinis partium in toto. | I answer that, It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was shown above (6, 4). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness (21, 4). This good of order existing in things created, is itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before (19, 4), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other parts are directed--namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself--as for instance, a man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of life--or in regard to others subject to him, in a family, city or kingdom; in which sense it is said (Matthew 24:45), "a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." In this way prudence or providence may suitably be attributed to God. For in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last end. This type of order in things towards an end is therefore in God called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that "Providence is the divine type itself, seated in the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things": which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., prudentia proprie est praeceptiva eorum, de quibus eubulia recte consiliatur, et synesis recte iudicat. Unde, licet consiliari non competat Deo, secundum quod consilium est inquisitio de rebus dubiis; tamen praecipere de ordinandis in finem, quorum rectam rationem habet, competit Deo, secundum illud Psalmi, praeceptum posuit, et non praeteribit. Et secundum hoc competit Deo ratio prudentiae et providentiae. Quamvis etiam dici possit, quod ipsa ratio rerum agendarum consilium in Deo dicitur; non propter inquisitionem, sed propter certitudinem cognitionis, ad quam consiliantes inquirendo perveniunt. Unde dicitur Ephes. I, qui operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae. | Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10), "Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has rightly counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [Cf. I-II, 57, 6. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He possesses, does belong to God, according to Ps. 148:6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God. Although at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will" (Ephesians 1:11). |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ad curam duo pertinent, scilicet ratio ordinis, quae dicitur providentia et dispositio; et executio ordinis, quae dicitur gubernatio. Quorum primum est aeternum, secundum temporale. | Reply to Objection 2. Two things pertain to the care of providence--namely, the "reason of order," which is called providence and disposition; and the execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the first is eternal, and the second is temporal. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod providentia est in intellectu, sed praesupponit voluntatem finis, nullus enim praecipit de agendis propter finem, nisi velit finem. Unde et prudentia praesupponit virtutes morales, per quas appetitus se habet ad bonum, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Et tamen si providentia ex aequali respiceret voluntatem et intellectum divinum, hoc esset absque detrimento divinae simplicitatis; cum voluntas et intellectus in Deo sint idem, ut supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3. Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect are one and the same thing, as we have said above (19). |
IЄ q. 22 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia sint subiecta divinae providentiae. Nullum enim provisum est fortuitum. Si ergo omnia sunt provisa a Deo, nihil erit fortuitum, et sic perit casus et fortuna. Quod est contra communem opinionem. |
Objection 1. It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then everything was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnis sapiens provisor excludit defectum et malum, quantum potest, ab his quorum curam gerit. Videmus autem multa mala in rebus esse. Aut igitur Deus non potest ea impedire, et sic non est omnipotens, aut non de omnibus curam habet. | Objection 2. Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, quae ex necessitate eveniunt, providentiam seu prudentiam non requirunt, unde, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., prudentia est recta ratio contingentium, de quibus est consilium et electio. Cum igitur multa in rebus ex necessitate eveniant, non omnia providentiae subduntur. | Objection 3. Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9, 10,11): "Prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice." Since, then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, quicumque dimittitur sibi, non subest providentiae alicuius gubernantis. Sed homines sibi ipsis dimittuntur a Deo, secundum illud Eccli. XV, Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui; et specialiter mali, secundum illud, dimisit illos secundum desideria cordis eorum. Non igitur omnia divinae providentiae subsunt. | Objection 4. Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by God in accordance with the words: "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel" (Sirach 15:14). And particularly in reference to the wicked: "I let them go according to the desires of their heart" (Psalm 80:13). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to divine providence. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 2 arg. 5 Praeterea, apostolus, I Cor. IX, dicit quod non est Deo cura de bobus, et eadem ratione, de aliis creaturis irrationalibus. Non igitur omnia subsunt divinae providentiae. | Objection 5. Further, the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 9:9): "God doth not care for oxen [Vulg. 'Doth God take care for oxen?']": and we may say the same of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under the care of divine providence. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. VIII, de divina sapientia, quod attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter. | On the contrary, It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wisdom 8:1). |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam totaliter providentiam negaverunt, sicut Democritus et Epicurei, ponentes mundum factum esse casu. Quidam vero posuerunt incorruptibilia tantum providentiae subiacere; corruptibilia vero, non secundum individua, sed secundum species; sic enim incorruptibilia sunt. Ex quorum persona dicitur Iob XXII, nubes latibulum eius, et circa cardines caeli perambulat, neque nostra considerat. A corruptibilium autem generalitate excepit Rabbi Moyses homines, propter splendorem intellectus, quem participant, in aliis autem individuis corruptibilibus, aliorum opinionem est secutus. Sed necesse est dicere omnia divinae providentiae subiacere, non in universali tantum, sed etiam in singulari. Quod sic patet. Cum enim omne agens agat propter finem, tantum se extendit ordinatio effectuum in finem, quantum se extendit causalitas primi agentis. Ex hoc enim contingit in operibus alicuius agentis aliquid provenire non ad finem ordinatum, quia effectus ille consequitur ex aliqua alia causa, praeter intentionem agentis. Causalitas autem Dei, qui est primum agens, se extendit usque ad omnia entia, non solum quantum ad principia speciei, sed etiam quantum ad individualia principia, non solum incorruptibilium, sed etiam corruptibilium. Unde necesse est omnia quae habent quocumque modo esse, ordinata esse a Deo in finem, secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. XIII, quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. Cum ergo nihil aliud sit Dei providentia quam ratio ordinis rerum in finem, ut dictum est, necesse est omnia, inquantum participant esse, intantum subdi divinae providentiae. Similiter etiam supra ostensum est quod Deus omnia cognoscit, et universalia et particularia. Et cum cognitio eius comparetur ad res sicut cognitio artis ad artificiata, ut supra dictum est, necesse est quod omnia supponantur suo ordini, sicut omnia artificiata subduntur ordini artis. | I answer that, Certain persons totally denied the existence of providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to providence and corruptible things not in their individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this respect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying (Job 22:14): "The clouds are His covert; and He doth not consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven." Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from the generality of things corruptible, on account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others. We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual selves. This is made evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, but also of things corruptible. Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle says: "Those things that are of God are well ordered [Vulg.'Those powers that are, are ordained of God': 'Quae autem sunt, a Deo ordinatae sunt.' St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.']" (Romans 13:1). Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine providence. It has also been shown (14, 6, 11) that God knows all things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliter est de causa universali, et de causa particulari. Ordinem enim causae particularis aliquid potest exire, non autem ordinem causae universalis. Non enim subducitur aliquid ab ordine causae particularis, nisi per aliquam aliam causam particularem impedientem, sicut lignum impeditur a combustione per actionem aquae. Unde, cum omnes causae particulares concludantur sub universali causa, impossibile est aliquem effectum ordinem causae universalis effugere. Inquantum igitur aliquis effectus ordinem alicuius causae particularis effugit, dicitur esse casuale vel fortuitum, respectu causae particularis, sed respectu causae universalis, a cuius ordine subtrahi non potest, dicitur esse provisum. Sicut et concursus duorum servorum, licet sit casualis quantum ad eos, est tamen provisus a domino, qui eos scienter sic ad unum locum mittit, ut unus de alio nesciat. | Reply to Objection 1. There is a difference between universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since then, all particular causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of a particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard the universal cause, outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meeting of two servants, although to them it appears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely sent to meet at the one place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod aliter de eo est qui habet curam alicuius particularis, et de provisore universali. Quia provisor particularis excludit defectum ab eo quod eius curae subditur, quantum potest, sed provisor universalis permittit aliquem defectum in aliquo particulari accidere, ne impediatur bonum totius. Unde corruptiones et defectus in rebus naturalibus, dicuntur esse contra naturam particularem; sed tamen sunt de intentione naturae universalis, inquantum defectus unius cedit in bonum alterius, vel etiam totius universi; nam corruptio unius est generatio alterius, per quam species conservatur. Cum igitur Deus sit universalis provisor totius entis, ad ipsius providentiam pertinet ut permittat quosdam defectus esse in aliquibus particularibus rebus, ne impediatur bonum universi perfectum. Si enim omnia mala impedirentur, multa bona deessent universo, non enim esset vita leonis, si non esset occisio animalium; nec esset patientia martyrum, si non esset persecutio tyrannorum. Unde dicit Augustinus in Enchirid. Deus omnipotens nullo modo sineret malum aliquod esse in operibus suis, nisi usque adeo esset omnipotens et bonus, ut bene faceret etiam de malo. Ex his autem duabus rationibus quas nunc solvimus, videntur moti fuisse, qui divinae providentiae subtraxerunt corruptibilia, in quibus inveniuntur casualia et mala. | Reply to Objection 2. It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchiridion 2): "Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil." It would appear that it was on account of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things--e.g. casual and evil things--as removed from the care of divine providence. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod homo non est institutor naturae, sed utitur in operibus artis et virtutis, ad suum usum, rebus naturalibus. Unde providentia humana non se extendit ad necessaria, quae ex natura proveniunt. Ad quae tamen se extendit providentia Dei, qui est auctor naturae. Et ex hac ratione videntur moti fuisse, qui cursum rerum naturalium subtraxerunt divinae providentiae, attribuentes ipsum necessitati materiae; ut Democritus, et alii naturales antiqui. | Reply to Objection 3. Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine providence, attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and others of the ancients. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod in hoc quod dicitur Deum hominem sibi reliquisse, non excluditur homo a divina providentia, sed ostenditur quod non praefigitur ei virtus operativa determinata ad unum, sicut rebus naturalibus; quae aguntur tantum, quasi ab altero directae in finem, non autem seipsa agunt, quasi se dirigentia in finem, ut creaturae rationales per liberum arbitrium, quo consiliantur et eligunt. Unde signanter dicit, in manu consilii sui. Sed quia ipse actus liberi arbitrii reducitur in Deum sicut in causam, necesse est ut ea quae ex libero arbitrio fiunt, divinae providentiae subdantur, providentia enim hominis continetur sub providentia Dei, sicut causa particularis sub causa universali. Hominum autem iustorum quodam excellentiori modo Deus habet providentiam quam impiorum, inquantum non permittit contra eos evenire aliquid, quod finaliter impediat salutem eorum, nam diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum, ut dicitur Rom. VIII. Sed ex hoc ipso quod impios non retrahit a malo culpae, dicitur eos dimittere. Non tamen ita, quod totaliter ab eius providentia excludantur, alioquin in nihilum deciderent, nisi per eius providentiam conservarentur. Et ex hac ratione videtur motus fuisse Tullius, qui res humanas, de quibus consiliamur, divinae providentiae subtraxit. | Reply to Objection 4. When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: "In the hand of his own counsel." But since the very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included under the providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause. God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation. For "to them that love God, all things work together unto good" (Romans 8:28). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to abandon them: not that He altogether withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not preserved in existence by His providence. This was the reason that had weight with Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 2 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod, quia creatura rationalis habet per liberum arbitrium dominium sui actus, ut dictum est, speciali quodam modo subditur divinae providentiae; ut scilicet ei imputetur aliquid ad culpam vel ad meritum, et reddatur ei aliquid ut poena vel praemium. Et quantum ad hoc curam Dei apostolus a bobus removet. Non tamen ita quod individua irrationalium creaturarum ad Dei providentiam non pertineant, ut Rabbi Moyses existimavit. | Reply to Objection 5. Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above (19, 10), it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses. |
IЄ q. 22 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non immediate omnibus provideat. Quidquid enim est dignitatis, Deo est attribuendum. Sed ad dignitatem alicuius regis pertinet, quod habeat ministros, quibus mediantibus subditis provideat. Ergo multo magis Deus non immediate omnibus providet. |
Objection 1. It seems that God has not immediate providence over all things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides for his subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over all things. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad providentiam pertinet res in finem ordinare. Finis autem cuiuslibet rei est eius perfectio et bonum. Ad quamlibet autem causam pertinet effectum suum perducere ad bonum. Quaelibet igitur causa agens est causa effectus providentiae. Si igitur Deus omnibus immediate providet, subtrahuntur omnes causae secundae. | Objection 2. Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. If therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes would be withdrawn. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod melius est quaedam nescire quam scire, ut vilia, et idem dicit philosophus, in XII Metaphys. Sed omne quod est melius, Deo est attribuendum. Ergo Deus non habet immediate providentiam quorundam vilium et malorum. | Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, "It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, vile things": and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore He has not immediate providence over bad and vile things. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Iob XXXIV, quem constituit alium super terram? Aut quem posuit super orbem quem fabricatus est? Super quo dicit Gregorius, mundum per seipsum regit, quem per seipsum condidit. | On the contrary, It is said (Job 34:13): "What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?" On which passage Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 20): "Himself He ruleth the world which He Himself hath made." |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ad providentiam duo pertinent, scilicet ratio ordinis rerum provisarum in finem; et executio huius ordinis, quae gubernatio dicitur. Quantum igitur ad primum horum, Deus immediate omnibus providet. Quia in suo intellectu habet rationem omnium, etiam minimorum, et quascumque causas aliquibus effectibus praefecit, dedit eis virtutem ad illos effectus producendos. Unde oportet quod ordinem illorum effectuum in sua ratione praehabuerit. Quantum autem ad secundum, sunt aliqua media divinae providentiae. Quia inferiora gubernat per superiora; non propter defectum suae virtutis, sed propter abundantiam suae bonitatis, ut dignitatem causalitatis etiam creaturis communicet. Et secundum hoc excluditur opinio Platonis, quam narrat Gregorius Nyssenus, triplicem providentiam ponentis. Quarum prima est summi Dei, qui primo et principaliter providet rebus spiritualibus; et consequenter toti mundo, quantum ad genera, species et causas universales. Secunda vero providentia est, qua providetur singularibus generabilium et corruptibilium, et hanc attribuit diis qui circumeunt caelos, idest substantiis separatis, quae movent corpora caelestia circulariter. Tertia vero providentia est rerum humanarum, quam attribuebat Daemonibus, quos Platonici ponebant medios inter nos et deos, ut narrat Augustinus IX de Civ. Dei. | I answer that, Two things belong to providence--namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, God has immediate providence over everything, because He has in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand the type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God's providence; for He governs things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid. viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a threefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes. The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move corporeal things in a circular direction. The third providence, over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14). |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod habere ministros executores suae providentiae, pertinet ad dignitatem regis, sed quod non habeat rationem eorum quae per eos agenda sunt, est ex defectu ipsius. Omnis enim scientia operativa tanto perfectior est, quanto magis particularia considerat, in quibus est actus. | Reply to Objection 1. It pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more it considers the particular things with which its action is concerned. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod per hoc quod Deus habet immediate providentiam de rebus omnibus, non excluduntur causae secundae, quae sunt executrices huius ordinis, ut ex supra dictis patet. | Reply to Objection 2. God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His order, as was said above (19, 5, 8). |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod nobis melius est non cognoscere mala et vilia, inquantum per ea impedimur a consideratione meliorum, quia non possumus simul multa intelligere, et inquantum cogitatio malorum pervertit interdum voluntatem in malum. Sed hoc non habet locum in Deo, qui simul omnia uno intuitu videt, et cuius voluntas ad malum flecti non potest. | Reply to Objection 3. It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil. |
IЄ q. 22 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod divina providentia necessitatem rebus provisis imponat. Omnis enim effectus qui habet aliquam causam per se, quae iam est vel fuit, ad quam de necessitate sequitur, provenit ex necessitate, ut philosophus probat in VI Metaphys. Sed providentia Dei, cum sit aeterna, praeexistit; et ad eam sequitur effectus de necessitate; non enim potest divina providentia frustrari. Ergo providentia divina necessitatem rebus provisis imponit. |
Objection 1. It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. For every effect that has a "per se" cause, either present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the providence of God, since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of necessity, for divine providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore divine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, unusquisque provisor stabilit opus suum quantum potest, ne deficiat. Sed Deus est summe potens. Ergo necessitatis firmitatem rebus a se provisis tribuit. | Objection 2. Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He assigns the stability of necessity to things provided. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, Boetius dicit, IV de Consol., quod fatum, ab immobilis providentiae proficiscens exordiis, actus fortunasque hominum indissolubili causarum connexione constringit. Videtur ergo quod providentia necessitatem rebus provisis imponat. | Objection 3. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6): "Fate from the immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes by the indissoluble connection of causes." It seems therefore that providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod corrumpere naturam non est providentiae. Hoc autem habet quarundam rerum natura, quod sint contingentia. Non igitur divina providentia necessitatem rebus imponit, contingentiam excludens. | On the contrary, Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, 23) "to corrupt nature is not the work of providence." But it is in the nature of some things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod providentia divina quibusdam rebus necessitatem imponit, non autem omnibus, ut quidam crediderunt. Ad providentiam enim pertinet ordinare res in finem. Post bonitatem autem divinam, quae est finis a rebus separatus, principale bonum in ipsis rebus existens, est perfectio universi, quae quidem non esset, si non omnes gradus essendi invenirentur in rebus. Unde ad divinam providentiam pertinet omnes gradus entium producere. Et ideo quibusdam effectibus praeparavit causas necessarias, ut necessario evenirent; quibusdam vero causas contingentes, ut evenirent contingenter, secundum conditionem proximarum causarum. | I answer that, Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things. Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod effectus divinae providentiae non solum est aliquid evenire quocumque modo; sed aliquid evenire vel contingenter vel necessario. Et ideo evenit infallibiliter et necessario, quod divina providentia disponit evenire infallibiliter et necessario, et evenit contingenter, quod divinae providentiae ratio habet ut contingenter eveniat. | Reply to Objection 1. The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by necessity or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of divine providence conceives to happen from contingency. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in hoc est immobilis et certus divinae providentiae ordo, quod ea quae ab ipso providentur, cuncta eveniunt eo modo quo ipse providet, sive necessario sive contingenter. | Reply to Objection 2. The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen, whether from necessity or from contingency. |
| IЄ q. 22 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod indissolubilitas illa et immutabilitas quam Boetius tangit, pertinet ad certitudinem providentiae, quae non deficit a suo effectu, neque a modo eveniendi quem providit, non autem pertinet ad necessitatem effectuum. Et considerandum est quod necessarium et contingens proprie consequuntur ens, inquantum huiusmodi. Unde modus contingentiae et necessitatis cadit sub provisione Dei, qui est universalis provisor totius entis, non autem sub provisione aliquorum particularium provisorum. | Reply to Objection 3. That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember that properly speaking 'necessary' and "contingent" are consequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things. |
| IЄ q. 23 pr. Post considerationem divinae providentiae, agendum est de praedestinatione, et de libro vitae. Et circa praedestinationem quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum Deo conveniat praedestinatio. Secundo, quid sit praedestinatio; et utrum ponat aliquid in praedestinato. Tertio, utrum Deo competat reprobatio aliquorum hominum. Quarto, de comparatione praedestinationis ad electionem; utrum scilicet praedestinati eligantur. Quinto, utrum merita sint causa vel ratio praedestinationis, vel reprobationis, aut electionis. Sexto, de certitudine praedestinationis; utrum scilicet praedestinati infallibiliter salventur. Septimo, utrum numerus praedestinatorum sit certus. Octavo, utrum praedestinatio possit iuvari precibus sanctorum. | |
IЄ q. 23 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines non praedestinentur a Deo. Dicit enim Damascenus, in II libro, oportet cognoscere quod omnia quidem praecognoscit Deus, non autem omnia praedeterminat. Praecognoscit enim ea quae in nobis sunt; non autem praedeterminat ea. Sed merita et demerita humana sunt in nobis, inquantum sumus nostrorum actuum domini per liberum arbitrium. Ea ergo quae pertinent ad meritum vel demeritum, non praedestinantur a Deo. Et sic hominum praedestinatio tollitur. |
Objection 1. It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all." But human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is done away. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnes creaturae ordinantur ad suos fines per divinam providentiam, ut supra dictum est. Sed aliae creaturae non dicuntur praedestinari a Deo. Ergo nec homines. | Objection 2. Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above (22, 1, 2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, Angeli sunt capaces beatitudinis, sicut et homines. Sed Angelis non competit praedestinari, ut videtur, cum in eis nunquam fuerit miseria; praedestinatio autem est propositum miserendi, ut dicit Augustinus. Ergo homines non praedestinantur. | Objection 3. Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose to take pity [miserendi]" [See 22, 3. Therefore men are not predestined. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, beneficia hominibus a Deo collata, per spiritum sanctum viris sanctis revelantur, secundum illud apostoli, I Cor. II, nos autem non spiritum huius mundi accepimus, sed spiritum qui ex Deo est, ut sciamus quae a Deo donata sunt nobis. Si ergo homines praedestinarentur a Deo, cum praedestinatio sit Dei beneficium, esset praedestinatis nota sua praedestinatio. Quod patet esse falsum. | Objection 4. Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Corinthians 2:12): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are given us from God." Therefore if man were predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination would be made known to each predestined; which is clearly false. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. VIII, quos praedestinavit, hos et vocavit. | On the contrary, It is written (Romans 8:30): "Whom He predestined, them He also called." |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Deo conveniens est homines praedestinare. Omnia enim divinae providentiae subiacent, ut supra ostensum est. Ad providentiam autem pertinet res in finem ordinare, ut dictum est. Finis autem ad quem res creatae ordinantur a Deo, est duplex. Unus, qui excedit proportionem naturae creatae et facultatem, et hic finis est vita aeterna, quae in divina visione consistit, quae est supra naturam cuiuslibet creaturae, ut supra habitum est. Alius autem finis est naturae creatae proportionatus, quem scilicet res creata potest attingere secundum virtutem suae naturae. Ad illud autem ad quod non potest aliquid virtute suae naturae pervenire, oportet quod ab alio transmittatur; sicut sagitta a sagittante mittitur ad signum. Unde, proprie loquendo, rationalis creatura, quae est capax vitae aeternae, perducitur in ipsam quasi a Deo transmissa. Cuius quidem transmissionis ratio in Deo praeexistit; sicut et in eo est ratio ordinis omnium in finem, quam diximus esse providentiam. Ratio autem alicuius fiendi in mente actoris existens, est quaedam praeexistentia rei fiendae in eo. Unde ratio praedictae transmissionis creaturae rationalis in finem vitae aeternae, praedestinatio nominatur, nam destinare est mittere. Et sic patet quod praedestinatio, quantum ad obiecta, est quaedam pars providentiae. | I answer that, It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (22, 2). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said (22, 1, 2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (12, 4). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Damascenus nominat praedeterminationem impositionem necessitatis; sicut est in rebus naturalibus, quae sunt praedeterminatae ad unum. Quod patet ex eo quod subdit, non enim vult malitiam, neque compellit virtutem. Unde praedestinatio non excluditur. | Reply to Objection 1. Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one end. This is clear from his adding: "He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue." Whence predestination is not excluded by Him. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod creaturae irrationales non sunt capaces illius finis qui facultatem humanae naturae excedit. Unde non proprie dicuntur praedestinari, etsi aliquando abusive praedestinatio nominetur respectu cuiuscumque alterius finis. | Reply to Objection 2. Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod praedestinari convenit Angelis, sicut et hominibus, licet nunquam fuerint miseri. Nam motus non accipit speciem a termino a quo, sed a termino ad quem, nihil enim refert, quantum ad rationem dealbationis, utrum ille qui dealbatur, fuerit niger aut pallidus vel rubeus. Et similiter nihil refert ad rationem praedestinationis, utrum aliquis praedestinetur in vitam aeternam a statu miseriae, vel non. Quamvis dici possit quod omnis collatio boni supra debitum eius cui confertur, ad misericordiam pertineat, ut supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3. Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not take its species from the term "wherefrom" but from the term "whereto." Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown previously (21, 3 and 4). |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, etiam si aliquibus ex speciali privilegio sua praedestinatio reveletur, non tamen convenit ut reveletur omnibus, quia sic illi qui non sunt praedestinati, desperarent; et securitas in praedestinatis negligentiam pareret. | Reply to Objection 4. Even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined. |
IЄ q. 23 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinatio ponat aliquid in praedestinato. Omnis enim actio ex se passionem infert. Si ergo praedestinatio actio est in Deo, oportet quod praedestinatio passio sit in praedestinatis. |
Objection 1. It seems that predestination does place something in the predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the predestined. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, Origenes dicit, super illud Rom. I, qui praedestinatus est etc., praedestinatio est eius qui non est, sed destinatio eius est qui est. Sed Augustinus dicit, in libro de praedestinatione sanctorum, quid est praedestinatio, nisi destinatio alicuius? Ergo praedestinatio non est nisi alicuius existentis. Et ita ponit aliquid in praedestinato. | Objection 2. Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was predestined," etc. (Romans 1:4): "Predestination is of one who is not; destination, of one who is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): "What is predestination but the destination of one who is?" Therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places something in the predestined. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, praeparatio est aliquid in praeparato. Sed praedestinatio est praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, ut dicit Augustinus, in libro de Praedest. Sanct. Ergo praedestinatio est aliquid in praedestinatis. | Objection 3. Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something in the predestined. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, temporale non ponitur in definitione aeterni. Sed gratia, quae est aliquid temporale, ponitur in definitione praedestinationis, nam praedestinatio dicitur esse praeparatio gratiae in praesenti, et gloriae in futuro. Ergo praedestinatio non est aliquid aeternum. Et ita oportet quod non sit in Deo, sed in praedestinatis, nam quidquid est in Deo, est aeternum. | Objection 4. Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is in Him is eternal. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, quod praedestinatio est praescientia beneficiorum Dei. Sed praescientia non est in praescitis, sed in praesciente. Ergo nec praedestinatio est in praedestinatis, sed in praedestinante. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that "predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines, and not in the predestined. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod praedestinatio non est aliquid in praedestinatis, sed in praedestinante tantum. Dictum est enim quod praedestinatio est quaedam pars providentiae providentia autem non est in rebus provisis; sed est quaedam ratio in intellectu provisoris, ut supra dictum est. Sed executio providentiae, quae gubernatio dicitur, passive quidem est in gubernatis; active autem est in gubernante. Unde manifestum est quod praedestinatio est quaedam ratio ordinis aliquorum in salutem aeternam, in mente divina existens. Executio autem huius ordinis est passive quidem in praedestinatis; active autem est in Deo. Est autem executio praedestinationis vocatio et magnificatio, secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. VIII, quos praedestinavit, hos et vocavit; et quos vocavit, hos et magnificavit. | I answer that, Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved above (22, 1). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (Romans 8:30): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']." |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod actiones in exteriorem materiam transeuntes, inferunt ex se passionem, ut calefactio et secatio, non autem actiones in agente manentes, ut sunt intelligere et velle, ut supra dictum est. Et talis actio est praedestinatio. Unde praedestinatio non ponit aliquid in praedestinato. Sed executio eius, quae transit in exteriores res, ponit in eis aliquem effectum. | Reply to Objection 1. Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion--for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above (14, 2; 18, 3, ad 1). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its execution, which passes out to external things, has an effect in them. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod destinatio aliquando sumitur pro reali missione alicuius ad aliquem terminum, et sic destinatio non est nisi eius quod est. Alio modo sumitur destinatio pro missione quam aliquis mente concipit, secundum quod dicimur destinare, quod mente firmiter proponimus, et hoc secundo modo dicitur II Machab. cap. VI, Eleazarus destinavit non admittere illicita propter vitae amorem. Et sic destinatio potest esse eius quod non est. Tamen praedestinatio, ratione antecessionis quam importat, potest esse eius quod non est, qualitercumque destinatio sumatur. | Reply to Objection 2. Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone actually existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar "determined not to do any unlawful things for the love of life" (2 Maccabees 6:20). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est praeparatio. Quaedam patientis, ut patiatur, et haec praeparatio est in praeparato. Quaedam alia est agentis, ut agat, et haec est in agente. Et talis praeparatio est praedestinatio; prout aliquod agens per intellectum dicitur se praeparare ad agendum, inquantum praeconcipit rationem operis fiendi. Et sic Deus ab aeterno praeparavit praedestinando, concipiens rationem ordinis aliquorum in salutem. | Reply to Objection 3. Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to action, and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination, conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod gratia non ponitur in definitione praedestinationis, quasi aliquid existens de essentia eius, sed inquantum praedestinatio importat respectum ad gratiam, ut causae ad effectum, et actus ad obiectum. Unde non sequitur quod praedestinatio sit aliquid temporale. | Reply to Objection 4. Grace does not come into the definition of predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination is anything temporal. |
IЄ q. 23 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus nullum hominem reprobet. Nullus enim reprobat quem diligit. Sed Deus omnem hominem diligit, secundum illud Sap. XI, diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti. Ergo Deus nullum hominem reprobat. |
Objection 1. It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to (Wisdom 11:25): "Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made." Therefore God reprobates no man. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, si Deus aliquem hominem reprobat, oportet quod sic se habeat reprobatio ad reprobatos, sicut praedestinatio ad praedestinatos. Sed praedestinatio est causa salutis praedestinatorum. Ergo reprobatio erit causa perditionis reproborum. Hoc autem est falsum, dicitur enim Osee XIII, perditio tua, Israel, ex te est; tantummodo ex me auxilium tuum. Non ergo Deus aliquem reprobat. | Objection 2. Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For it is said (Hosea 13:9): "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me." God does not, then, reprobate any man. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, nulli debet imputari quod vitare non potest. Sed si Deus aliquem reprobat, non potest vitare quin ipse pereat, dicitur enim Eccle. VII, considera opera Dei, quod nemo possit corrigere quem ipse despexerit. Ergo non esset hominibus imputandum quod pereunt. Hoc autem est falsum. Non ergo Deus aliquem reprobat. | Objection 3. Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For it is said (Ecclesiastes 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised." Therefore it could not be imputed to any man, were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Malach. I, Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui. | On the contrary, It is said (Malachi 1:2-3): "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau." |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Deus aliquos reprobat. Dictum enim est supra quod praedestinatio est pars providentiae. Ad providentiam autem pertinet permittere aliquem defectum in rebus quae providentiae subduntur, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum per divinam providentiam homines in vitam aeternam ordinentur, pertinet etiam ad divinam providentiam, ut permittat aliquos ab isto fine deficere. Et hoc dicitur reprobare. Sic igitur, sicut praedestinatio est pars providentiae respectu eorum qui divinitus ordinantur in aeternam salutem; ita reprobatio est pars providentiae respectu illorum qui ab hoc fine decidunt. Unde reprobatio non nominat praescientiam tantum, sed aliquid addit secundum rationem, sicut et providentia, ut supra dictum est. Sicut enim praedestinatio includit voluntatem conferendi gratiam et gloriam, ita reprobatio includit voluntatem permittendi aliquem cadere in culpam, et inferendi damnationis poenam pro culpa. | I answer that, God does reprobate some. For it was said above (1) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (22, 2). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (22, 1). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus omnes homines diligit, et etiam omnes creaturas, inquantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum, non tamen quodcumque bonum vult omnibus. Inquantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum quod est vita aeterna, dicitur eos habere odio, vel reprobare. | Reply to Objection 1. God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good--namely, eternal life--He is said to hate or reprobated them. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod aliter se habet reprobatio in causando, quam praedestinatio. Nam praedestinatio est causa et eius quod expectatur in futura vita a praedestinatis, scilicet gloriae; et eius quod percipitur in praesenti, scilicet gratiae. Reprobatio vero non est causa eius quod est in praesenti, scilicet culpae; sed est causa derelictionis a Deo. Est tamen causa eius quod redditur in futuro, scilicet poenae aeternae. Sed culpa provenit ex libero arbitrio eius qui reprobatur et a gratia deseritur. Et secundum hoc verificatur dictum prophetae, scilicet, perditio tua, Israel, ex te. | Reply to Objection 2. Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined--namely, glory--and of what is received in this life--namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present--namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future--namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the prophet is true--namely, "Destruction is thy own, O Israel." |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod reprobatio Dei non subtrahit aliquid de potentia reprobati. Unde, cum dicitur quod reprobatus non potest gratiam adipisci, non est hoc intelligendum secundum impossibilitatem absolutam, sed secundum impossibilitatem conditionatam, sicut supra dictum est quod praedestinatum necesse est salvari, necessitate conditionata, quae non tollit libertatem arbitrii. Unde, licet aliquis non possit gratiam adipisci qui reprobatur a Deo, tamen quod in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur, ex eius libero arbitrio contingit. Unde et merito sibi imputatur in culpam. | Reply to Objection 3. Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as was said above (19, 3), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of choice. Whence, although anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt. |
IЄ q. 23 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinati non eligantur a Deo. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod, sicut sol corporeus non eligendo omnibus corporibus lumen immittit, ita et Deus suam bonitatem. Sed bonitas divina communicatur praecipue aliquibus secundum participationem gratiae et gloriae. Ergo Deus absque electione gratiam et gloriam communicat. Quod ad praedestinationem pertinet. |
Objection 1. It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends his rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His grace and glory; and this belongs to predestination. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, electio est eorum quae sunt. Sed praedestinatio ab aeterno est etiam eorum quae non sunt. Ergo praedestinantur aliqui absque electione. | Objection 2. Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore, some are predestined without election. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, electio quandam discretionem importat. Sed Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri, ut dicitur I Tim. II. Ergo praedestinatio, quae praeordinat homines in salutem, est absque electione. | Objection 3. Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God "wills all men to be saved" (1 Timothy 2:4). Therefore, predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes. I, elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem. | On the contrary, It is said (Ephesians 1:4): "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world." |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod praedestinatio, secundum rationem, praesupponit electionem; et electio dilectionem. Cuius ratio est, quia praedestinatio, ut dictum est, est pars providentiae. Providentia autem, sicut et prudentia, est ratio in intellectu existens, praeceptiva ordinationis aliquorum in finem, ut supra dictum est. Non autem praecipitur aliquid ordinandum in finem, nisi praeexistente voluntate finis. Unde praedestinatio aliquorum in salutem aeternam, praesupponit, secundum rationem, quod Deus illorum velit salutem. Ad quod pertinet electio et dilectio. Dilectio quidem, inquantum vult eis hoc bonum salutis aeternae, nam diligere est velle alicui bonum, ut supra dictum est. Electio autem, inquantum hoc bonum aliquibus prae aliis vult, cum quosdam reprobet, ut supra dictum est. Electio tamen et dilectio aliter ordinantur in nobis et in Deo, eo quod in nobis voluntas diligendo non causat bonum; sed ex bono praeexistente incitamur ad diligendum. Et ideo eligimus aliquem, quem diligamus, et sic electio dilectionem praecedit in nobis. In Deo autem est e converso. Nam voluntas eius, qua vult bonum alicui diligendo, est causa quod illud bonum ab eo prae aliis habeatur. Et sic patet quod dilectio praesupponitur electioni, secundum rationem; et electio praedestinationi. Unde omnes praedestinati sunt electi et dilecti. | I answer that, Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, as stated above (1), is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above (22, 2). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:--love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above (20, 2, 3):--election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above (3). Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election and love. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si consideretur communicatio bonitatis divinae in communi, absque electione bonitatem suam communicat; inquantum scilicet nihil est, quod non participet aliquid de bonitate eius, ut supra dictum est. Sed si consideretur communicatio istius vel illius boni, non absque electione tribuit, quia quaedam bona dat aliquibus, quae non dat aliis. Et sic in collatione gratiae et gloriae attenditur electio. | Reply to Objection 1. If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (6, 4). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory election is implied. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, quando voluntas eligentis provocatur ad eligendum a bono in re praeexistente, tunc oportet quod electio sit eorum quae sunt; sicut accidit in electione nostra. Sed in Deo est aliter, ut dictum est. Et ideo, sicut dicit Augustinus, eliguntur a Deo qui non sunt, neque tamen errat qui eligit. | Reply to Objection 2. When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above (20, 2). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His choice." |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri antecedenter, quod non est simpliciter velle, sed secundum quid, non autem consequenter, quod est simpliciter velle. | Reply to Objection 3. God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will simply. |
IЄ q. 23 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praescientia meritorum sit causa praedestinationis. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VIII, quos praescivit, hos et praedestinavit. Et Glossa Ambrosii, super illud Rom. IX, miserebor cui miserebor etc., dicit, misericordiam illi dabo, quem praescio toto corde reversurum ad me. Ergo videtur quod praescientia meritorum sit causa praedestinationis. |
Objection 1. It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says (Romans 8:29): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on Rm. 9:15: "I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says: "I will give mercy to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his whole heart." Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, praedestinatio divina includit divinam voluntatem, quae irrationabilis esse non potest, cum praedestinatio sit propositum miserendi, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed nulla alia ratio potest esse praedestinationis nisi praescientia meritorum. Ergo praescientia meritorum est causa vel ratio praedestinationis. | Objection 2. Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is "the purpose to have mercy," as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17). But there can be no other reason for predestination than the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, non est iniquitas apud Deum, ut dicitur Rom. IX. Iniquum autem esse videtur, ut aequalibus inaequalia dentur. Omnes autem homines sunt aequales et secundum naturam, et secundum peccatum originale, attenditur autem in eis inaequalitas secundum merita vel demerita propriorum actuum. Non igitur inaequalia praeparat Deus hominibus, praedestinando et reprobando, nisi propter differentium meritorum praescientiam. | Objection 3. Further, "There is no injustice in God" (Romans 9:14). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit apostolus, ad Tit. III, non ex operibus iustitiae, quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit. Sicut autem salvos nos fecit, ita et praedestinavit nos salvos fieri. Non ergo praescientia meritorum est causa vel ratio praedestinationis. | On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:5): "Not by works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us." But as He saved us, so He predestined that we should be saved. Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum praedestinatio includat voluntatem, ut supra dictum est, sic inquirenda est ratio praedestinationis, sicut inquiritur ratio divinae voluntatis. Dictum est autem supra quod non est assignare causam divinae voluntatis ex parte actus volendi; sed potest assignari ratio ex parte volitorum, inquantum scilicet Deus vult esse aliquid propter aliud. Nullus ergo fuit ita insanae mentis, qui diceret merita esse causam divinae praedestinationis, ex parte actus praedestinantis. Sed hoc sub quaestione vertitur, utrum ex parte effectus, praedestinatio habeat aliquam causam. Et hoc est quaerere, utrum Deus praeordinaverit se daturum effectum praedestinationis alicui, propter merita aliqua. Fuerunt igitur quidam, qui dixerunt quod effectus praedestinationis praeordinatur alicui propter merita praeexistentia in alia vita. Et haec fuit positio Origenis, qui posuit animas humanas ab initio creatas, et secundum diversitatem suorum operum, diversos status eas sortiri in hoc mundo corporibus unitas. Sed hanc opinionem excludit apostolus, Rom. IX, dicens, cum nondum nati fuissent, aut aliquid egissent boni vel mali, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est, quia maior serviet minori. Fuerunt ergo alii, qui dixerunt quod merita praeexistentia in hac vita sunt ratio et causa effectus praedestinationis. Posuerunt enim Pelagiani quod initium benefaciendi sit ex nobis, consummatio autem a Deo. Et sic, ex hoc contingit quod alicui datur praedestinationis effectus, et non alteri, quia unus initium dedit se praeparando, et non alius. Sed contra hoc est quod dicit apostolus, II Cor. III, quod non sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis. Nullum autem anterius principium inveniri potest quam cogitatio. Unde non potest dici quod aliquod in nobis initium existat, quod sit ratio effectus praedestinationis. Unde fuerunt alii, qui dixerunt quod merita sequentia praedestinationis effectum, sunt ratio praedestinationis, ut intelligatur quod ideo Deus dat gratiam alicui, et praeordinavit se ei daturum, quia praescivit eum bene usurum gratia; sicut si rex det alicui militi equum, quem scit eo bene usurum. Sed isti videntur distinxisse inter id quod est ex gratia, et id quod est ex libero arbitrio, quasi non possit esse idem ex utroque. Manifestum est autem quod id quod est gratiae, est praedestinationis effectus, et hoc non potest poni ut ratio praedestinationis, cum hoc sub praedestinatione concludatur. Si igitur aliquid aliud ex parte nostra sit ratio praedestinationis, hoc erit praeter effectum praedestinationis. Non est autem distinctum quod est ex libero arbitrio, et ex praedestinatione; sicut nec est distinctum quod est ex causa secunda, et causa prima, divina enim providentia producit effectus per operationes causarum secundarum, ut supra dictum est. Unde et id quod est per liberum arbitrium, est ex praedestinatione. Dicendum est ergo quod effectum praedestinationis considerare possumus dupliciter. Uno modo, in particulari. Et sic nihil prohibet aliquem effectum praedestinationis esse causam et rationem alterius, posteriorem quidem prioris, secundum rationem causae finalis; priorem vero posterioris, secundum rationem causae meritoriae, quae reducitur ad dispositionem materiae. Sicut si dicamus quod Deus praeordinavit se daturum alicui gloriam ex meritis; et quod praeordinavit se daturum alicui gratiam, ut mereretur gloriam. Alio modo potest considerari praedestinationis effectus in communi. Et sic impossibile est quod totus praedestinationis effectus in communi habeat aliquam causam ex parte nostra. Quia quidquid est in homine ordinans ipsum in salutem, comprehenditur totum sub effectu praedestinationis, etiam ipsa praeparatio ad gratiam, neque enim hoc fit nisi per auxilium divinum, secundum illud Thren. ultimi, converte nos, domine, ad te, et convertemur. Habet tamen hoc modo praedestinatio, ex parte effectus, pro ratione divinam bonitatem; ad quam totus effectus praedestinationis ordinatur ut in finem, et ex qua procedit sicut ex principio primo movente. | I answer that, Since predestination includes will, as was said above (4), the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above (19, 5), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else. Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits. Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says (Romans 9:11-12): "For when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall serve the younger." Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummaion from God: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle (2 Corinthians 3:5), that "we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination. And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was above shown (22, 3). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light--in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to the prophet Jeremias (Lamentations 5:21): "convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod usus gratiae praescitus, non est ratio collationis gratiae, nisi secundum rationem causae finalis, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1. The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was explained above. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod praedestinatio habet rationem ex parte effectus, in communi, ipsam divinam bonitatem. In particulari autem, unus effectus est ratio alterius, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2. Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already stated. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ex ipsa bonitate divina ratio sumi potest praedestinationis aliquorum, et reprobationis aliorum. Sic enim Deus dicitur omnia propter suam bonitatem fecisse, ut in rebus divina bonitas repraesentetur. Necesse est autem quod divina bonitas, quae in se est una et simplex, multiformiter repraesentetur in rebus; propter hoc quod res creatae ad simplicitatem divinam attingere non possunt. Et inde est quod ad completionem universi requiruntur diversi gradus rerum, quarum quaedam altum, et quaedam infimum locum teneant in universo. Et ut multiformitas graduum conservetur in rebus, Deus permittit aliqua mala fieri, ne multa bona impediantur, ut supra dictum est. Sic igitur consideremus totum genus humanum, sicut totam rerum universitatem. Voluit igitur Deus in hominibus, quantum ad aliquos, quos praedestinat, suam repraesentare bonitatem per modum misericordiae, parcendo; et quantum ad aliquos, quos reprobat, per modum iustitiae, puniendo. Et haec est ratio quare Deus quosdam eligit, et quosdam reprobat. Et hanc causam assignat apostolus, ad Rom. IX, dicens, volens Deus ostendere iram (idest vindictam iustitiae), et notam facere potentiam suam, sustinuit (idest permisit) in multa patientia, vasa irae apta in interitum, ut ostenderet divitias gloriae suae in vasa misericordiae, quae praeparavit in gloriam. Et II Tim. II dicit, in magna autem domo non solum sunt vasa aurea et argentea, sed etiam lignea et fictilia; et quaedam quidem in honorem, quaedam in contumeliam. Sed quare hos elegit in gloriam, et illos reprobavit, non habet rationem nisi divinam voluntatem. Unde Augustinus dicit, super Ioannem, quare hunc trahat, et illum non trahat, noli velle diiudicare, si non vis errare. Sicut etiam in rebus naturalibus potest assignari ratio, cum prima materia tota sit in se uniformis, quare una pars eius est sub forma ignis, et alia sub forma terrae, a Deo in principio condita, ut scilicet sit diversitas specierum in rebus naturalibus. Sed quare haec pars materiae est sub ista forma, et illa sub alia, dependet ex simplici divina voluntate. Sicut ex simplici voluntate artificis dependet, quod ille lapis est in ista parte parietis, et ille in alia, quamvis ratio artis habeat quod aliqui sint in hac, et aliqui sint in illa. Neque tamen propter hoc est iniquitas apud Deum, si inaequalia non inaequalibus praeparat. Hoc enim esset contra iustitiae rationem, si praedestinationis effectus ex debito redderetur, et non daretur ex gratia. In his enim quae ex gratia dantur, potest aliquis pro libito suo dare cui vult, plus vel minus, dummodo nulli subtrahat debitum, absque praeiudicio iustitiae. Et hoc est quod dicit paterfamilias, Matt. XX, tolle quod tuum est, et vade. An non licet mihi quod volo, facere? | Reply to Objection 3. The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (22, 2). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (Romans 9:22-23): "What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (2 Timothy 2:20): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err." Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" (Matthew 20:14,15). |
IЄ q. 23 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinatio non sit certa. Quia super illud Apoc. III, tene quod habes, ne alius accipiat coronam tuam, dicit Augustinus, quod alius non est accepturus, nisi iste perdiderit. Potest ergo et acquiri et perdi corona, quae est praedestinationis effectus. Non est igitur praedestinatio certa. |
Objection 1. It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown," (Apocalypse 3:11), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another will not receive, unless this one were to lose it." Hence the crown which is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore predestination cannot be certain. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, posito possibili, nullum sequitur impossibile. Possibile est autem aliquem praedestinatum, ut Petrum, peccare, et tunc occidi. Hoc autem posito, sequitur praedestinationis effectum frustrari. Hoc igitur non est impossibile. Non ergo est praedestinatio certa. | Objection 2. Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible follows. But it is possible that one predestined--e.g. Peter--may sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, is not impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, quidquid Deus potuit, potest. Sed potuit non praedestinare quem praedestinavit. Ergo nunc potest non praedestinare. Ergo praedestinatio non est certa. | Objection 3. Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod super illud Rom. VIII, quos praescivit, et praedestinavit etc., dicit Glossa, praedestinatio est praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, qua certissime liberantur quicumque liberantur. | On the contrary, A gloss on Rm. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be freed." |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod praedestinatio certissime et infallibiliter consequitur suum effectum, nec tamen imponit necessitatem, ut scilicet effectus eius ex necessitate proveniat. Dictum est enim supra quod praedestinatio est pars providentiae. Sed non omnia quae providentiae subduntur, necessaria sunt, sed quaedam contingenter eveniunt, secundum conditionem causarum proximarum, quas ad tales effectus divina providentia ordinavit. Et tamen providentiae ordo est infallibilis, ut supra ostensum est. Sic igitur et ordo praedestinationis est certus; et tamen libertas arbitrii non tollitur, ex qua contingenter provenit praedestinationis effectus. Ad hoc etiam consideranda sunt quae supra dicta sunt de divina scientia et de divina voluntate, quae contingentiam a rebus non tollunt, licet certissima et infallibilia sint. | I answer that, Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect should take place from necessity. For it was said above (1), that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above (22, 4). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will (14, 13; 19, 4) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are most certain and infallible. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corona dicitur esse alicuius, dupliciter. Uno modo, ex praedestinatione divina, et sic nullus coronam suam amittit. Alio modo, ex merito gratiae, quod enim meremur, quodammodo nostrum est. Et sic suam coronam aliquis amittere potest per peccatum mortale sequens. Alius autem illam coronam amissam accipit, inquantum loco eius subrogatur. Non enim permittit Deus aliquos cadere, quin alios erigat, secundum illud Iob XXXIV, conteret multos et innumerabiles, et stare faciet alios pro eis. Sic enim in locum Angelorum cadentium substituti sunt homines; et in locum Iudaeorum, gentiles. Substitutus autem in statum gratiae, etiam quantum ad hoc coronam cadentis accipit, quod de bonis quae alius fecit, in aeterna vita gaudebit, in qua unusquisque gaudebit de bonis tam a se quam ab aliis factis. | Reply to Objection 1. The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his crown: secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to fall, without raising others; according to Job 34:24: "He shall break in pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of the fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by himself or by others. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet sit possibile eum qui est praedestinatus, mori in peccato mortali, secundum se consideratum; tamen hoc est impossibile, posito (prout scilicet ponitur) eum esse praedestinatum. Unde non sequitur quod praedestinatio falli possit. | Reply to Objection 2. Although it is possible for one who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible, supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall short of its effect. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum praedestinatio includat divinam voluntatem, sicut supra dictum est quod Deum velle aliquid creatum est necessarium ex suppositione, propter immutabilitatem divinae voluntatis, non tamen absolute; ita dicendum est hic de praedestinatione. Unde non oportet dicere quod Deus possit non praedestinare quem praedestinavit, in sensu composito accipiendo; licet, absolute considerando, Deus possit praedestinare vel non praedestinare. Sed ex hoc non tollitur praedestinationis certitudo. | Reply to Objection 3. Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above (4): and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, thought, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed. |
IЄ q. 23 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod numerus praedestinatorum non sit certus. Numerus enim cui potest fieri additio, non est certus. Sed numero praedestinatorum potest fieri additio, ut videtur, dicitur enim Deut. I, dominus Deus noster addat ad hunc numerum multa millia; Glossa, idest definitum apud Deum, qui novit qui sunt eius. Ergo numerus praedestinatorum non est certus. |
Objection 1. It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain. But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is written (Deuteronomy 1:11): "The Lord God adds to this number many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who belong to Him." Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, non potest assignari ratio quare magis in hoc numero quam in alio, Deus homines praeordinet ad salutem. Sed nihil a Deo sine ratione disponitur. Ergo non est certus numerus salvandorum praeordinatus a Deo. | Objection 2. Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained by God cannot be certain. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, operatio Dei est perfectior quam operatio naturae. Sed in operibus naturae bonum invenitur ut in pluribus, defectus autem et malum ut in paucioribus. Si igitur a Deo institueretur numerus salvandorum, plures essent salvandi quam damnandi. Cuius contrarium ostenditur Matt. VII, ubi dicitur, lata et spatiosa est via quae ducit ad perditionem, et multi sunt qui intrant per eam, angusta est porta, et arcta via, quae ducit ad vitam, et pauci sunt qui inveniunt eam. Non ergo est praeordinatus a Deo numerus salvandorum. | Objection 3. Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there would be more saved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from Mt. 7:13,14: "For wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!" Therefore the number of those pre-ordained by God to be saved is not certain. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de correptione et gratia, certus est praedestinatorum numerus, qui neque augeri potest, neque minui. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor diminished." |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod numerus praedestinatorum est certus. Sed quidam dixerunt eum esse certum formaliter, sed non materialiter, ut puta si diceremus certum esse quod centum vel mille salventur, non autem quod hi vel illi. Sed hoc tollit certitudinem praedestinationis, de qua iam diximus. Et ideo oportet dicere quod numerus praedestinatorum sit certus Deo non solum formaliter, sed etiam materialiter. Sed advertendum est quod numerus praedestinatorum certus Deo dicitur, non solum ratione cognitionis, quia scilicet scit quot sunt salvandi (sic enim Deo certus est etiam numerus guttarum pluviae, et arenae maris); sed ratione electionis et definitionis cuiusdam. Ad cuius evidentiam, est sciendum quod omne agens intendit facere aliquid finitum, ut ex supradictis de infinito apparet. Quicumque autem intendit aliquam determinatam mensuram in suo effectu, excogitat aliquem numerum in partibus essentialibus eius, quae per se requiruntur ad perfectionem totius. Non enim per se eligit aliquem numerum in his quae non principaliter requiruntur, sed solum propter aliud, sed in tanto numero accipit huiusmodi, inquantum sunt necessaria propter aliud. Sicut aedificator excogitat determinatam mensuram domus, et etiam determinatum numerum mansionum quas vult facere in domo, et determinatum numerum mensurarum parietis vel tecti, non autem eligit determinatum numerum lapidum, sed accipit tot, quot sufficiunt ad explendam tantam mensuram parietis. Sic igitur considerandum est in Deo, respectu totius universitatis quae est eius effectus. Praeordinavit enim in qua mensura deberet esse totum universum, et quis numerus esset conveniens essentialibus partibus universi, quae scilicet habent aliquo modo ordinem ad perpetuitatem; quot scilicet sphaerae, quot stellae, quot elementa, quot species rerum. Individua vero corruptibilia non ordinantur ad bonum universi quasi principaliter, sed quasi secundario, inquantum in eis salvatur bonum speciei. Unde, licet Deus sciat numerum omnium individuorum, non tamen numerus vel boum vel culicum, vel aliorum huiusmodi, est per se praeordinatus a Deo, sed tot ex huiusmodi divina providentia produxit, quot sufficiunt ad specierum conservationem. Inter omnes autem creaturas, principalius ordinantur ad bonum universi creaturae rationales, quae, inquantum huiusmodi, incorruptibiles sunt; et potissime illae quae beatitudinem consequuntur, quae immediatius attingunt ultimum finem. Unde certus est Deo numerus praedestinatorum, non solum per modum cognitionis, sed etiam per modum cuiusdam principalis praefinitionis. Non sic autem omnino est de numero reproborum; qui videntur esse praeordinati a Deo in bonum electorum, quibus omnia cooperantur in bonum. De numero autem omnium praedestinatorum hominum, quis sit, dicunt quidam quod tot ex hominibus salvabuntur, quot Angeli ceciderunt. Quidam vero, quod tot salvabuntur, quot Angeli remanserunt. Quidam vero, quod tot ex hominibus salvabuntur, quot Angeli ceciderunt, et insuper tot, quot fuerunt Angeli creati. Sed melius dicitur quod soli Deo est cognitus numerus electorum in superna felicitate locandus. | I answer that, The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys the certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above (6). Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It must, however, be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the infinite (7, 2, 3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally, but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number "per se"; but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we consider concerning God in regard to the whole universe, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the universe, and what number would befit the essential parts of that universe--that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity; how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption, are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the total number of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such like, is not pre-ordained by God "per se"; but divine providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe, being as such incorruptible; more especially those who attain to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate end. Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal pre-ordination. It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for the good of the elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (Romans 8:28). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that, "to God alone is known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness [From the 'secret' prayer of the missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis.']" |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum illud Deuteronomii est intelligendum de illis qui sunt praenotati a Deo respectu praesentis iustitiae. Horum enim numerus et augetur et minuitur, et non numerus praedestinatorum. | Reply to Objection 1. These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to present righteousness. For their number is increased and diminished, but not the number of the predestined. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio quantitatis alicuius partis, accipienda est ex proportione illius partis ad totum. Sic enim est apud Deum ratio quare tot stellas fecerit, vel tot rerum species, et quare tot praedestinavit, ex proportione partium principalium ad bonum universi. | Reply to Objection 2. The reason of the quantity of any one part must be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God the reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things, or predestined so many, is according to the proportion of the principal parts to the good of the whole universe. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum proportionatum communi statui naturae, accidit ut in pluribus; et defectus ab hoc bono, ut in paucioribus. Sed bonum quod excedit communem statum naturae, invenitur ut in paucioribus; et defectus ab hoc bono, ut in pluribus. Sicut patet quod plures homines sunt qui habent sufficientem scientiam ad regimen vitae suae, pauciores autem qui hac scientia carent, qui moriones vel stulti dicuntur, sed paucissimi sunt, respectu aliorum, qui attingunt ad habendam profundam scientiam intelligibilium rerum. Cum igitur beatitudo aeterna, in visione Dei consistens, excedat communem statum naturae, et praecipue secundum quod est gratia destituta per corruptionem originalis peccati, pauciores sunt qui salvantur. Et in hoc etiam maxime misericordia Dei apparet, quod aliquos in illam salutem erigit, a qua plurimi deficiunt secundum communem cursum et inclinationem naturae. | Reply to Objection 3. The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall short. |
IЄ q. 23 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinatio non possit iuvari precibus sanctorum. Nullum enim aeternum praeceditur ab aliquo temporali, et per consequens non potest temporale iuvare ad hoc quod aliquod aeternum sit. Sed praedestinatio est aeterna. Cum igitur preces sanctorum sint temporales, non possunt iuvare ad hoc quod aliquis praedestinetur. Non ergo praedestinatio iuvatur precibus sanctorum. |
Objection 1. It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination therefore is not furthered by the prayers of the saints. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut nihil indiget consilio nisi propter defectum cognitionis, ita nihil indiget auxilio nisi propter defectum virtutis. Sed neutrum horum competit Deo praedestinanti, unde dicitur Rom. XI, quis adiuvit spiritum domini? Aut quis consiliarius eius fuit? Ergo praedestinatio non iuvatur precibus sanctorum. | Objection 2. Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord? [Vulg.: 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?'] Or who hath been His counsellor?" (Romans 11:34). Therefore predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, eiusdem est adiuvari et impediri. Sed praedestinatio non potest aliquo impediri. Ergo non potest aliquo iuvari. | Objection 3. Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore it cannot be furthered by anything. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Genes. XXV, quod Isaac rogavit Deum pro Rebecca uxore sua, et dedit conceptum Rebeccae. Ex illo autem conceptu natus est Iacob, qui praedestinatus fuit. Non autem fuisset impleta praedestinatio, si natus non fuisset. Ergo praedestinatio iuvatur precibus sanctorum. | On the contrary, It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive" (Genesis 25:21). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hanc quaestionem diversi errores fuerunt. Quidam enim, attendentes certitudinem divinae praedestinationis, dixerunt superfluas esse orationes, vel quidquid aliud fiat ad salutem aeternam consequendam, quia his factis vel non factis, praedestinati consequuntur, reprobati non consequuntur. Sed contra hoc sunt omnes admonitiones sacrae Scripturae, exhortantes ad orationem, et ad alia bona opera. Alii vero dixerunt quod per orationes mutatur divina praedestinatio. Et haec dicitur fuisse opinio Aegyptiorum, qui ponebant ordinationem divinam, quam fatum appellabant, aliquibus sacrificiis et orationibus impediri posse. Sed contra hoc etiam est auctoritas sacrae Scripturae. Dicitur enim I Reg. XV, porro triumphator in Israel non parcet, neque poenitudine flectetur. Et Rom. XI dicitur quod sine poenitentia sunt dona Dei et vocatio. Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod in praedestinatione duo sunt consideranda, scilicet ipsa praeordinatio divina, et effectus eius. Quantum igitur ad primum, nullo modo praedestinatio iuvatur precibus sanctorum, non enim precibus sanctorum fit, quod aliquis praedestinetur a Deo. Quantum vero ad secundum, dicitur praedestinatio iuvari precibus sanctorum, et aliis bonis operibus, quia providentia, cuius praedestinatio est pars, non subtrahit causas secundas, sed sic providet effectus, ut etiam ordo causarum secundarum subiaceat providentiae. Sicut igitur sic providentur naturales effectus, ut etiam causae naturales ad illos naturales effectus ordinentur, sine quibus illi effectus non provenirent; ita praedestinatur a Deo salus alicuius, ut etiam sub ordine praedestinationis cadat quidquid hominem promovet in salutem, vel orationes propriae, vel aliorum, vel alia bona, vel quidquid huiusmodi, sine quibus aliquis salutem non consequitur. Unde praedestinatis conandum est ad bene operandum et orandum, quia per huiusmodi praedestinationis effectus certitudinaliter impletur. Propter quod dicitur II Petr. I, satagite, ut per bona opera certam vestram vocationem et electionem faciatis. | I answer that, Concerning this question, there were different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works. Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, who thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved to repentance" (1 Samuel 15:29); and that "the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance" (Romans 11:29). Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered--namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence. So, as natural effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about those natural effects, without which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those of another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must strive after good works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said: "Labor more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election" (2 Peter 1:10). |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa ostendit quod praedestinatio non iuvatur precibus sanctorum, quantum ad ipsam praeordinationem. | Reply to Objection 1. This argument shows that predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquis dicitur adiuvari per alium, dupliciter. Uno modo, inquantum ab eo accipit virtutem, et sic adiuvari infirmi est, unde Deo non competit. Et sic intelligitur illud, quis adiuvit spiritum domini? Alio modo dicitur quis adiuvari per aliquem, per quem exequitur suam operationem, sicut dominus per ministrum. Et hoc modo Deus adiuvatur per nos, inquantum exequimur suam ordinationem, secundum illud I ad Cor. III, Dei enim adiutores sumus. Neque hoc est propter defectum divinae virtutis, sed quia utitur causis mediis, ut ordinis pulchritudo servetur in rebus, et ut etiam creaturis dignitatem causalitatis communicet. | Reply to Objection 2. One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?" In another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. 3:9: "We are God's co-adjutors." Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality. |
| IЄ q. 23 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod secundae causae non possunt egredi ordinem causae primae universalis, ut supra dictum est; sed ipsum exequuntur. Et ideo praedestinatio per creaturas potest adiuvari, sed non impediri. | Reply to Objection 3. Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said above (19, 6), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them. |
| IЄ q. 24 pr. Deinde considerandum est de libro vitae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, quid sit liber vitae. Secundo, cuius vitae sit liber. Tertio, utrum aliquis possit deleri de libro vitae. | |
IЄ q. 24 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liber vitae non sit idem quod praedestinatio. Dicitur enim Eccli. XXIV, haec omnia liber vitae; Glossa, idest novum et vetus testamentum. Hoc autem non est praedestinatio. Ergo liber vitae non est idem quod praedestinatio. |
Objection 1. It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as pre-destination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life" (Sirach 4:32)--i.e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss. This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life is not predestination. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus, in libro XX de Civ. Dei, ait quod liber vitae est quaedam vis divina, qua fiet ut cuique opera sua bona vel mala in memoriam reducantur. Sed vis divina non videtur pertinere ad praedestinationem, sed magis ad attributum potentiae. Ergo liber vitae non est idem quod praedestinatio. | Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the book of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that to each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory." But divine energy belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but rather to divine power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predestination. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, praedestinationi opponitur reprobatio. Si igitur liber vitae esset praedestinatio, inveniretur liber mortis, sicut liber vitae. | Objection 3. Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if the book of life were the same as predestination, there should also be a book of death, as there is a book of life. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Glossa, super illud Psalmi LXVIII, deleantur de libro viventium, liber iste est notitia Dei, qua praedestinavit ad vitam, quos praescivit. | On the contrary, It is said in a gloss upon Ps. 68:29, "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of God, by which He hath predestined to life those whom He foreknew." |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod liber vitae in Deo dicitur metaphorice, secundum similitudinem a rebus humanis acceptam. Est enim consuetum apud homines, quod illi qui ad aliquid eliguntur, conscribuntur in libro; utpote milites vel consiliarii, qui olim dicebantur patres conscripti. Patet autem ex praemissis quod omnes praedestinati eliguntur a Deo ad habendum vitam aeternam. Ipsa ergo praedestinatorum conscriptio dicitur liber vitae. Dicitur autem metaphorice aliquid conscriptum in intellectu alicuius, quod firmiter in memoria tenet, secundum illud Prov. III, ne obliviscaris legis meae, et praecepta mea cor tuum custodiat; et post pauca sequitur, describe illa in tabulis cordis tui. Nam et in libris materialibus aliquid conscribitur ad succurrendum memoriae. Unde ipsa Dei notitia, qua firmiter retinet se aliquos praedestinasse ad vitam aeternam, dicitur liber vitae. Nam sicut Scriptura libri est signum eorum quae fienda sunt ita Dei notitia est quoddam signum apud ipsum, eorum qui sunt perducendi ad vitam aeternam; secundum illud II Tim. II, firmum fundamentum Dei stat, habens signaculum hoc, novit dominus qui sunt eius. | I answer that, The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual among men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding (23, 4) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore, of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory, according to Prov. 3:3: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart." For things are written down in material books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that He has predestined some to eternal life, is called the book of life. For as the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to be brought to eternal life, according to 2 Tim. 11:19: "The sure foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His." |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod liber vitae potest dici dupliciter. Uno modo, conscriptio eorum qui sunt electi ad vitam, et sic loquimur nunc de libro vitae. Alio modo potest dici liber vitae, conscriptio eorum quae ducunt in vitam. Et hoc dupliciter. Vel sicut agendorum, et sic novum et vetus testamentum dicitur liber vitae. Vel sicut iam factorum, et sic illa vis divina, qua fiet ut cuilibet in memoriam reducantur facta sua, dicitur liber vitae. Sicut etiam liber militiae potest dici, vel in quo scribuntur electi ad militiam, vel in quo traditur ars militaris, vel in quo recitantur facta militum. | Reply to Objection 1. The book of life may be understood in two senses. In one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus we now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of those things which lead us to life may be called the book of life; and this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old and New Testament are called a book of life; or of things already done, and thus that divine energy by which it happens that to each one his deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life. Thus that also may be called the book of war, whether it contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the art of warfare, or relates the deeds of soldiers. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 1 ad 2 Unde patet solutio ad secundum. | Reply to Objection 2. Hence the solution of the Second Objection. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non est consuetum conscribi eos qui repudiantur, sed eos qui eliguntur. Unde reprobationi non respondet liber mortis, sicut praedestinationi liber vitae. | Reply to Objection 3. It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death corresponding to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod secundum rationem differt liber vitae a praedestinatione. Importat enim notitiam praedestinationis, sicut etiam ex Glossa inducta apparet. | Reply to Objection 4. Predestination and the book of life are different aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of predestination; as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above. |
IЄ q. 24 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liber vitae non sit solum respectu vitae gloriae praedestinatorum. Liber enim vitae est notitia vitae. Sed Deus per vitam suam cognoscit omnem aliam vitam. Ergo liber vitae praecipue dicitur respectu vitae divinae; et non solum respectu vitae praedestinatorum. |
Objection 1. It seems that the book of life does not only regard the life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine life; and not only in regard to the life of the predestined. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut vita gloriae est a Deo, ita vita naturae. Si igitur notitia vitae gloriae dicitur liber vitae, etiam notitia vitae naturae dicetur liber vitae. | Objection 2. Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory is called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of nature be so called. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, aliqui eliguntur ad gratiam, qui non eliguntur ad vitam gloriae; ut patet per id quod dicitur Ioan. VI, nonne duodecim vos elegi, et unus ex vobis Diabolus est? Sed liber vitae est conscriptio electionis divinae, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam est respectu vitae gratiae. | Objection 3. Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said: "Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" (John 6:71). But the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated above (1). Therefore it applies also to the life of grace. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod liber vitae est notitia praedestinationis, ut dictum est. Sed praedestinatio non respicit vitam gratiae, nisi secundum quod ordinatur ad gloriam, non enim sunt praedestinati, qui habent gratiam et deficiunt a gloria. Liber igitur vitae non dicitur nisi respectu gloriae. | On the contrary, The book of life is the knowledge of predestination, as stated above (1). But predestination does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are not predestined who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod liber vitae, ut dictum est, importat conscriptionem quandam sive notitiam electorum ad vitam. Eligitur autem aliquis ad id quod non competit sibi secundum suam naturam. Et iterum, id ad quod eligitur aliquis, habet rationem finis, non enim miles eligitur aut conscribitur ad hoc quod armetur, sed ad hoc quod pugnet; hoc enim est proprium officium ad quod militia ordinatur. Finis autem supra naturam existens, est vita gloriae, ut supra dictum est. Unde proprie liber vitae respicit vitam gloriae. | I answer that, The book of life, as stated above (1), implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not belong to him by nature; and again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor, but to fight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the life of glory is an end exceeding human nature, as said above (23, 1). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vita divina, etiam prout est vita gloriosa, est Deo naturalis. Unde respectu eius non est electio, et per consequens neque liber vitae. Non enim dicimus quod aliquis homo eligatur ad habendum sensum, vel aliquid eorum quae consequuntur naturam. | Reply to Objection 1. The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things that are consequent on nature. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 2 ad 2 Unde per hoc etiam patet solutio ad secundum. Respectu enim vitae naturalis non est electio, neque liber vitae. | From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no election, nor a book of life, as regards the life of nature. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod vita gratiae non habet rationem finis, sed rationem eius quod est ad finem. Unde ad vitam gratiae non dicitur aliquis eligi, nisi inquantum vita gratiae ordinatur ad gloriam. Et propter hoc, illi qui habent gratiam et excidunt a gloria, non dicuntur esse electi simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et similiter non dicuntur esse scripti simpliciter in libro vitae sed secundum quid; prout scilicet de eis in ordinatione et notitia divina existit, quod sint habituri aliquem ordinem ad vitam aeternam, secundum participationem gratiae. | Reply to Objection 3. The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end, but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, fail to obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise they are not said to be written in the book of life simply, but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life, according to their participation in grace. |
IЄ q. 24 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus deleatur de libro vitae. Dicit enim Augustinus, in XX de Civ. Dei, quod praescientia Dei, quae non potest falli, liber vitae est. Sed a praescientia Dei non potest aliquid subtrahi, similiter neque a praedestinatione. Ergo nec de libro vitae potest aliquis deleri. |
Objection 1. It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge, which cannot be deceived, is the book of life." But nothing can be taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination. Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, quidquid est in aliquo, est in eo per modum eius in quo est. Sed liber vitae est quid aeternum et immutabile. Ergo quidquid est in eo, est ibi non temporaliter, sed immobiliter et indelebiliter. | Objection 2. Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, deletio Scripturae opponitur. Sed aliquis non potest de novo scribi in libro vitae. Ergo neque inde deleri potest. | Objection 3. Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither therefore can he be blotted out. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo LXVIII, deleantur de libro viventium. | On the contrary, It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book of the living" (Psalm 68:29). |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod de libro vitae nullus potest deleri secundum rei veritatem, potest tamen aliquis deleri secundum opinionem hominum. Est enim consuetum in Scripturis ut aliquid dicatur fieri, quando innotescit. Et secundum hoc, aliqui dicuntur esse scripti in libro vitae, inquantum homines opinantur eos ibi scriptos, propter praesentem iustitiam quam in eis vident. Sed quando apparet, vel in hoc seculo vel in futuro, quod ab hac iustitia exciderunt, dicuntur inde deleri. Et sic etiam exponitur in Glossa deletio talis, super illud Psalmi LXVIII, deleantur de libro viventium. Sed quia non deleri de libro vitae ponitur inter praemia iustorum, secundum illud Apoc. III, qui vicerit, sic vestietur vestimentis albis, et non delebo nomen eius de libro vitae; quod autem sanctis repromittitur, non est solum in hominum opinione; potest dici quod deleri vel non deleri de libro vitae, non solum ad opinionem hominum referendum est, sed etiam quantum ad rem. Est enim liber vitae conscriptio ordinatorum in vitam aeternam. Ad quam ordinatur aliquis ex duobus, scilicet ex praedestinatione divina, et haec ordinatio nunquam deficit; et ex gratia. Quicumque enim gratiam habet, ex hoc ipso est dignus vita aeterna. Et haec ordinatio deficit interdum, quia aliqui ordinati sunt ex gratia habita ad habendum vitam aeternam, a qua tamen deficiunt per peccatum mortale. Illi igitur qui sunt ordinati ad habendum vitam aeternam ex praedestinatione divina, sunt simpliciter scripti in libro vitae, quia sunt ibi scripti ut habituri vitam aeternam in seipsa. Et isti nunquam delentur de libro vitae. Sed illi qui sunt ordinati ad habendum vitam aeternam, non ex praedestinatione divina, sed solum ex gratia, dicuntur esse scripti in libro vitae, non simpliciter, sed secundum quid, quia sunt ibi scripti ut habituri vitam aeternam, non in seipsa, sed in sua causa. Et tales possunt deleri de libro vitae, ut deletio non referatur ad notitiam Dei, quasi Deus aliquid praesciat, et postea nesciat; sed ad rem scitam, quia scilicet Deus scit aliquem prius ordinari in vitam aeternam, et postea non ordinari, cum deficit a gratia. | I answer that, Some have said that none could be blotted out of the book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in the book of life, inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the present righteousness they see in them; but when it becomes evident, either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from that state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus a gloss explains the passage: "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living." But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is placed among the rewards of the just, according to the text, "He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot his name out of the book of life" (Apocalypse 3:5) (and what is promised to holy men, is not merely something in the opinion of men), it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out, of the book of life is not only to be referred to the opinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription of those ordained to eternal life, to which one is directed from two sources; namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and from grace; for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because some are directed by possessing grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin. Therefore those who are ordained to possess eternal life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life simply, because they are written therein to have eternal life in reality; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those, however, who are ordained to eternal life, not through divine predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book of life not simply, but relatively, for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though these latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first ordained to eternal life, and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod deletio, ut dictum est, non refertur ad librum vitae ex parte praescientiae, quasi in Deo sit aliqua mutabilitas, sed ex parte praescitorum, quae sunt mutabilia. | Reply to Objection 1. The act of blotting out does not refer to the book of life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were any change; but as regards things foreknown, which can change. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet res in Deo sint immutabiliter, tamen in seipsis mutabiles sunt. Et ad hoc pertinet deletio libri vitae. | Reply to Objection 2. Although things are immutably in God, yet in themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting out of the book of life refers. |
| IЄ q. 24 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod eo modo quo aliquis dicitur deleri de libro vitae, potest dici quod ibi scribatur de novo; vel secundum opinionem hominum, vel secundum quod de novo incipit habere ordinem ad vitam aeternam per gratiam. Quod etiam sub divina notitia comprehenditur, licet non de novo. | Reply to Objection 3. The way in which one is said to be blotted out of the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew; either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is included in the knowledge of God, although not anew. |
