Directory:Logic Museum/Aquinas Summa-I-77-79

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE – QUESTIONS LXXVII - LXXIX

Question 77a1
Question 77a2
Question 77a3
Question 77a4
Question 77a5
Question 77a6
Question 77a7
Question 77a8
Question 78a1
Question 78a2
Question 78a3
Question 78a4
Question 79a1
Question 79a10
Question 79a11
Question 79a12
Question 79a13
Question 79a2
Question 79a3
Question 79a4
Question 79a5
Question 79a6
Question 79a7
Question 79a8
Question 79a9

Latin	English
Iª q. 77 pr. Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad potentias animae. Et primo, in generali; secundo, in speciali. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum essentia animae sit eius potentia. Secundo, utrum sit una tantum potentia animae, vel plures. Tertio, quomodo potentiae animae distinguantur. Quarto, de ordine ipsarum ad invicem. Quinto, utrum anima sit subiectum omnium potentiarum. Sexto, utrum potentiae fluant ab essentia animae. Septimo, utrum potentia una oriatur ex alia. Octavo, utrum omnes potentiae animae remaneant in ea post mortem.
Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ipsa essentia animae sit eius potentia. Dicit enim Augustinus, in IX de Trin., quod mens, notitia et amor sunt substantialiter in anima, vel, ut idem dicam, essentialiter. Et in X dicit quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una vita, una mens, una essentia.	Objection 1. It would seem that the essence of the soul is its power. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4), that "mind, knowledge, and love are in the soul substantially, or, which is the same thing, essentially": and (De Trin. x, 11), that "memory, understanding, and will are one life, one mind, one essence."
Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, anima est nobilior quam materia prima. Sed materia prima est sua potentia. Ergo multo magis anima.	Objection 2. Further, the soul is nobler than primary matter. But primary matter is its own potentiality. Much more therefore is the soul its own power.
Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, forma substantialis est simplicior quam accidentalis, cuius signum est, quod forma substantialis non intenditur vel remittitur, sed in indivisibili consistit. Forma autem accidentalis est ipsa sua virtus. Ergo multo magis forma substantialis, quae est anima.	Objection 3. Further, the substantial form is simpler than the accidental form; a sign of which is that the substantial form is not intensified or relaxed, but is indivisible. But the accidental form is its own power. Much more therefore is that substantial form which is the soul.
Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, potentia sensitiva est qua sentimus, et potentia intellectiva qua intelligimus. Sed id quo primo sentimus et intelligimus est anima, secundum philosophum, in II de anima. Ergo anima est suae potentiae.	Objection 4. Further, we sense by the sensitive power and we understand by the intellectual power. But "that by which we first sense and understand" is the soul, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2). Therefore the soul is its own power.
Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 5 Praeterea, omne quod non est de essentia rei, est accidens. Si ergo potentia animae est praeter essentiam eius, sequitur quod sit accidens. Quod est contra Augustinum, in IX de Trin., ubi dicit quod praedicta non sunt in anima sicut in subiecto, ut color aut figura in corpore, aut ulla alia qualitas aut quantitas, quidquid enim tale est, non excedit subiectum in quo est; mens autem potest etiam alia amare et cognoscere.	Objection 5. Further, whatever does not belong to the essence is an accident. Therefore if the power of the soul is something else besides the essence thereof, it is an accident, which is contrary to Augustine, who says that the foregoing (see Objection 1) "are not in the soul as in a subject as color or shape, or any other quality, or quantity, are in a body; for whatever is so, does not exceed the subject in which it is: Whereas the mind can love and know other things" (De Trin. ix, 4).
Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 6 Praeterea, forma simplex subiectum esse non potest. Anima autem est forma simplex, cum non sit composita ex materia et forma, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo potentia animae potest esse in ipsa sicut in subiecto.	Objection 6. Further, " a simple form cannot be a subject." But the soul is a simple form; since it is not composed of matter and form, as we have said above (75, 5). Therefore the power of the soul cannot be in it as in a subject.
Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 7 Praeterea, accidens non est principium substantialis differentiae. Sed sensibile et rationale sunt substantiales differentiae, et sumuntur a sensu et ratione, quae sunt potentiae animae. Ergo potentiae animae non sunt accidentia. Et ita videtur quod potentia animae sit eius essentia.	Objection 7. Further, an accident is not the principle of a substantial difference. But sensitive and rational are substantial differences; and they are taken from sense and reason, which are powers of the soul. Therefore the powers of the soul are not accidents; and so it would seem that the power of the soul is its own essence.
Iª q. 77 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, XI cap. Caelest. Hier., quod caelestes spiritus dividuntur in essentiam, virtutem et operationem. Multo igitur magis in anima aliud est essentia, et aliud virtus sive potentia.	On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi) says that "heavenly spirits are divided into essence, power, and operation." Much more, then, in the soul is the essence distinct from the virtue or power.
Iª q. 77 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est dicere quod essentia animae sit eius potentia; licet hoc quidam posuerint. Et hoc dupliciter ostenditur, quantum ad praesens. Primo quia, cum potentia et actus dividant ens et quodlibet genus entis, oportet quod ad idem genus referatur potentia et actus. Et ideo, si actus non est in genere substantiae, potentia quae dicitur ad illum actum, non potest esse in genere substantiae. Operatio autem animae non est in genere substantiae; sed in solo Deo, cuius operatio est eius substantia. Unde Dei potentia, quae est operationis principium, est ipsa Dei essentia. Quod non potest esse verum neque in anima, neque in aliqua creatura; ut supra etiam de Angelo dictum est. Secundo, hoc etiam impossibile apparet in anima. Nam anima secundum suam essentiam est actus. Si ergo ipsa essentia animae esset immediatum operationis principium, semper habens animam actu haberet opera vitae; sicut semper habens animam actu est vivum. Non enim, inquantum est forma, est actus ordinatus ad ulteriorem actum, sed est ultimus terminus generationis. Unde quod sit in potentia adhuc ad alium actum, hoc non competit ei secundum suam essentiam, inquantum est forma; sed secundum suam potentiam. Et sic ipsa anima, secundum quod subest suae potentiae, dicitur actus primus, ordinatus ad actum secundum. Invenitur autem habens animam non semper esse in actu operum vitae. Unde etiam in definitione animae dicitur quod est actus corporis potentia vitam habentis, quae tamen potentia non abiicit animam. Relinquitur ergo quod essentia animae non est eius potentia. Nihil enim est in potentia secundum actum, inquantum est actus.	I answer that, It is impossible to admit that the power of the soul is its essence, although some have maintained it. For the present purpose this may be proved in two ways. First, because, since power and act divide being and every kind of being, we must refer a power and its act to the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the genus of substance, the power directed to that act cannot be in the genus of substance. Now the operation of the soul is not in the genus of substance; for this belongs to God alone, whose operation is His own substance. Wherefore the Divine power which is the principle of His operation is the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true either of the soul, or of any creature; as we have said above when speaking of the angels (54, 3). Secondly, this may be also shown to be impossible in the soul. For the soul by its very essence is an act. Therefore if the very essence of the soul were the immediate principle of operation, whatever has a soul would always have actual vital actions, as that which has a soul is always an actually living thing. For as a form the soul is not an act ordained to a further act, but the ultimate term of generation. Wherefore, for it to be in potentiality to another act, does not belong to it according to its essence, as a form, but according to its power. So the soul itself, as the subject of its power, is called the first act, with a further relation to the second act. Now we observe that what has a soul is not always actual with respect to its vital operations; whence also it is said in the definition of the soul, that it is "the act of a body having life potentially"; which potentiality, however, "does not exclude the soul." Therefore it follows that the essence of the soul is not its power. For nothing is in potentiality by reason of an act, as act.
Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de mente secundum quod noscit se et amat se. Sic ergo notitia et amor, inquantum referuntur ad ipsam ut cognitam et amatam, substantialiter vel essentialiter sunt in anima, quia ipsa substantia vel essentia animae cognoscitur et amatur. Et similiter intelligendum est quod alibi dicit, quod sunt una vita, una mens, una essentia. Vel, sicut quidam dicunt, haec locutio verificatur secundum modum quo totum potestativum praedicatur de suis partibus, quod medium est inter totum universale et totum integrale. Totum enim universale adest cuilibet parti secundum totam suam essentiam et virtutem, ut animal homini et equo, et ideo proprie de singulis partibus praedicatur. Totum vero integrale non est in qualibet parte, neque secundum totam essentiam, neque secundum totam virtutem. Et ideo nullo modo de singulis partibus praedicatur; sed aliquo modo, licet improprie, praedicatur de omnibus simul, ut si dicamus quod paries, tectum et fundamentum sunt domus. Totum vero potentiale adest singulis partibus secundum totam suam essentiam, sed non secundum totam virtutem. Et ideo quodammodo potest praedicari de qualibet parte; sed non ita proprie sicut totum universale. Et per hunc modum Augustinus dicit quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una animae essentia.	Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of the mind as it knows and loves itself. Thus knowledge and love as referred to the soul as known and loved, are substantially or essentially in the soul, for the very substance or essence of the soul is known and loved. In the same way are we to understand what he says in the other passage, that those things are "one life, one mind, one essence." Or, as some say, this passage is true in the sense in which the potential whole is predicated of its parts, being midway between the universal whole, and the integral whole. For the universal whole is in each part according to its entire essence and power; as animal in a man and in a horse; and therefore it is properly predicated of each part. But the integral whole is not in each part, neither according to its whole essence, nor according to its whole power. Therefore in no way can it be predicated of each part; yet in a way it is predicated, though improperly, of all the parts together; as if we were to say that the wall, roof, and foundations are a house. But the potential whole is in each part according to its whole essence, not, however, according to its whole power. Therefore in a way it can be predicated of each part, but not so properly as the universal whole. In this sense, Augustine says that the memory, understanding, and the will are the one essence of the soul.
Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod actus ad quem est in potentia materia prima, est substantialis forma. Et ideo potentia materiae non est aliud quam eius essentia.	Reply to Objection 2. The act to which primary matter is in potentiality is the substantial form. Therefore the potentiality of matter is nothing else but its essence.
Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod actio est compositi, sicut et esse, existentis enim est agere. Compositum autem per formam substantialem habet esse substantialiter; per virtutem autem quae consequitur formam substantialem, operatur. Unde sic se habet forma accidentalis activa ad formam substantialem agentis (ut calor ad formam ignis), sicut se habet potentia animae ad animam.	Reply to Objection 3. Action belongs to the composite, as does existence; for to act belongs to what exists. Now the composite has substantial existence through the substantial form; and it operates by the power which results from the substantial form. Hence an active accidental form is to the substantial form of the agent (for instance, heat compared to the form of fire) as the power of the soul is to the soul.
Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod forma accidentalis est actionis principium, habet a forma substantiali. Et ideo forma substantialis est primum actionis principium, sed non proximum. Et secundum hoc philosophus dicit quod id quo intelligimus et sentimus, est anima.	Reply to Objection 4. That the accidental form is a principle of action is due to the substantial form. Therefore the substantial form is the first principle of action; but not the proximate principle. In this sense the Philosopher says that "the soul is that whereby we understand and sense."
Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod, si accidens accipiatur secundum quod dividitur contra substantiam, sic nihil potest esse medium inter substantiam et accidens, quia dividuntur secundum affirmationem et negationem, scilicet secundum esse in subiecto et non esse in subiecto. Et hoc modo, cum potentia animae non sit eius essentia, oportet quod sit accidens, et est in secunda specie qualitatis. Si vero accipiatur accidens secundum quod ponitur unum quinque universalium, sic aliquid est medium inter substantiam et accidens. Quia ad substantiam pertinet quidquid est essentiale rei, non autem quidquid est extra essentiam, potest sic dici accidens, sed solum id quod non causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei. Proprium enim non est de essentia rei, sed ex principiis essentialibus speciei causatur, unde medium est inter essentiam et accidens sic dictum. Et hoc modo potentiae animae possunt dici mediae inter substantiam et accidens, quasi proprietates animae naturales. Quod autem Augustinus dicit, quod notitia et amor non sunt in anima sicut accidentia in subiecto, intelligitur secundum modum praedictum, prout comparantur ad animam, non sicut ad amantem et cognoscentem; sed prout comparantur ad eam sicut ad amatam et cognitam. Et hoc modo procedit sua probatio, quia si amor esset in anima amata sicut in subiecto, sequeretur quod accidens transcenderet suum subiectum; cum etiam alia sint amata per animam.	Reply to Objection 5. If we take accident as meaning what is divided against substance, then there can be no medium between substance and accident; because they are divided by affirmation and negation, that is, according to existence in a subject, and non-existence in a subject. In this sense, as the power of the soul is not its essence, it must be an accident; and it belongs to the second species of accident, that of quality. But if we take accident as one of the five universals, in this sense there is a medium between substance and accident. For the substance is all that belongs to the essence of a thing; whereas whatever is beyond the essence of a thing cannot be called accident in this sense; but only what is not caused by the essential principle of the species. For the 'proper' does not belong to the essence of a thing, but is caused by the essential principles of the species; wherefore it is a medium between the essence and accident thus understood. In this sense the powers of the soul may be said to be a medium between substance and accident, as being natural properties of the soul. When Augustine says that knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents in a subject, this must be understood in the sense given above, inasmuch as they are compared to the soul, not as loving and knowing, but as loved and known. His argument proceeds in this sense; for if love were in the soul loved as in a subject, it would follow that an accident transcends its subject, since even other things are loved through the soul.
Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod anima, licet non sit composita ex materia et forma, habet tamen aliquid de potentialitate admixtum ut supra dictum est. Et ideo potest esse subiectum accidentis. Propositio autem inducta locum habet in Deo, qui est actus purus, in qua materia Boetius eam introducit.	Reply to Objection 6. Although the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has an admixture of potentiality, as we have said above (75, 5, ad 4); and for this reason it can be the subject of an accident. The statement quoted is verified in God, Who is the Pure Act; in treating of which subject Boethius employs that phrase (De Trin. i).
Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 7 Ad septimum dicendum quod rationale et sensibile, prout sunt differentiae, non sumuntur a potentiis sensus et rationis; sed ab ipsa anima sensitiva et rationali. Quia tamen formae substantiales, quae secundum se sunt nobis ignotae, innotescunt per accidentia; nihil prohibet interdum accidentia loco differentiarum substantialium poni.	Reply to Objection 7. Rational and sensitive, as differences, are not taken from the powers of sense and reason, but from the sensitive and rational soul itself. But because substantial forms, which in themselves are unknown to us, are known by their accidents; nothing prevents us from sometimes substituting accidents for substantial differences.
Iª q. 77 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint plures potentiae animae. Anima enim intellectiva maxime ad divinam similitudinem accedit. Sed in Deo est una et simplex potentia. Ergo et in anima intellectiva.	Objection 1. It would seem that there are not several powers of the soul. For the intellectual soul approaches nearest to the likeness of God. But in God there is one simple power: and therefore also in the intellectual soul.
Iª q. 77 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, quanto virtus est superior, tanto est magis unita. Sed anima intellectiva excedit omnes alias formas in virtute. Ergo maxime debet habere unam virtutem seu potentiam.	Objection 2. Further, the higher a power is, the more unified it is. But the intellectual soul excels all other forms in power. Therefore above all others it has one virtue or power.
Iª q. 77 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, operari est existentis in actu. Sed per eandem essentiam animae homo habet esse secundum diversos gradus perfectionis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo per eandem potentiam animae operatur diversas operationes diversorum graduum.	Objection 3. Further, to operate belongs to what is in act. But by the one essence of the soul, man has actual existence in the different degrees of perfection, as we have seen above (76, 3,4). Therefore by the one power of the soul he performs operations of various degrees.
Iª q. 77 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II de anima ponit plures animae potentias.	On the contrary, The Philosopher places several powers in the soul (De Anima ii, 2,3).
Iª q. 77 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere plures animae potentias. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II de caelo, quae sunt in rebus infima, non possunt consequi perfectam bonitatem, sed aliquam imperfectam consequuntur paucis motibus; superiora vero his adipiscuntur perfectam bonitatem motibus multis; his autem superiora sunt quae adipiscuntur perfectam bonitatem motibus paucis; summa vero perfectio invenitur in his quae absque motu perfectam possident bonitatem. Sicut infime est ad sanitatem dispositus qui non potest perfectam consequi sanitatem, sed aliquam modicam consequitur paucis remediis; melius autem dispositus est qui potest perfectam consequi sanitatem, sed remediis multis; et adhuc melius, qui remediis paucis; optime autem, qui absque remedio perfectam sanitatem habet. Dicendum est ergo quod res quae sunt infra hominem, quaedam particularia bona consequuntur, et ideo quasdam paucas et determinatas operationes habent et virtutes. Homo autem potest consequi universalem et perfectam bonitatem, quia potest adipisci beatitudinem. Est tamen in ultimo gradu, secundum naturam, eorum quibus competit beatitudo, et ideo multis et diversis operationibus et virtutibus indiget anima humana. Angelis vero minor diversitas potentiarum competit. In Deo vero non est aliqua potentia vel actio, praeter eius essentiam. Est et alia ratio quare anima humana abundat diversitate potentiarum, videlicet quia est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum, et ideo concurrunt in ipsa virtutes utrarumque creaturarum.	I answer that, Of necessity we must place several powers in the soul. To make this evident, we observe that, as the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, 12), the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness, by few movements; and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect goodness by many movements; and those yet higher acquire perfect goodness by few movements; and the highest perfection is found in those things which acquire perfect goodness without any movement whatever. Thus he is least of all disposed of health, who can only acquire imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better disposed is he who can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies; and better still, he who can by few remedies; best of all is he who has perfect health without any remedies. We conclude, therefore, that things which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and so they have a few determinate operations and powers. But man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, according to his nature, of those to whom beatitude is possible; therefore the human soul requires many and various operations and powers. But to angels a smaller variety of powers is sufficient. In God there is no power or action beyond His own Essence. There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of powers--because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal creatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul.
Iª q. 77 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in hoc ipso magis ad similitudinem Dei accedit anima intellectiva quam creaturae inferiores, quod perfectam bonitatem consequi potest; licet per multa et diversa; in quo deficit a superioribus.	Reply to Objection 1. The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire perfect goodness; although by many and various means; and in this it falls short of more perfect creatures.
Iª q. 77 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus unita est superior, si ad aequalia se extendat. Sed virtus multiplicata est superior, si plura ei subiiciantur.	Reply to Objection 2. A unified power is superior if it extends to equal things: but a multiform power is superior to it, if it is over many things.
Iª q. 77 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod unius rei est unum esse substantiale, sed possunt esse operationes plures. Et ideo est una essentia animae, sed potentiae plures.	Reply to Objection 3. One thing has one substantial existence, but may have several operations. So there is one essence of the soul, with several powers.
Iª q. 77 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod potentiae non distinguantur per actus et obiecta. Nihil enim determinatur ad speciem per illud quod posterius, vel extrinsecum est. Actus autem est posterior potentia; obiectum autem est extrinsecum. Ergo per ea potentiae non distinguuntur secundum speciem.	Objection 1. It would seem that the powers of the soul are not distinguished by acts and objects. For nothing is determined to its species by what is subsequent and extrinsic to it. But the act is subsequent to the power; and the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore the soul's powers are not specifically distinct by acts and objects.
Iª q. 77 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, contraria sunt quae maxime differunt. Si igitur potentiae distinguerentur penes obiecta, sequeretur quod contrariorum non esset eadem potentia. Quod patet esse falsum fere in omnibus, nam potentia visiva eadem est albi et nigri, et gustus idem est dulcis et amari.	Objection 2. Further, contraries are what differ most from each other. Therefore if the powers are distinguished by their objects, it follows that the same power could not have contrary objects. This is clearly false in almost all the powers; for the power of vision extends to white and black, and the power to taste to sweet and bitter.
Iª q. 77 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, remota causa, removetur effectus. Si igitur potentiarum differentia esset ex differentia obiectorum, idem obiectum non pertineret ad diversas potentias. Quod patet esse falsum, nam idem est quod potentia cognoscitiva cognoscit, et appetitiva appetit.	Objection 3. Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. Hence if the difference of powers came from the difference of objects, the same object would not come under different powers. This is clearly false; for the same thing is known by the cognitive power, and desired by the appetitive.
Iª q. 77 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, id quod per se est causa alicuius, in omnibus causat illud. Sed quaedam obiecta diversa, quae pertinent ad diversas potentias, pertinent etiam ad aliquam unam potentiam, sicut sonus et color pertinent ad visum et auditum, quae sunt diversae potentiae; et tamen pertinent ad unam potentiam sensus communis. Non ergo potentiae distinguuntur secundum differentiam obiectorum.	Objection 4. Further, that which of itself is the cause of anything, is the cause thereof, wherever it is. But various objects which belong to various powers, belong also to some one power; as sound and color belong to sight and hearing, which are different powers, yet they come under the one power of common sense. Therefore the powers are not distinguished according to the difference of their objects.
Iª q. 77 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, posteriora distinguuntur secundum priora. Sed philosophus dicit II de anima, quod priores potentiis actus et operationes secundum rationem sunt; et adhuc his priora sunt opposita, sive obiecta. Ergo potentiae distinguuntur secundum actus et obiecta.	On the contrary, Things that are subsequent are distinguished by what precedes. But the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "acts and operations precede the powers according to reason; and these again are preceded by their opposites," that is their objects. Therefore the powers are distinguished according to their acts and objects.
Iª q. 77 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod potentia, secundum illud quod est potentia, ordinatur ad actum. Unde oportet rationem potentiae accipi ex actu ad quem ordinatur, et per consequens oportet quod ratio potentiae diversificetur, ut diversificatur ratio actus. Ratio autem actus diversificatur secundum diversam rationem obiecti. Omnis enim actio vel est potentiae activae, vel passivae. Obiectum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae passivae, sicut principium et causa movens, color enim inquantum movet visum, est principium visionis. Ad actum autem potentiae activae comparatur obiectum ut terminus et finis, sicut augmentativae virtutis obiectum est quantum perfectum, quod est finis augmenti. Ex his autem duobus actio speciem recipit, scilicet ex principio, vel ex fine seu termino, differt enim calefactio ab infrigidatione, secundum quod haec quidem a calido, scilicet activo, ad calidum; illa autem a frigido ad frigidum procedit. Unde necesse est quod potentiae diversificentur secundum actus et obiecta. Sed tamen considerandum est quod ea quae sunt per accidens, non diversificant speciem. Quia enim coloratum accidit animali, non diversificantur species animalis per differentiam coloris, sed per differentiam eius quod per se accidit animali, per differentiam scilicet animae sensitivae, quae quandoque invenitur cum ratione, quandoque sine ratione. Unde rationale et irrationale sunt differentiae divisivae animalis, diversas eius species constituentes. Sic igitur non quaecumque diversitas obiectorum diversificat potentias animae; sed differentia eius ad quod per se potentia respicit. Sicut sensus per se respicit passibilem qualitatem, quae per se dividitur in colorem, sonum et huiusmodi, et ideo alia potentia sensitiva est coloris, scilicet visus, et alia soni, scilicet auditus. Sed passibili qualitati, ut colorato accidit esse musicum vel grammaticum, vel magnum et parvum, aut hominem vel lapidem. Et ideo penes huiusmodi differentias potentiae animae non distinguuntur.	I answer that, A power as such is directed to an act. Wherefore we seek to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is directed, and consequently the nature of a power is diversified, as the nature of the act is diversified. Now the nature of an act is diversified according to the various natures of the objects. For every act is either of an active power or of a passive power. Now, the object is to the act of a passive power, as the principle and moving cause: for color is the principle of vision, inasmuch as it moves the sight. On the other hand, to the act of an active power the object is a term and end; as the object of the power of growth is perfect quantity, which is the end of growth. Now, from these two things an act receives its species, namely, from its principle, or from its end or term; for the act of heating differs from the act of cooling, in this, that the former proceeds from something hot, which is the active principle, to heat; the latter from something cold, which is the active principle, to cold. Therefore the powers are of necessity distinguished by their acts and objects. Nevertheless, we must observe that things which are accidental do not change the species. For since to be colored is accidental to an animal, its species is not changed by a difference of color, but by a difference in that which belongs to the nature of an animal, that is to say, by a difference in the sensitive soul, which is sometimes rational, and sometimes otherwise. Hence "rational" and "irrational" are differences dividing animal, constituting its various species. In like manner therefore, not any variety of objects diversifies the powers of the soul, but a difference in that to which the power of its very nature is directed. Thus the senses of their very nature are directed to the passive quality which of itself is divided into color, sound, and the like, and therefore there is one sensitive power with regard to color, namely, the sight, and another with regard to sound, namely, hearing. But it is accidental to a passive quality, for instance, to something colored, to be a musician or a grammarian, great or small, a man or a stone. Therefore by reason of such differences the powers of the soul are not distinct.
Iª q. 77 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod actus, licet sit posterior potentia in esse, est tamen prior in intentione et secundum rationem, sicut finis agente. Obiectum autem, licet sit extrinsecum, est tamen principium vel finis actionis. Principio autem et fini proportionantur ea quae sunt intrinseca rei.	Reply to Objection 1. Act, though subsequent in existence to power, is, nevertheless, prior to it in intention and logically; as the end is with regard to the agent. And the object, although extrinsic, is, nevertheless, the principle or end of the action; and those conditions which are intrinsic to a thing, are proportionate to its principle and end.
Iª q. 77 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, si potentia aliqua per se respiceret unum contrariorum sicut obiectum, oporteret quod contrarium ad aliam potentiam pertineret. Sed potentia animae non per se respicit propriam rationem contrarii, sed communem rationem utriusque contrariorum, sicut visus non respicit per se rationem albi, sed rationem coloris. Et hoc ideo, quia unum contrariorum est quodammodo ratio alterius, cum se habeant sicut perfectum et imperfectum.	Reply to Objection 2. If any power were to have one of two contraries as such for its object, the other contrary would belong to another power. But the power of the soul does not regard the nature of the contrary as such, but rather the common aspect of both contraries; as sight does not regard white as such, but as color. This is because of two contraries one, in a manner, includes the idea of the other, since they are to one another as perfect and imperfect.
Iª q. 77 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est subiecto idem esse diversum secundum rationem. Et ideo potest ad diversas potentias animae pertinere.	Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents things which coincide in subject, from being considered under different aspects; therefore they can belong to various powers of the soul.
Iª q. 77 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod potentia superior per se respicit universaliorem rationem obiecti, quam potentia inferior, quia quanto potentia est superior, tanto ad plura se extendit. Et ideo multa conveniunt in una ratione obiecti, quam per se respicit superior potentia, quae tamen differunt secundum rationes quas per se respiciunt inferiores potentiae. Et inde est quod diversa obiecta pertinent ad diversas inferiores potentias, quae tamen uni superiori potentiae subduntur.	Reply to Objection 4. The higher power of itself regards a more universal formality of the object than the lower power; because the higher a power is, to a greater number of things does it extend. Therefore many things are combined in the one formality of the object, which the higher power considers of itself; while they differ in the formalities regarded by the lower powers of themselves. Thus it is that various objects belong to various lower powers; which objects, however, are subject to one higher power.
Iª q. 77 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in potentiis animae non sit ordo. In his enim quae cadunt sub una divisione, non est prius et posterius, sed sunt naturaliter simul. Sed potentiae animae contra se invicem dividuntur. Ergo inter eas non est ordo.	Objection 1. It would seem that there is no order among the powers of the soul. For in those things which come under one division, there is no before and after, but all are naturally simultaneous. But the powers of the soul are contradistinguished from one another. Therefore there is no order among them.
Iª q. 77 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, potentiae animae comparantur ad obiecta, et ad ipsam animam. Sed ex parte animae, inter eas non est ordo, quia anima est una. Similiter etiam nec ex parte obiectorum, cum sint diversa et penitus disparata, ut patet de colore et sono. In potentiis ergo animae non est ordo.	Objection 2. Further, the powers of the soul are referred to their objects and to the soul itself. On the part of the soul, there is not order among them, because the soul is one. In like manner the objects are various and dissimilar, as color and sound. Therefore there is no order among the powers of the soul.
Iª q. 77 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, in potentiis ordinatis hoc invenitur, quod operatio unius dependet ab operatione alterius. Sed actus unius potentiae animae non dependet ab actu alterius, potest enim visus exire in actum absque auditu, et e converso. Non ergo inter potentias animae est ordo.	Objection 3. Further, where there is order among powers, we find that the operation of one depends on the operation of another. But the action of one power of the soul does not depend on that of another; for sight can act independently of hearing, and conversely. Therefore there is no order among the powers of the soul.
Iª q. 77 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II de anima, comparat partes sive potentias animae figuris. Sed figurae habent ordinem ad invicem. Ergo et potentiae animae.	On the contrary, The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 3) compares the parts or powers of the soul to figures. But figures have an order among themselves. Therefore the powers of the soul have order.
Iª q. 77 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum anima sit una, potentiae vero plures; ordine autem quodam ab uno in multitudinem procedatur; necesse est inter potentias animae ordinem esse. Triplex autem ordo inter eas attenditur. Quorum duo considerantur secundum dependentiam unius potentiae ab altera, tertius autem accipitur secundum ordinem obiectorum. Dependentia autem unius potentiae ab altera dupliciter accipi potest, uno modo, secundum naturae ordinem, prout perfecta sunt naturaliter imperfectis priora; alio modo, secundum ordinem generationis et temporis, prout ex imperfecto ad perfectum venitur. Secundum igitur primum potentiarum ordinem, potentiae intellectivae sunt priores potentiis sensitivis, unde dirigunt eas et imperant eis. Et similiter potentiae sensitivae hoc ordine sunt priores potentiis animae nutritivae. Secundum vero ordinem secundum, e converso se habet. Nam potentiae animae nutritivae sunt priores, in via generationis, potentiis animae sensitivae, unde ad earum actiones praeparant corpus. Et similiter est de potentiis sensitivis respectu intellectivarum. Secundum autem ordinem tertium, ordinantur quaedam vires sensitivae ad invicem, scilicet visus, auditus et olfactus. Nam visibile est prius naturaliter, quia est commune superioribus et inferioribus corporibus. Sonus autem audibilis fit in aere, qui est naturaliter prior commixtione elementorum, quam consequitur odor.	I answer that, Since the soul is one, and the powers are many; and since a number of things that proceed from one must proceed in a certain order; there must be some order among the powers of the soul. Accordingly we may observe a triple order among them, two of which correspond to the dependence of one power on another; while the third is taken from the order of the objects. Now the dependence of one power on another can be taken in two ways; according to the order of nature, forasmuch as perfect things are by their nature prior to imperfect things; and according to the order of generation and time; forasmuch as from being imperfect, a thing comes to be perfect. Thus, according to the first kind of order among the powers, the intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive powers; wherefore they direct them and command them. Likewise the sensitive powers are prior in this order to the powers of the nutritive soul. In the second kind of order, it is the other way about. For the powers of the nutritive soul are prior by way of generation to the powers of the sensitive soul; for which, therefore, they prepare the body. The same is to be said of the sensitive powers with regard to the intellectual. But in the third kind of order, certain sensitive powers are ordered among themselves, namely, sight, hearing, and smelling. For the visible naturally comes first; since it is common to higher and lower bodies. But sound is audible in the air, which is naturally prior to the mingling of elements, of which smell is the result.
Iª q. 77 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod alicuius generis species se habent secundum prius et posterius, sicut numeri et figurae, quantum ad esse; licet simul esse dicantur inquantum suscipiunt communis generis praedicationem.	Reply to Objection 1. The species of a given genus are to one another as before and after, like numbers and figures, if considered in their nature; although they may be said to be simultaneous, according as they receive the predication of the common genus.
Iª q. 77 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ordo iste potentiarum animae est et ex parte animae, quae secundum ordinem quendam habet aptitudinem ad diversos actus, licet sit una secundum essentiam; et ex parte obiectorum; et etiam ex parte actuum, ut dictum est.	Reply to Objection 2. This order among the powers of the soul is both on the part of the soul (which, though it be one according to its essence, has a certain aptitude to various acts in a certain order) and on the part of the objects, and furthermore on the part of the acts, as we have said above.
Iª q. 77 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de illis potentiis in quibus attenditur ordo solum secundum tertium modum. Illae autem potentiae quae ordinantur secundum alios duos modos, ita se habent quod actus unius dependet ab altera.	Reply to Objection 3. This argument is verified as regards those powers among which order of the third kind exists. Those powers among which the two other kinds of order exist are such that the action of one depends on another.
Iª q. 77 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes potentiae animae sint in anima sicut in subiecto. Sicut enim se habent potentiae corporis ad corpus, ita se habent potentiae animae ad animam. Sed corpus est subiectum corporalium potentiarum. Ergo anima est subiectum potentiarum animae.	Objection 1. It would seem that all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject. For as the powers of the body are to the body; so are the powers of the soul to the soul. But the body is the subject of the corporeal powers. Therefore the soul is the subject of the powers of the soul.
Iª q. 77 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, operationes potentiarum animae attribuuntur corpori propter animam, quia, ut dicitur in II de anima, anima est quo sentimus et intelligimus primum. Sed propria principia operationum animae sunt potentiae. Ergo potentiae per prius sunt in anima.	Objection 2. Further, the operations of the powers of the soul are attributed to the body by reason of the soul; because, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2), "The soul is that by which we sense and understand primarily." But the natural principles of the operations of the soul are the powers. Therefore the powers are primarily in the soul.
Iª q. 77 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod anima quaedam sentit non per corpus, immo sine corpore, ut est timor et huiusmodi; quaedam vero sentit per corpus. Sed si potentia sensitiva non esset in sola anima sicut in subiecto, nihil posset sine corpore sentire. Ergo anima est subiectum potentiae sensitivae; et pari ratione, omnium aliarum potentiarum.	Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) that the soul senses certain things, not through the body, in fact, without the body, as fear and such like; and some things through the body. But if the sensitive powers were not in the soul alone as their subject, the soul could not sense anything without the body. Therefore the soul is the subject of the sensitive powers; and for a similar reason, of all the other powers.
Iª q. 77 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in libro de somno et vigilia quod sentire non est proprium animae neque corporis, sed coniuncti. Potentia ergo sensitiva est in coniuncto sicut in subiecto. Non ergo sola anima est subiectum omnium potentiarum suarum.	On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigilia i) that "sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor to the body, but to the composite." Therefore the sensitive power is in "the composite" as its subject. Therefore the soul alone is not the subject of all the powers.
Iª q. 77 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod illud est subiectum operativae potentiae, quod est potens operari, omne enim accidens denominat proprium subiectum. Idem autem est quod potest operari, et quod operatur. Unde oportet quod eius sit potentia sicut subiecti, cuius est operatio; ut etiam philosophus dicit, in principio de somno et vigilia. Manifestum est autem ex supra dictis quod quaedam operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur sine organo corporali, ut intelligere et velle. Unde potentiae quae sunt harum operationum principia, sunt in anima sicut in subiecto. Quaedam vero operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur per organa corporalia; sicut visio per oculum, et auditus per aurem. Et simile est de omnibus aliis operationibus nutritivae et sensitivae partis. Et ideo potentiae quae sunt talium operationum principia, sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto, et non in anima sola.	I answer that, The subject of operative power is that which is able to operate, for every accident denominates its proper subject. Now the same is that which is able to operate, and that which does operate. Wherefore the "subject of power" is of necessity "the subject of operation," as again the Philosopher says in the beginning of De Somno et Vigilia. Now, it is clear from what we have said above (75, 2,3; 76, 1, ad 1), that some operations of the soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as understanding and will. Hence the powers of these operations are in the soul as their subject. But some operations of the soul are performed by means of corporeal organs; as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And so it is with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of these operations have their subject in the composite, and not in the soul alone.
Iª q. 77 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes potentiae dicuntur esse animae, non sicut subiecti, sed sicut principii, quia per animam coniunctum habet quod tales operationes operari possit.	Reply to Objection 1. All the powers are said to belong to the soul, not as their subject, but as their principle; because it is by the soul that the composite has the power to perform such operations.
Iª q. 77 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod omnes huiusmodi potentiae per prius sunt in anima quam in coniuncto, non sicut in subiecto, sed sicut in principio.	Reply to Objection 2. All such powers are primarily in the soul, as compared to the composite; not as in their subject, but as in their principle.
Iª q. 77 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod opinio Platonis fuit quod sentire est operatio animae propria, sicut et intelligere. In multis autem quae ad philosophiam pertinent, Augustinus utitur opinionibus Platonis, non asserendo, sed recitando. Tamen, quantum ad praesens pertinet, hoc quod dicitur anima quaedam sentire cum corpore et quaedam sine corpore, dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, quod hoc quod dico cum corpore vel sine corpore, determinet actum sentiendi secundum quod exit a sentiente. Et sic nihil sentit sine corpore, quia actio sentiendi non potest procedere ab anima nisi per organum corporale. Alio modo potest intelligi ita quod praedicta determinent actum sentiendi ex parte obiecti quod sentitur. Et sic quaedam sentit cum corpore, idest in corpore existentia, sicut cum sentit vulnus vel aliquid huiusmodi, quaedam vero sentit sine corpore, idest non existentia in corpore, sed solum in apprehensione animae, sicut cum sentit se tristari vel gaudere de aliquo audito.	Reply to Objection 3. Plato's opinion was that sensation is an operation proper to the soul, just as understanding is. Now in many things relating to Philosophy Augustine makes use of the opinions of Plato, not asserting them as true, but relating them. However, as far as the present question is concerned, when it is said that the soul senses some things with the body, and some without the body, this can be taken in two ways. Firstly, the words "with the body or without the body" may determine the act of sense in its mode of proceeding from the sentient. Thus the soul senses nothing without the body, because the action of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a corporeal organ. Secondly, they may be understood as determining the act of sense on the part of the object sensed. Thus the soul senses some things with the body, that is, things existing in the body, as when it feels a wound or something of that sort; while it senses some things without the body, that is, which do not exist in the body, but only in the apprehension of the soul, as when it feels sad or joyful on hearing something.
Iª q. 77 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod potentiae animae non fluant ab eius essentia. Ab uno enim simplici non procedunt diversa. Essentia autem animae est una et simplex. Cum ergo potentiae animae sint multae et diversae, non possunt procedere ab eius essentia.	Objection 1. It would seem that the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence. For different things do not proceed from one simple thing. But the essence of the soul is one and simple. Since, therefore, the powers of the soul are many and various, they cannot proceed from its essence.
Iª q. 77 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud a quo aliud procedit, est causa eius. Sed essentia animae non potest dici causa potentiarum; ut patet discurrenti per singula causarum genera. Ergo potentiae animae non fluunt ab eius essentia.	Objection 2. Further, that from which a thing proceeds is its cause. But the essence of the soul cannot be said to be the cause of the powers; as is clear if one considers the different kinds of causes. Therefore the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence.
Iª q. 77 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, emanatio quendam motum nominat. Sed nihil movetur a seipso, ut probatur in VII libro Physic.; nisi forte ratione partis, sicut animal dicitur moveri a seipso, quia una pars eius est movens et alia mota. Neque etiam anima movetur, ut probatur in I de anima. Non ergo anima causat in se suas potentias.	Objection 3. Further, emanation involves some sort of movement. But nothing is moved by itself, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vii, 1,2); except, perhaps, by reason of a part of itself, as an animal is said to be moved by itself, because one part thereof moves and another is moved. Neither is the soul moved, as the Philosopher proves (De Anima i, 4). Therefore the soul does not produce its powers within itself.
Iª q. 77 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra, potentiae animae sunt quaedam proprietates naturales ipsius. Sed subiectum est causa propriorum accidentium, unde et ponitur in definitione accidentis, ut patet in VII Metaphys. Ergo potentiae animae procedunt ab eius essentia sicut a causa.	On the contrary, The powers of the soul are its natural properties. But the subject is the cause of its proper accidents; whence also it is included in the definition of accident, as is clear from Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 4). Therefore the powers of the soul proceed from its essence as their cause.
Iª q. 77 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod forma substantialis et accidentalis partim conveniunt, et partim differunt. Conveniunt quidem in hoc, quod utraque est actus, et secundum utramque est aliquid quodammodo in actu. Differunt autem in duobus. Primo quidem, quia forma substantialis facit esse simpliciter, et eius subiectum est ens in potentia tantum. Forma autem accidentalis non facit esse simpliciter; sed esse tale, aut tantum, aut aliquo modo se habens, subiectum enim eius est ens in actu. Unde patet quod actualitas per prius invenitur in forma substantiali quam in eius subiecto, et quia primum est causa in quolibet genere, forma substantialis causat esse in actu in suo subiecto. Sed e converso, actualitas per prius invenitur in subiecto formae accidentalis, quam in forma accidentali, unde actualitas formae accidentalis causatur ab actualitate subiecti. Ita quod subiectum, inquantum est in potentia, est susceptivum formae accidentalis, inquantum autem est in actu, est eius productivum. Et hoc dico de proprio et per se accidente, nam respectu accidentis extranei, subiectum est susceptivum tantum; productivum vero talis accidentis est agens extrinsecum. Secundo autem differunt substantialis forma et accidentalis, quia, cum minus principale sit propter principalius, materia est propter formam substantialem; sed e converso, forma accidentalis est propter completionem subiecti. Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod potentiarum animae subiectum est vel ipsa anima sola, quae potest esse subiectum accidentis secundum quod habet aliquid potentialitatis, ut supra dictum est; vel compositum. Compositum autem est in actu per animam. Unde manifestum est quod omnes potentiae animae, sive subiectum earum sit anima sola, sive compositum, fluunt ab essentia animae sicut a principio, quia iam dictum est quod accidens causatur a subiecto secundum quod est actu, et recipitur in eo inquantum est in potentia.	I answer that, The substantial and the accidental form partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that each is an act; and that by each of them something is after a manner actual. They differ, however, in two respects. First, because the substantial form makes a thing to exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely potential. But the accidental form does not make a thing to exist absolutely but to be such, or so great, or in some particular condition; for its subject is an actual being. Hence it is clear that actuality is observed in the substantial form prior to its being observed in the subject: and since that which is first in a genus is the cause in that genus, the substantial form causes existence in its subject. On the other hand, actuality is observed in the subject of the accidental form prior to its being observed in the accidental form; wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject. So the subject, forasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form: but forasmuch as it is in act, it produces it. This I say of the proper and "per se" accident; for with regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is receptive only, the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent. Secondly, substantial and accidental forms differ, because, since that which is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is the more principal, matter therefore exists on account of the substantial form; while on the contrary, the accidental form exists on account of the completeness of the subject. Now it is clear, from what has been said (5), that either the subject of the soul's powers is the soul itself alone, which can be the subject of an accident, forasmuch as it has something of potentiality, as we have said above (1, ad 6); or else this subject is the composite. Now the composite is actual by the soul. Whence it is clear that all the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the soul alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the soul, as from their principle; because it has already been said that the accident is caused by the subject according as it is actual, and is received into it according as it is in potentiality.
Iª q. 77 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ab uno simplici possunt naturaliter multa procedere ordine quodam. Et iterum propter diversitatem recipientium. Sic igitur ab una essentia animae procedunt multae et diversae potentiae, tum propter ordinem potentiarum, tum etiam secundum diversitatem organorum corporalium.	Reply to Objection 1. From one simple thing many things may proceed naturally, in a certain order; or again if there be diversity of recipients. Thus, from the one essence of the soul many and various powers proceed; both because order exists among these powers; and also by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs.
Iª q. 77 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod subiectum est causa proprii accidentis et finalis, et quodammodo activa; et etiam ut materialis, inquantum est susceptivum accidentis. Et ex hoc potest accipi quod essentia animae est causa omnium potentiarum sicut finis et sicut principium activum; quarundam autem sicut susceptivum.	Reply to Objection 2. The subject is both the final cause, and in a way the active cause, of its proper accident. It is also as it were the material cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident. From this we may gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all its powers, as their end, and as their active principle; and of some as receptive thereof.
Iª q. 77 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod emanatio propriorum accidentium a subiecto non est per aliquam transmutationem; sed per aliquam naturalem resultationem, sicut ex uno naturaliter aliud resultat, ut ex luce color.	Reply to Objection 3. The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance; thus one thing results naturally from another, as color from light.
Iª q. 77 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod una potentia animae non oriatur ab alia. Eorum enim quae simul esse incipiunt, unum non oritur ab alio. Sed omnes potentiae animae sunt simul animae concreatae. Ergo una earum ab alia non oritur.	Objection 1. It would seem that one power of the soul does not arise from another. For if several things arise together, one of them does not arise from another. But all the powers of the soul are created at the same time with the soul. Therefore one of them does not arise from another.
Iª q. 77 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, potentia animae oritur ab anima sicut accidens a subiecto. Sed una potentia animae non potest esse subiectum alterius, quia accidentis non est accidens. Ergo una potentia non oritur ab alia.	Objection 2. Further, the power of the soul arises from the soul as an accident from the subject. But one power of the soul cannot be the subject of another; because nothing is the accident of an accident. Therefore one power does not arise from another.
Iª q. 77 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, oppositum non oritur a suo opposito, sed unumquodque oritur ex simili secundum speciem. Potentiae autem animae ex opposito dividuntur, sicut diversae species. Ergo una earum non procedit ab alia.	Objection 3. Further, one opposite does not arise from the other opposite; but everything arises from that which is like it in species. Now the powers of the soul are oppositely divided, as various species. Therefore one of them does not proceed from another.
Iª q. 77 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra, potentiae cognoscuntur per actus. Sed actus unius potentiae causatur ab alio; sicut actus phantasiae ab actu sensus. Ergo una potentia animae causatur ab alia.	On the contrary, Powers are known by their actions. But the action of one power is caused by the action of another power, as the action of the imagination by the action of the senses. Therefore one power of the soul is caused by another.
Iª q. 77 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in his quae secundum ordinem naturalem procedunt ab uno, sicut primum est causa omnium, ita quod est primo propinquius, est quodammodo causa eorum quae sunt magis remota. Ostensum est autem supra quod inter potentias animae est multiplex ordo. Et ideo una potentia animae ab essentia animae procedit mediante alia. Sed quia essentia animae comparatur ad potentias et sicut principium activum et finale, et sicut principium susceptivum, vel seorsum per se vel simul cum corpore; agens autem et finis est perfectius, susceptivum autem principium, inquantum huiusmodi, est minus perfectum, consequens est quod potentiae animae quae sunt priores secundum ordinem perfectionis et naturae, sint principia aliarum per modum finis et activi principii. Videmus enim quod sensus est propter intellectum, et non e converso. Sensus etiam est quaedam deficiens participatio intellectus, unde secundum naturalem originem quodammodo est ab intellectu, sicut imperfectum a perfecto. Sed secundum viam susceptivi principii, e converso potentiae imperfectiores inveniuntur principia respectu aliarum, sicut anima, secundum quod habet potentiam sensitivam, consideratur sicut subiectum et materiale quoddam respectu intellectus. Et propter hoc, imperfectiores potentiae sunt priores in via generationis, prius enim animal generatur quam homo.	I answer that, In those things which proceed from one according to a natural order, as the first is the cause of all, so that which is nearer to the first is, in a way, the cause of those which are more remote. Now it has been shown above (4) that among the powers of the soul there are several kinds of order. Therefore one power of the soul proceeds from the essence of the soul by the medium of another. But since the essence of the soul is compared to the powers both as a principle active and final, and as a receptive principle, either separately by itself, or together with the body; and since the agent and the end are more perfect, while the receptive principle, as such, is less perfect; it follows that those powers of the soul which precede the others, in the order of perfection and nature, are the principles of the others, after the manner of the end and active principle. For we see that the senses are for the sake of the intelligence, and not the other way about. The senses, moreover, are a certain imperfect participation of the intelligence; wherefore, according to their natural origin, they proceed from the intelligence as the imperfect from the perfect. But considered as receptive principles, the more perfect powers are principles with regard to the others; thus the soul, according as it has the sensitive power, is considered as the subject, and as something material with regard to the intelligence. On this account, the more imperfect powers precede the others in the order of generation, for the animal is generated before the man.
Iª q. 77 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut potentia animae ab essentia fluit, non per transmutationem, sed per naturalem quandam resultationem, et est simul cum anima; ita est etiam de una potentia respectu alterius.	Reply to Objection 1. As the power of the soul flows from the essence, not by a transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance, and is simultaneous with the soul, so is it the case with one power as regards another.
Iª q. 77 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod accidens per se non potest esse subiectum accidentis; sed unum accidens per prius recipitur in substantia quam aliud, sicut quantitas quam qualitas. Et hoc modo unum accidens dicitur esse subiectum alterius, ut superficies coloris, inquantum substantia uno accidente mediante recipit aliud. Et similiter potest dici de potentiis animae.	Reply to Objection 2. An accident cannot of itself be the subject of an accident; but one accident is received prior to another into substance, as quantity prior to quality. In this sense one accident is said to be the subject of another; as surface is of color, inasmuch as substance receives an accident through the means of another. The same thing may be said of the powers of the soul.
Iª q. 77 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod potentiae animae opponuntur ad invicem oppositione perfecti et imperfecti; sicut etiam species numerorum et figurarum. Haec autem oppositio non impedit originem unius ab alio, quia imperfecta naturaliter a perfectis procedunt.	Reply to Objection 3. The powers of the soul are opposed to one another, as perfect and imperfect; as also are the species of numbers and figures. But this opposition does not prevent the origin of one from another, because imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect things.
Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes potentiae animae remaneant in anima a corpore separata. Dicitur enim in libro de spiritu et anima, quod anima recedit a corpore, secum trahens sensum et imaginationem, rationem et intellectum et intelligentiam, concupiscibilitatem et irascibilitatem.	Objection 1. It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in the soul separated from the body. For we read in the book De Spiritu et Anima that "the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself sense and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and irascibility."
Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, potentiae animae sunt eius naturales proprietates. Sed proprium semper inest, et nunquam separatur ab eo cuius est proprium. Ergo potentiae animae sunt in ea etiam post mortem.	Objection 2. Further, the powers of the soul are its natural properties. But properties are always in that to which they belong; and are never separated from it. Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even after death.
Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, potentiae animae, etiam sensitivae, non debilitantur debilitato corpore, quia, ut dicitur in I de anima, si senex accipiat oculum iuvenis, videbit utique sicut et iuvenis. Sed debilitas est via ad corruptionem. Ergo potentiae animae non corrumpuntur corrupto corpore, sed manent in anima separata.	Objection 3. Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are not weakened when the body becomes weak; because, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), "If an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would see even as well as a young man." But weakness is the road to corruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when the body is corrupted, but remain in the separated soul.
Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 4 Praeterea, memoria est potentia animae sensitivae, ut philosophus probat. Sed memoria manet in anima separata, dicitur enim, Luc. XVI, diviti epuloni in Inferno secundum animam existenti, recordare quia recepisti bona in vita tua. Ergo memoria manet in anima separata; et per consequens aliae potentiae sensitivae partis.	Objection 4. Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. 1). But memory remains in the separated soul; for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in hell: "Remember that thou didst receive good things during thy lifetime" (Luke 16:25). Therefore memory remains in the separated soul; and consequently the other powers of the sensitive part.
Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 5 Praeterea, gaudium et tristitia sunt in concupiscibili, quae est potentia sensitivae partis. Manifestum est autem animas separatas tristari et gaudere de praemiis vel poenis quas habent. Ergo vis concupiscibilis manet in anima separata.	Objection 5. Further, joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part, which is a power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear that separate souls grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive. Therefore the concupiscible power remains in the separate soul.
Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 6 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod sicut anima, cum corpus iacet sine sensu nondum penitus mortuum, videt quaedam secundum imaginariam visionem; ita cum fuerit a corpore penitus separata per mortem. Sed imaginatio est potentia sensitivae partis. Ergo potentia sensitivae partis manet in anima separata; et per consequens omnes aliae potentiae.	Objection 6. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32) that, as the soul, when the body lies senseless, yet not quite dead, sees some things by imaginary vision; so also when by death the soul is quite separate from the body. But the imagination is a power of the sensitive part. Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in the separate soul; and consequently all the other powers.
Iª q. 77 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., ex duabus tantum substantiis constat homo, anima cum ratione sua, et carne cum sensibus suis. Ergo, defuncta carne, potentiae sensitivae non manent.	On the contrary, It is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xix) that "of two substances only does man consist; the soul with its reason, and the body with its senses." Therefore the body being dead, the sensitive powers do not remain.
Iª q. 77 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, omnes potentiae animae comparantur ad animam solam sicut ad principium. Sed quaedam potentiae comparantur ad animam solam sicut ad subiectum, ut intellectus et voluntas. Et huiusmodi potentiae necesse est quod maneant in anima, corpore destructo. Quaedam vero potentiae sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto, sicut omnes potentiae sensitivae partis et nutritivae. Destructo autem subiecto, non potest accidens remanere. Unde, corrupto coniuncto, non manent huiusmodi potentiae actu; sed virtute tantum manent in anima, sicut in principio vel radice. Et sic falsum est, quod quidam dicunt huiusmodi potentias in anima remanere etiam corpore corrupto. Et multo falsius, quod dicunt etiam actus harum potentiarum remanere in anima separata, quia talium potentiarum nulla est actio nisi per organum corporeum.	I answer that, As we have said already (5,6,7), all the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the body. But other powers are subjected in the composite; as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts. Now accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not remain actually; but they remain virtually in the soul, as in their principle or root. So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in the soul even after the corruption of the body. It is much more false that, as they say also, the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul; because these powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ.
Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod liber ille auctoritatem non habet. Unde quod ibi scriptum est, eadem facilitate contemnitur, qua dicitur. Tamen potest dici quod trahit secum anima huiusmodi potentias, non actu, sed virtute.	Reply to Objection 1. That book has no authority, and so what is there written can be despised with the same facility as it was said; although we may say that the soul takes with itself these powers, not actually but virtually.
Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod huiusmodi potentiae quas dicimus actu in anima separata non manere, non sunt proprietates solius animae, sed coniuncti.	Reply to Objection 2. These powers, which we say do not actually remain in the separate soul, are not the properties of the soul alone, but of the composite.
Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod dicuntur non debilitari huiusmodi potentiae debilitato corpore, quia anima manet immutabilis, quae est virtuale principium huiusmodi potentiarum.	Reply to Objection 3. These powers are said not to be weakened when the body becomes weak, because the soul remains unchangeable, and is the virtual principle of these powers.
Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod illa recordatio accipitur eo modo quo Augustinus ponit memoriam in mente; non eo modo quo ponitur pars animae sensitivae.	Reply to Objection 4. The recollection spoken of there is to be taken in the same way as Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xiv, 7) places memory in the mind; not as a part of the sensitive soul.
Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod tristitia et gaudium sunt in anima separata, non secundum appetitum sensitivum, sed secundum appetitum intellectivum; sicut etiam in Angelis.	Reply to Objection 5. In the separate soul, sorrow and joy are not in the sensitive, but in the intellectual appetite, as in the angels.
Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi inquirendo, non asserendo. Unde quaedam ibi dicta retractat.	Reply to Objection 6. Augustine in that passage is speaking as inquiring, not as asserting. Wherefore he retracted some things which he had said there (Retrac. ii, 24).
Iª q. 78 pr. Deinde considerandum est de potentiis animae in speciali. Ad considerationem autem theologi pertinet inquirere specialiter solum de potentiis intellectivis et appetitivis, in quibus virtutes inveniuntur. Sed quia cognitio harum potentiarum quodammodo dependet ex aliis, ideo nostra consideratio de potentiis animae in speciali erit tripartita, primo namque considerandum est de his quae sunt praeambula ad intellectum; secundo, de potentiis intellectivis; tertio, de potentiis appetitivis. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, de generibus potentiarum animae. Secundo, de speciebus vegetativae partis. Tertio, de sensibus exterioribus. Quarto, de sensibus interioribus.
Iª q. 78 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint quinque genera potentiarum animae distinguenda, scilicet vegetativum, sensitivum, appetitivum, motivum secundum locum, et intellectivum. Potentiae enim animae dicuntur partes ipsius. Sed tantum tres partes animae communiter ab omnibus assignantur, scilicet anima vegetabilis, anima sensibilis, et anima rationalis. Ergo tantum tria sunt genera potentiarum animae, et non quinque.	Objection 1. It would seem that there are not to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul--namely, vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intellectual. For the powers of the soul are called its parts. But only three parts of the soul are commonly assigned--namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the rational soul. Therefore there are only three genera of powers in the soul, and not five.
Iª q. 78 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, potentiae animae sunt principia operum vitae. Sed quatuor modis dicitur aliquid vivere. Dicit enim philosophus, in II de anima, multipliciter ipso vivere dicto, etsi unum aliquod horum insit solum, aliquid dicimus vivere; ut intellectus, et sensus, motus et status secundum locum, adhuc autem motus secundum alimentum, et decrementum et augmentum. Ergo tantum quatuor sunt genera potentiarum animae, appetitivo excluso.	Objection 2. Further, the powers of the soul are the principles of its vital operations. Now, in four ways is a thing said to live. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2): "In several ways a thing is said to live, and even if only one of these is present, the thing is said to live; as intellect and sense, local movement and rest, and lastly, movement of decrease and increase due to nourishment." Therefore there are only four genera of powers of the soul, as the appetitive is excluded.
Iª q. 78 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad illud quod est commune omnibus potentiis, non debet deputari aliquod speciale animae genus. Sed appetere convenit cuilibet potentiae animae. Visus enim appetit visibile conveniens, unde dicitur Eccli. XL, gratiam et speciem desiderabit oculus, et super hoc virides sationes. Et eadem ratione, quaelibet alia potentia desiderat obiectum sibi conveniens. Ergo non debet poni appetitivum unum speciale genus potentiarum animae.	Objection 3. Further, a special kind of soul ought not to be assigned as regards what is common to all the powers. Now desire is common to each power of the soul. For sight desires an appropriate visible object; whence we read (Sirach 40:22): "The eye desireth favor and beauty, but more than these green sown fields." In the same way every other power desires its appropriate object. Therefore the appetitive power should not be made a special genus of the powers of the soul.
Iª q. 78 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, principium movens in animalibus est sensus, aut intellectus, aut appetitus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Non ergo motivum debet poni speciale genus animae praeter praedicta.	Objection 4. Further, the moving principle in animals is sense, intellect or appetite, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore the motive power should not be added to the above as a special genus of soul.
Iª q. 78 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II de anima, potentias autem dicimus vegetativum sensitivum, appetitivum, motivum secundum locum, et intellectivum.	On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), "The powers are the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotion, and the intellectual."
Iª q. 78 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quinque sunt genera potentiarum animae, quae numerata sunt. Tres vero dicuntur animae. Quatuor vero dicuntur modi vivendi. Et huius diversitatis ratio est, quia diversae animae distinguuntur secundum quod diversimode operatio animae supergreditur operationem naturae corporalis, tota enim natura corporalis subiacet animae, et comparatur ad ipsam sicut materia et instrumentum. Est ergo quaedam operatio animae, quae intantum excedit naturam corpoream, quod neque etiam exercetur per organum corporale. Et talis est operatio animae rationalis. Est autem alia operatio animae infra istam, quae quidem fit per organum corporale, non tamen per aliquam corpoream qualitatem. Et talis est operatio animae sensibilis, quia etsi calidum et frigidum, et humidum et siccum, et aliae huiusmodi qualitates corporeae requirantur ad operationem sensus; non tamen ita quod mediante virtute talium qualitatum operatio animae sensibilis procedat; sed requiruntur solum ad debitam dispositionem organi. Infima autem operationum animae est, quae fit per organum corporeum, et virtute corporeae qualitatis. Supergreditur tamen operationem naturae corporeae, quia motiones corporum sunt ab exteriori principio, huiusmodi autem operationes sunt a principio intrinseco; hoc enim commune est omnibus operationibus animae; omne enim animatum aliquo modo movet seipsum. Et talis est operatio animae vegetabilis, digestio enim, et ea quae consequuntur, fit instrumentaliter per actionem caloris, ut dicitur in II de anima. Genera vero potentiarum animae distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Quanto enim potentia est altior, tanto respicit universalius obiectum, ut supra dictum est. Obiectum autem operationis animae in triplici ordine potest considerari. Alicuius enim potentiae animae obiectum est solum corpus animae unitum. Et hoc genus potentiarum animae dicitur vegetativum, non enim vegetativa potentia agit nisi in corpus cui anima unitur. Est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae, quod respicit universalius obiectum, scilicet omne corpus sensibile; et non solum corpus animae unitum. Est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae, quod respicit adhuc universalius obiectum, scilicet non solum corpus sensibile, sed universaliter omne ens. Ex quo patet quod ista duo secunda genera potentiarum animae habent operationem non solum respectu rei coniunctae, sed etiam respectu rei extrinsecae. Cum autem operans oporteat aliquo modo coniungi suo obiecto circa quod operatur, necesse est extrinsecam rem, quae est obiectum operationis animae, secundum duplicem rationem ad animam comparari. Uno modo, secundum quod nata est animae coniungi et in anima esse per suam similitudinem. Et quantum ad hoc, sunt duo genera potentiarum, scilicet sensitivum, respectu obiecti minus communis, quod est corpus sensibile; et intellectivum, respectu obiecti communissimi, quod est ens universale. Alio vero modo, secundum quod ipsa anima inclinatur et tendit in rem exteriorem. Et secundum hanc etiam comparationem, sunt duo genera potentiarum animae, unum quidem, scilicet appetitivum, secundum quod anima comparatur ad rem extrinsecam ut ad finem, qui est primum in intentione; aliud autem motivum secundum locum, prout anima comparatur ad rem exteriorem sicut ad terminum operationis et motus; ad consequendum enim aliquod desideratum et intentum, omne animal movetur. Modi vero vivendi distinguuntur secundum gradus viventium. Quaedam enim viventia sunt, in quibus est tantum vegetativum, sicut in plantis. Quaedam vero, in quibus cum vegetativo est etiam sensitivum, non tamen motivum secundum locum; sicut sunt immobilia animalia, ut conchilia. Quaedam vero sunt, quae supra hoc habent motivum secundum locum; ut perfecta animalia, quae multis indigent ad suam vitam, et ideo indigent motu, ut vitae necessaria procul posita quaerere possint. Quaedam vero viventia sunt, in quibus cum his est intellectivum, scilicet in hominibus. Appetitivum autem non constituit aliquem gradum viventium, quia in quibuscumque est sensus, est etiam appetitus, ut dicitur in II libro de anima.	I answer that, There are five genera of powers of the soul, as above numbered. Of these, three are called souls, and four are called modes of living. The reason of this diversity lies in the various souls being distinguished accordingly as the operation of the soul transcends the operation of the corporeal nature in various ways; for the whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul, and is related to it as its matter and instrument. There exists, therefore, an operation of the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that it is not even performed by any corporeal organ; and such is the operation of the "rational soul." Below this, there is another operation of the soul, which is indeed performed through a corporeal organ, but not through a corporeal quality, and this is the operation of the "sensitive soul"; for though hot and cold, wet and dry, and other such corporeal qualities are required for the work of the senses, yet they are not required in such a way that the operation of the senses takes place by virtue of such qualities; but only for the proper disposition of the organ. The lowest of the operations of the soul is that which is performed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue of a corporeal quality. Yet this transcends the operation of the corporeal nature; because the movements of bodies are caused by an extrinsic principle, while these operations are from an intrinsic principle; for this is common to all the operations of the soul; since every animate thing, in some way, moves itself. Such is the operation of the "vegetative soul"; for digestion, and what follows, is caused instrumentally by the action of heat, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now the powers of the soul are distinguished generically by their objects. For the higher a power is, the more universal is the object to which it extends, as we have said above (77, 3, ad 4). But the object of the soul's operation may be considered in a triple order. For in the soul there is a power the object of which is only the body that is united to that soul; the powers of this genus are called "vegetative" for the vegetative power acts only on the body to which the soul is united. There is another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a more universal object--namely, every sensible body, not only the body to which the soul is united. And there is yet another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a still more universal object--namely, not only the sensible body, but all being in universal. Wherefore it is evident that the latter two genera of the soul's powers have an operation in regard not merely to that which is united to them, but also to something extrinsic. Now, since whatever operates must in some way be united to the object about which it operates, it follows of necessity that this something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul's operation, must be related to the soul in a twofold manner. First, inasmuch as this something extrinsic has a natural aptitude to be united to the soul, and to be by its likeness in the soul. In this way there are two kinds of powers --namely, the "sensitive" in regard to the less common object--the sensible body; and the "intellectual," in regard to the most common object--universal being. Secondly, forasmuch as the soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the something extrinsic. And in this way there are again two kinds of powers in the soul: one--the "appetitive"--in respect of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to an end, which is first in the intention; the other--the "locomotive" power--in respect of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to the term of its operation and movement; for every animal is moved for the purpose of realizing its desires and intentions. The modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of living things. There are some living things in which there exists only vegetative power, as the plants. There are others in which with the vegetative there exists also the sensitive, but not the locomotive power; such as immovable animals, as shellfish. There are others which besides this have locomotive powers, as perfect animals, which require many things for their life, and consequently movement to seek necessaries of life from a distance. And there are some living things which with these have intellectual power--namely, men. But the appetitive power does not constitute a degree of living things; because wherever there is sense there is also appetite (De Anima ii, 3).
Iª q. 78 a. 1 ad 1 Et per hoc solvuntur duo prima obiecta.	Thus the first two objectives are hereby solved.
Iª q. 78 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod appetitus naturalis est inclinatio cuiuslibet rei in aliquid, ex natura sua, unde naturali appetitu quaelibet potentia desiderat sibi conveniens. Sed appetitus animalis consequitur formam apprehensam. Et ad huiusmodi appetitum requiritur specialis animae potentia, et non sufficit sola apprehensio. Res enim appetitur prout est in sua natura, non est autem secundum suam naturam in virtute apprehensiva, sed secundum suam similitudinem. Unde patet quod visus appetit naturaliter visibile solum ad suum actum, scilicet ad videndum, animal autem appetit rem visam per vim appetitivam, non solum ad videndum, sed etiam ad alios usus. Si autem non indigeret anima rebus perceptis a sensu, nisi propter actiones sensuum, scilicet ut eas sentiret; non oporteret appetitivum ponere speciale genus inter potentias animae, quia sufficeret appetitus naturalis potentiarum.	Reply to Objection 3. The "natural appetite" is that inclination which each thing has, of its own nature, for something; wherefore by its natural appetite each power desires something suitable to itself. But the "animal appetite" results from the form apprehended; this sort of appetite requires a special power of the soul--mere apprehension does not suffice. For a thing is desired as it exists in its own nature, whereas in the apprehensive power it exists not according to its own nature, but according to its likeness. Whence it is clear that sight desires naturally a visible object for the purpose of its act only--namely, for the purpose of seeing; but the animal by the appetitive power desires the thing seen, not merely for the purpose of seeing it, but also for other purposes. But if the soul did not require things perceived by the senses, except on account of the actions of the senses, that is, for the purpose of sensing them; there would be no need for a special genus of appetitive powers, since the natural appetite of the powers would suffice.
Iª q. 78 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, quamvis sensus et appetitus sint principia moventia in animalibus perfectis, non tamen sensus et appetitus, inquantum huiusmodi, sufficiunt ad movendum, nisi superadderetur eis aliqua virtus, nam in immobilibus animalibus est sensus et appetitus, non tamen habent vim motivam. Haec autem vis motiva non solum est in appetitu et sensu ut imperante motum; sed etiam est in ipsis partibus corporis, ut sint habilia ad obediendum appetitui animae moventis. Cuius signum est, quod quando membra removentur a sua dispositione naturali, non obediunt appetitui ad motum.	Reply to Objection 4. Although sense and appetite are principles of movement in perfect animals, yet sense and appetite, as such, are not sufficient to cause movement, unless another power be added to them; for immovable animals have sense and appetite, and yet they have not the power of motion. Now this motive power is not only in the appetite and sense as commanding the movement, but also in the parts of the body, to make them obey the appetite of the soul which moves them. Of this we have a sign in the fact that when the members are deprived of their natural disposition, they do not move in obedience to the appetite.
Iª q. 78 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter partes vegetativae assignentur, scilicet nutritivum, augmentativum, et generativum. Huiusmodi enim vires dicuntur naturales. Sed potentiae animae sunt supra vires naturales. Ergo huiusmodi vires non debent poni potentiae animae.	Objection 1. It would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are not fittingly described--namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and generative. For these are called "natural" forces. But the powers of the soul are above the natural forces. Therefore we should not class the above forces as powers of the soul.
Iª q. 78 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad id quod est commune viventibus et non viventibus, non debet aliqua potentia animae deputari. Sed generatio est communis omnibus generabilibus et corruptibilibus, tam viventibus quam non viventibus. Ergo vis generativa non debet poni potentia animae.	Objection 2. Further, we should not assign a particular power of the soul to that which is common to living and non-living things. But generation is common to all things that can be generated and corrupted, whether living or not living. Therefore the generative force should not be classed as a power of the soul.
Iª q. 78 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, anima potentior est quam natura corporea. Sed natura corporea eadem virtute activa dat speciem et debitam quantitatem. Ergo multo magis anima. Non est ergo alia potentia animae augmentativa a generativa.	Objection 3. Further, the soul is more powerful than the body. But the body by the same force gives species and quantity; much more, therefore, does the soul. Therefore the augmentative power of the soul is not distinct from the generative power.
Iª q. 78 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, unaquaeque res conservatur in esse per id per quod esse habet. Sed potentia generativa est per quam acquiritur esse viventis. Ergo per eandem res viva conservatur. Sed ad conservationem rei viventis ordinatur vis nutritiva, ut dicitur in II de anima, est enim potentia potens salvare suscipiens ipsam. Non debet ergo distingui nutritiva potentia a generativa.	Objection 4. Further, everything is preserved in being by that whereby it exists. But the generative power is that whereby a living thing exists. Therefore by the same power the living thing is preserved. Now the nutritive force is directed to the preservation of the living thing (De Anima ii, 4), being "a power which is capable of preserving whatever receives it." Therefore we should not distinguish the nutritive power from the generative.
Iª q. 78 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II de anima, quod opera huius animae sunt generare, et alimento uti, et iterum augmentum facere.	On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2,4) that the operations of this soul are "generation, the use of food," and (cf. De Anima iii, 9) "growth."
Iª q. 78 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod tres sunt potentiae vegetativae partis. Vegetativum enim, ut dictum est, habet pro obiecto ipsum corpus vivens per animam, ad quod quidem corpus triplex animae operatio est necessaria. Una quidem, per quam esse acquirat, et ad hoc ordinatur potentia generativa. Alia vero, per quam corpus vivum acquirit debitam quantitatem, et ad hoc ordinatur vis augmentativa. Alia vero, per quam corpus viventis salvatur et in esse, et in quantitate debita, et ad hoc ordinatur vis nutritiva. Est tamen quaedam differentia attendenda inter has potentias. Nam nutritiva et augmentativa habent suum effectum in eo in quo sunt, quia ipsum corpus unitum animae augetur et conservatur per vim augmentativam et nutritivam in eadem anima existentem. Sed vis generativa habet effectum suum, non in eodem corpore, sed in alio, quia nihil est generativum sui ipsius. Et ideo vis generativa quodammodo appropinquat ad dignitatem animae sensitivae, quae habet operationem in res exteriores, licet excellentiori modo et universaliori, supremum enim inferioris naturae attingit id quod est infimum superioris, ut patet per Dionysium, in VII cap. de Div. Nom. Et ideo inter istas tres potentias finalior et principalior et perfectior est generativa, ut dicitur in II de anima, est enim rei iam perfectae facere alteram qualis ipsa est. Generativae autem deserviunt et augmentativa et nutritiva, augmentativae vero nutritiva.	I answer that, The vegetative part has three powers. For the vegetative part, as we have said (1), has for its object the body itself, living by the soul; for which body a triple operation of the soul is required. One is whereby it acquires existence, and to this is directed the "generative" power. Another is whereby the living body acquires its due quantity; to this is directed the "augmentative" power. Another is whereby the body of a living thing is preserved in its existence and in its due quantity; to this is directed the "nutritive" power. We must, however, observe a difference among these powers. The nutritive and the augmentative have their effect where they exist, since the body itself united to the soul grows and is preserved by the augmentative and nutritive powers which exist in one and the same soul. But the generative power has its effect, not in one and the same body but in another; for a thing cannot generate itself. Therefore the generative power, in a way, approaches to the dignity of the sensitive soul, which has an operation extending to extrinsic things, although in a more excellent and more universal manner; for that which is highest in an inferior nature approaches to that which is lowest in the higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore, of these three powers, the generative has the greater finality, nobility, and perfection, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4), for it belongs to a thing which is already perfect to "produce another like unto itself." And the generative power is served by the augmentative and nutritive powers; and the augmentative power by the nutritive.
Iª q. 78 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi vires dicuntur naturales, tum quia habent effectum similem naturae, quae etiam dat esse et quantitatem et conservationem (licet hae vires habeant hoc altiori modo), tum quia hae vires exercent suas actiones instrumentaliter per qualitates activas et passivas, quae sunt naturalium actionum principia.	Reply to Objection 1. Such forces are called natural, both because they produce an effect like that of nature, which also gives existence, quantity and preservation (although the above forces accomplish these things in a more perfect way); and because those forces perform their actions instrumentally, through the active and passive qualities, which are the principles of natural actions.
Iª q. 78 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod generatio in rebus inanimatis est totaliter ab extrinseco. Sed generatio viventium est quodam altiori modo, per aliquid ipsius viventis, quod est semen, in quo est aliquod principium corporis formativum. Et ideo oportet esse aliquam potentiam rei viventis, per quam semen huiusmodi praeparetur, et haec est vis generativa.	Reply to Objection 2. Generation of inanimate things is entirely from an extrinsic source; whereas the generation of living things is in a higher way, through something in the living thing itself, which is the semen containing the principle productive of the body. Therefore there must be in the living thing a power that prepares this semen; and this is the generative power.
Iª q. 78 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia generatio viventium est ex aliquo semine, oportet quod in principio animal generetur parvae quantitatis. Et propter hoc necesse est quod habeat potentiam animae, per quam ad debitam quantitatem perducatur. Sed corpus inanimatum generatur ex materia determinata ab agente extrinseco, et ideo simul recipit speciem et quantitatem secundum materiae conditionem.	Reply to Objection 3. Since the generation of living things is from a semen, it is necessary that in the beginning an animal of small size be generated. For this reason it must have a power in the soul, whereby it is brought to its appropriate size. But the inanimate body is generated from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent; therefore it receives at once its nature and its quantity, according to the condition of the matter.
Iª q. 78 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, operatio vegetativi principii completur mediante calore, cuius est humidum consumere. Et ideo, ad restaurationem humidi deperditi, necesse est habere potentiam nutritivam, per quam alimentum convertatur in substantiam corporis. Quod etiam est necessarium ad actum virtutis augmentativae et generativae.	Reply to Objection 4. As we have said above (1), the operation of the vegetative principle is performed by means of heat, the property of which is to consume humidity. Therefore, in order to restore the humidity thus lost, the nutritive power is required, whereby the food is changed into the substance of the body. This is also necessary for the action of the augmentative and generative powers.
Iª q. 78 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur quinque sensus exteriores. Sensus enim est cognoscitivus accidentium. Sunt autem multa genera accidentium. Cum ergo potentiae distinguantur per obiecta, videtur quod sensus multiplicentur secundum numerum qui est in generibus accidentium.	Objection 1. It would seem inaccurate to distinguish five exterior senses. But there are many kinds of accidents. Therefore, as powers are distinguished by their objects, it seems that the senses are multiplied according to the number of the kinds of accidents.
Iª q. 78 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, magnitudo et figura, et alia quae dicuntur sensibilia communia, non sunt sensibilia per accidens, sed contra ea dividuntur in II de anima. Diversitas autem per se obiectorum diversificat potentias. Cum ergo plus differant magnitudo et figura a colore quam sonus; videtur quod multo magis debeat esse alia potentia sensitiva cognoscitiva magnitudinis aut figurae, quam coloris et soni.	Objection 2. Further, magnitude and shape, and other things which are called "common sensibles," are "not sensibles by accident," but are contradistinguished from them by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 6). Now the diversity of objects, as such, diversifies the powers. Since, therefore, magnitude and shape are further from color than sound is, it seems that there is much more need for another sensitive power than can grasp magnitude or shape than for that which grasps color or sound.
Iª q. 78 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, unus sensus est unius contrarietatis; sicut visus albi et nigri. Sed tactus est cognoscitivus plurium contrarietatum, scilicet calidi et frigidi, humidi et sicci, et huiusmodi. Ergo non est sensus unus, sed plures. Ergo plures sensus sunt quam quinque.	Objection 3. Further, one sense regards one contrariety; as sight regards white and black. But the sense of touch grasps several contraries; such as hot or cold, damp or dry, and suchlike. Therefore it is not a single sense but several. Therefore there are more than five senses.
Iª q. 78 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, species non dividitur contra genus. Sed gustus est tactus quidam. Ergo non debet poni alter sensus praeter tactum.	Objection 4. Further, a species is not divided against its genus. But taste is a kind of touch. Therefore it should not be classed as a distinct sense of touch.
Iª q. 78 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod non est alter sensus praeter quinque.	On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 1): "There is no other besides the five senses."
Iª q. 78 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod rationem distinctionis et numeri sensuum exteriorum quidam accipere voluerunt ex parte organorum, in quibus aliquod elementorum dominatur, vel aqua, vel aer, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Quidam autem ex parte medii, quod est vel coniunctum, vel extrinsecum; et hoc vel aer, vel aqua, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Quidam autem ex diversa natura sensibilium qualitatum, secundum quod est qualitas simplicis corporis, vel sequens complexionem. Sed nihil istorum conveniens est. Non enim potentiae sunt propter organa, sed organa propter potentias, unde non propter hoc sunt diversae potentiae, quia sunt diversa organa; sed ideo natura instituit diversitatem in organis, ut congruerent diversitati potentiarum. Et similiter diversa media diversis sensibus attribuit, secundum quod erat conveniens ad actus potentiarum. Naturas autem sensibilium qualitatum cognoscere non est sensus, sed intellectus. Accipienda est ergo ratio numeri et distinctionis exteriorum sensuum, secundum illud quod proprie et per se ad sensum pertinet. Est autem sensus quaedam potentia passiva, quae nata est immutari ab exteriori sensibili. Exterius ergo immutativum est quod per se a sensu percipitur, et secundum cuius diversitatem sensitivae potentiae distinguuntur. Est autem duplex immutatio, una naturalis, et alia spiritualis. Naturalis quidem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse naturale, sicut calor in calefacto. Spiritualis autem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse spirituale; ut forma coloris in pupilla, quae non fit per hoc colorata. Ad operationem autem sensus requiritur immutatio spiritualis, per quam intentio formae sensibilis fiat in organo sensus. Alioquin, si sola immutatio naturalis sufficeret ad sentiendum, omnia corpora naturalia sentirent dum alterantur. Sed in quibusdam sensibus invenitur immutatio spiritualis tantum, sicut in visu. In quibusdam autem, cum immutatione spirituali, etiam naturalis; vel ex parte obiecti tantum, vel etiam ex parte organi. Ex parte autem obiecti, invenitur transmutatio naturalis, secundum locum quidem, in sono, qui est obiectum auditus, nam sonus ex percussione causatur et aeris commotione. Secundum alterationem vero, in odore, qui est obiectum olfactus, oportet enim per calidum alterari aliquo modo corpus, ad hoc quod spiret odorem. Ex parte autem organi, est immutatio naturalis in tactu et gustu, nam et manus tangens calida calefit, et lingua humectatur per humiditatem saporum. Organum vero olfactus aut auditus nulla naturali immutatione immutatur in sentiendo, nisi per accidens. Visus autem, quia est absque immutatione naturali et organi et obiecti, est maxime spiritualis, et perfectior inter omnes sensus, et communior. Et post hoc auditus, et deinde olfactus, qui habent immutationem naturalem ex parte obiecti. Motus tamen localis est perfectior et naturaliter prior quam motus alterationis, ut probatur in VIII Physic. Tactus autem et gustus sunt maxime materiales, de quorum distinctione post dicetur. Et inde est quod alii tres sensus non fiunt per medium coniunctum, ne aliqua naturalis transmutatio pertingat ad organum, ut accidit in his duobus sensibus.	I answer that, The reason of the distinction and number of the senses has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other of the elements preponderate, as water, air, or the like. By others it has been assigned to the medium, which is either in conjunction or extrinsic and is either water or air, or such like. Others have ascribed it to the various natures of the sensible qualities, according as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from complexity. But none of these explanations is apt. For the powers are not for the organs, but the organs for the powers; wherefore there are not various powers for the reason that there are various organs; on the contrary, for this has nature provided a variety of organs, that they might be adapted to various powers. In the same way nature provided various mediums for the various senses, according to the convenience of the acts of the powers. And to be cognizant of the natures of sensible qualities does not pertain to the senses, but to the intellect. The reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses properly and "per se." Now, sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such immutation is what is "per se" perceived by the sense, and according to the diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers diversified. Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual. Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received according to its natural existence, into the thing immuted, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing immuted, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby become colored. Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the sensile organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel when they undergo alteration. But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in "sight" while in others we find not only spiritual but also a natural immutation; either on the part of the object only, or likewise on the part of the organ. On the part of the object we find natural immutation, as to place, in sound which is the object of "hearing"; for sound is caused by percussion and commotion of air: and we find natural immutation by alteration, in odor which is the object of "smelling"; for in order to exhale an odor, a body must be in a measure affected by heat. On the part of an organ, natural immutation takes place in "touch" and "taste"; for the hand that touches something hot becomes hot, while the tongue is moistened by the humidity of the flavored morsel. But the organs of smelling and hearing are not affected in their respective operations by any natural immutation unless indirectly. Now, the sight, which is without natural immutation either in its organ or in its object, is the most spiritual, the most perfect, and the most universal of all the senses. After this comes the hearing and then the smell, which require a natural immutation on the part of the object; while local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the motion of alteration, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). Touch and taste are the most material of all: of the distinction of which we shall speak later on (ad 3,4). Hence it is that the three other senses are not exercised through a medium united to them, to obviate any natural immutation in their organ; as happens as regards these two senses.
Iª q. 78 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non omnia accidentia habent vim immutativam secundum se; sed solae qualitates tertiae speciei, secundum quas contingit alteratio. Et ideo solae huiusmodi qualitates sunt obiecta sensuum, quia, ut dicitur in VII Physic., secundum eadem alteratur sensus, secundum quae alterantur corpora inanimata.	Reply to Objection 1. Not every accident has in itself a power of immutation but only qualities of the third species, which are the principles of alteration: therefore only suchlike qualities are the objects of the senses; because "the senses are affected by the same things whereby inanimate bodies are affected," as stated in Phys. vii, 2.
Iª q. 78 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod magnitudo et figura et huiusmodi, quae dicuntur communia sensibilia, sunt media inter sensibilia per accidens et sensibilia propria, quae sunt obiecta sensuum. Nam sensibilia propria primo et per se immutant sensum; cum sint qualitates alterantes. Sensibilia vero communia omnia reducuntur ad quantitatem. Et de magnitudine quidem et numero, patet quod sunt species quantitatis. Figura autem est qualitas circa quantitatem; cum consistat ratio figurae in terminatione magnitudinis. Motus autem et quies sentiuntur, secundum quod subiectum uno modo vel pluribus modis se habet secundum magnitudinem subiecti vel localis distantiae, quantum ad motum augmenti et motum localem; vel etiam secundum sensibiles qualitates, ut in motu alterationis, et sic sentire motum et quietem est quodammodo sentire unum et multa. Quantitas autem est proximum subiectum qualitatis alterativae, ut superficies coloris. Et ideo sensibilia communia non movent sensum primo et per se, sed ratione sensibilis qualitatis; ut superficies ratione coloris. Nec tamen sunt sensibilia per accidens, quia huiusmodi sensibilia aliquam diversitatem faciunt in immutatione sensus. Alio enim modo immutatur sensus a magna superficie, et a parva, quia etiam ipsa albedo dicitur magna vel parva, et ideo dividitur secundum proprium subiectum.	Reply to Objection 2. Size, shape, and the like, which are called "common sensibles," are midway between "accidental sensibles" and "proper sensibles," which are the objects of the senses. For the proper sensibles first, and of their very nature, affect the senses; since they are qualities that cause alteration. But the common sensibles are all reducible to quantity. As to size and number, it is clear that they are species of quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity, since the notion of shape consists of fixing the bounds of magnitude. Movement and rest are sensed according as the subject is affected in one or more ways in the magnitude of the subject or of its local distance, as in the movement of growth or of locomotion, or again, according as it is affected in some sensible qualities, as in the movement of alteration; and thus to sense movement and rest is, in a way, to sense one thing and many. Now quantity is the proximate subject of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of color. Therefore the common sensibles do not move the senses first and of their own nature, but by reason of the sensible quality; as the surface by reason of color. Yet they are not accidental sensibles, for they produce a certain variety in the immutation of the senses. For sense is immuted differently by a large and by a small surface: since whiteness itself is said to be great or small, and therefore it is divided according to its proper subject.
Iª q. 78 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut philosophus videtur dicere in II de anima, sensus tactus est unus genere, sed dividitur in multos sensus secundum speciem; et propter hoc est diversarum contrarietatum. Qui tamen non separantur ab invicem secundum organum, sed per totum corpus se concomitantur; et ideo eorum distinctio non apparet. Gustus autem, qui est perceptivus dulcis et amari, concomitatur tactum in lingua, non autem per totum corpus; et ideo de facili a tactu distinguitur. Posset tamen dici quod omnes illae contrarietates, et singulae conveniunt in uno genere proximo, et omnes in uno genere communi, quod est obiectum tactus secundum rationem communem. Sed illud genus commune est innominatum; sicut etiam genus proximum calidi et frigidi est innominatum.	Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher seems to say (De Anima ii, 11), the sense of touch is generically one, but is divided into several specific senses, and for this reason it extends to various contrarieties; which senses, however, are not separate from one another in their organ, but are spread throughout the whole body, so that their distinction is not evident. But taste, which perceives the sweet and the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue, but not in the whole body; so it is easily distinguished from touch. We might also say that all those contrarieties agree, each in some proximate genus, and all in a common genus, which is the common and formal object of touch. Such common genus is, however, unnamed, just as the proximate genus of hot and cold is unnamed.
Iª q. 78 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod sensus gustus, secundum dictum philosophi, est quaedam species tactus quae est in lingua tantum. Non autem distinguitur a tactu in genere, sed a tactu quantum ad illas species quae per totum corpus diffunduntur. Si vero tactus sit unus sensus tantum, propter unam rationem communem obiecti, dicendum erit quod secundum rationem diversam immutationis, distinguitur gustus a tactu. Nam tactus immutatur naturali immutatione, et non solum spirituali, quantum ad organum suum, secundum qualitatem quae ei proprie obiicitur. Gustus autem organum non immutatur de necessitate naturali immutatione secundum qualitatem quae ei proprie obiicitur, ut scilicet lingua fiat dulcis vel amara; sed secundum praeambulam qualitatem, in qua fundatur sapor, scilicet secundum humorem, qui est obiectum tactus.	Reply to Objection 4. The sense of taste, according to a saying of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9), is a kind of touch existing in the tongue only. It is not distinct from touch in general, but only from the species of touch distributed in the body. But if touch is one sense only, on account of the common formality of its object: we must say that taste is distinguished from touch by reason of a different formality of immutation. For touch involves a natural, and not only a spiritual, immutation in its organ, by reason of the quality which is its proper object. But the organ of taste is not necessarily immuted by a natural immutation by reason of the quality which is its proper object, so that the tongue itself becomes sweet and bitter: but by reason of a quality which is a preamble to, and on which is based, the flavor, which quality is moisture, the object of touch.
Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod interiores sensus inconvenienter distinguantur. Commune enim non dividitur contra proprium. Ergo sensus communis non debet enumerari inter vires interiores sensitivas, praeter sensus exteriores proprios.	Objection 1. It would seem that the interior senses are not suitably distinguished. For the common is not divided against the proper. Therefore the common sense should not be numbered among the interior sensitive powers, in addition to the proper exterior senses.
Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad id ad quod sufficit sensus proprius et exterior, non oportet ponere aliquam vim apprehensivam interiorem. Sed ad iudicandum de sensibilibus, sufficiunt sensus proprii et exteriores, unusquisque enim sensus iudicat de proprio obiecto. Similiter etiam videntur sufficere ad hoc quod percipiant suos actus, quia cum actio sensus sit quodammodo medium inter potentiam et obiectum, videtur quod multo magis visus possit suam visionem, tanquam sibi propinquiorem, percipere, quam colorem; et sic de aliis. Non ergo necessarium fuit ad hoc ponere interiorem potentiam, quae dicatur sensus communis.	Objection 2. Further, there is no need to assign an interior power of apprehension when the proper and exterior sense suffices. But the proper and exterior senses suffice for us to judge of sensible things; for each sense judges of its proper object. In like manner they seem to suffice for the perception of their own actions; for since the action of the sense is, in a way, between the power and its object, it seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its own vision, as being nearer to it, than the color; and in like manner with the other senses. Therefore for this there is no need to assign an interior power, called the common sense.
Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, secundum philosophum, phantasticum et memorativum sunt passiones primi sensitivi. Sed passio non dividitur contra subiectum. Ergo memoria et phantasia non debent poni aliae potentiae praeter sensum.	Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin. i), the imagination and the memory are passions of the "first sensitive." But passion is not divided against its subject. Therefore memory and imagination should not be assigned as powers distinct from the senses.
Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, intellectus minus dependet a sensu, quam quaecumque potentia sensitivae partis. Sed intellectus nihil cognoscit nisi accipiendo a sensu, unde dicitur in I posteriorum, quod quibus deest unus sensus, deficit una scientia. Ergo multo minus debet poni una potentia sensitivae partis ad percipiendum intentiones quas non percipit sensus, quam vocant aestimativam.	Objection 4. Further, the intellect depends on the senses less than any power of the sensitive part. But the intellect knows nothing but what it receives from the senses; whence we read (Poster. i, 8), that "those who lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge." Therefore much less should we assign to the sensitive part a power, which they call the "estimative" power, for the perception of intentions which the sense does not perceive.
Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, actus cogitativae, qui est conferre et componere et dividere, et actus reminiscitivae, qui est quodam syllogismo uti ad inquirendum, non minus distant ab actu aestimativae et memorativae, quam actus aestimativae ab actu phantasiae. Debent ergo vel cogitativa et reminiscitiva poni aliae vires praeter aestimativam et memorativam; vel aestimativa et memorativa non debent poni aliae vires praeter phantasiam.	Objection 5. Further, the action of the cogitative power, which consists in comparing, adding and dividing, and the action of the reminiscence, which consists in the use of a kind of syllogism for the sake of inquiry, is not less distant from the actions of the estimative and memorative powers, than the action of the estimative is from the action of the imagination. Therefore either we must add the cognitive and reminiscitive to the estimative and memorative powers, or the estimative and memorative powers should not be made distinct from the imagination.
Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 6 Praeterea, Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., ponit tria genera visionum, scilicet corporalem, quae fit per sensum; et spiritualem, quae fit per imaginationem sive phantasiam; et intellectualem, quae fit per intellectum. Non est ergo aliqua vis interior quae sit media inter sensum et intellectum, nisi imaginativa tantum.	Objection 6. Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6,7,24) describes three kinds of vision; namely, corporeal, which is the action of the sense; spiritual, which is an action of the imagination or phantasy; and intellectual, which is an action of the intellect. Therefore there is no interior power between the sense and intellect, besides the imagination.
Iª q. 78 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Avicenna, in suo libro de anima, ponit quinque potentias sensitivas interiores, scilicet sensum communem, phantasiam, imaginativam, aestimativam, et memorativam.	On the contrary, Avicenna (De Anima iv, 1) assigns five interior sensitive powers; namely, "common sense, phantasy, imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers."
Iª q. 78 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum natura non deficiat in necessariis, oportet esse tot actiones animae sensitivae, quot sufficiant ad vitam animalis perfecti. Et quaecumque harum actionum non possunt reduci in unum principium, requirunt diversas potentias, cum potentia animae nihil aliud sit quam proximum principium operationis animae. Est autem considerandum quod ad vitam animalis perfecti requiritur quod non solum apprehendat rem apud praesentiam sensibilis, sed etiam apud eius absentiam. Alioquin, cum animalis motus et actio sequantur apprehensionem, non moveretur animal ad inquirendum aliquid absens; cuius contrarium apparet maxime in animalibus perfectis, quae moventur motu processivo; moventur enim ad aliquid absens apprehensum. Oportet ergo quod animal per animam sensitivam non solum recipiat species sensibilium, cum praesentialiter immutatur ab eis; sed etiam eas retineat et conservet. Recipere autem et retinere reducuntur in corporalibus ad diversa principia, nam humida bene recipiunt, et male retinent; e contrario autem est de siccis. Unde, cum potentia sensitiva sit actus organi corporalis, oportet esse aliam potentiam quae recipiat species sensibilium, et quae conservet. Rursus considerandum est quod, si animal moveretur solum propter delectabile et contristabile secundum sensum, non esset necessarium ponere in animali nisi apprehensionem formarum quas percipit sensus, in quibus delectatur aut horret. Sed necessarium est animali ut quaerat aliqua vel fugiat, non solum quia sunt convenientia vel non convenientia ad sentiendum, sed etiam propter aliquas alias commoditates et utilitates, sive nocumenta, sicut ovis videns lupum venientem fugit, non propter indecentiam coloris vel figurae, sed quasi inimicum naturae; et similiter avis colligit paleam, non quia delectet sensum, sed quia est utilis ad nidificandum. Necessarium est ergo animali quod percipiat huiusmodi intentiones, quas non percipit sensus exterior. Et huius perceptionis oportet esse aliquod aliud principium, cum perceptio formarum sensibilium sit ex immutatione sensibilis, non autem perceptio intentionum praedictarum. Sic ergo ad receptionem formarum sensibilium ordinatur sensus proprius et communis, de quorum distinctione post dicetur. Ad harum autem formarum retentionem aut conservationem ordinatur phantasia, sive imaginatio, quae idem sunt, est enim phantasia sive imaginatio quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum. Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non accipiuntur, ordinatur vis aestimativa. Ad conservandum autem eas, vis memorativa, quae est thesaurus quidam huiusmodi intentionum. Cuius signum est, quod principium memorandi fit in animalibus ex aliqua huiusmodi intentione, puta quod est nocivum vel conveniens. Et ipsa ratio praeteriti, quam attendit memoria, inter huiusmodi intentiones computatur. Considerandum est autem quod, quantum ad formas sensibiles, non est differentia inter hominem et alia animalia, similiter enim immutantur a sensibilibus exterioribus. Sed quantum ad intentiones praedictas, differentia est, nam alia animalia percipiunt huiusmodi intentiones solum naturali quodam instinctu, homo autem etiam per quandam collationem. Et ideo quae in aliis animalibus dicitur aestimativa naturalis, in homine dicitur cogitativa, quae per collationem quandam huiusmodi intentiones adinvenit. Unde etiam dicitur ratio particularis, cui medici assignant determinatum organum, scilicet mediam partem capitis, est enim collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio intellectiva intentionum universalium. Ex parte autem memorativae, non solum habet memoriam, sicut cetera animalia, in subita recordatione praeteritorum; sed etiam reminiscentiam, quasi syllogistice inquirendo praeteritorum memoriam, secundum individuales intentiones. Avicenna vero ponit quintam potentiam, mediam inter aestimativam et imaginativam, quae componit et dividit formas imaginatas; ut patet cum ex forma imaginata auri et forma imaginata montis componimus unam formam montis aurei, quem nunquam vidimus. Sed ista operatio non apparet in aliis animalibus ab homine, in quo ad hoc sufficit virtus imaginativa. Cui etiam hanc actionem attribuit Averroes, in libro quodam quem fecit de sensu et sensibilibus. Et sic non est necesse ponere nisi quatuor vires interiores sensitivae partis, scilicet sensum communem et imaginationem, aestimativam et memorativam.	I answer that, As nature does not fail in necessary things, there must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for the life of a perfect animal. If any of these actions cannot be reduced to the same one principle, they must be assigned to diverse powers; since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the soul's operation. Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal, the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of sensation, but also when it is absent. Otherwise, since animal motion and action follow apprehension, an animal would not be moved to seek something absent: the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect animals, which are moved by progression, for they are moved towards something apprehended and absent. Therefore an animal through the sensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things, when it is actually affected by them, but it must also retain and preserve them. Now to receive and retain are, in corporeal things, reduced to diverse principles; for moist things are apt to receive, but retain with difficulty, while it is the reverse with dry things. Wherefore, since the sensitive power is the act of a corporeal organ, it follows that the power which receives the species of sensible things must be distinct from the power which preserves them. Again we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the sense, there would be no need to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also on account of other advantages and uses, or disadvantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not on account of its color or shape, but as a natural enemy: and again a bird gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to the sense, but because they are useful for building its nest. Animals, therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which the exterior sense does not perceive. And some distinct principle is necessary for this; since the perception of sensible forms comes by an immutation caused by the sensible, which is not the case with the perception of those intentions. Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the "proper sense" and the "common sense" are appointed, and of their distinction we shall speak farther on (ad 1,2). But for the retention and preservation of these forms, the "phantasy" or "imagination" is appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the "estimative" power is appointed: and for the preservation thereof, the "memorative" power, which is a storehouse of such-like intentions. A sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of memory in animals is found in some such intention, for instance, that something is harmful or otherwise. And the very formality of the past, which memory observes, is to be reckoned among these intentions. Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between man and other animals; for they are similarly immuted by the extrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above intentions: for other animals perceive these intentions only by some natural instinct, while man perceives them by means of coalition of ideas. Therefore the power by which in other animals is called the natural estimative, in man is called the "cogitative," which by some sort of collation discovers these intentions. Wherefore it is also called the "particular reason," to which medical men assign a certain particular organ, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions. As to the memorative power, man has not only memory, as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past; but also "reminiscence" by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a recollection of the past by the application of individual intentions. Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative, a fifth power, which combines and divides imaginary forms: as when from the imaginary form of gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen. But this operation is not to be found in animals other than man, in whom the imaginative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes attribute this action in his book De sensu et sensibilibus (viii). So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive part--namely, the common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers.
Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensus interior non dicitur communis per praedicationem, sicut genus; sed sicut communis radix et principium exteriorum sensuum.	Reply to Objection 1. The interior sense is called "common" not by predication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and principle of the exterior senses.
Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod sensus proprius iudicat de sensibili proprio, discernendo ipsum ab aliis quae cadunt sub eodem sensu, sicut discernendo album a nigro vel a viridi. Sed discernere album a dulci non potest neque visus neque gustus, quia oportet quod qui inter aliqua discernit, utrumque cognoscat. Unde oportet ad sensum communem pertinere discretionis iudicium, ad quem referantur, sicut ad communem terminum, omnes apprehensiones sensuum; a quo etiam percipiantur intentiones sensuum, sicut cum aliquis videt se videre. Hoc enim non potest fieri per sensum proprium, qui non cognoscit nisi formam sensibilis a quo immutatur; in qua immutatione perficitur visio, et ex qua immutatione sequitur alia immutatio in sensu communi, qui visionem percipit.	Reply to Objection 2. The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by discerning it from other things which come under the same sense; for instance, by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet: because what discerns between two things must know both. Wherefore the discerning judgment must be assigned to the common sense; to which, as to a common term, all apprehensions of the senses must be referred: and by which, again, all the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which only knows the form of the sensible by which it is immuted, in which immutation the action of sight is completed, and from immutation follows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision.
Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut una potentia oritur ab anima, alia mediante, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam anima subiicitur alii potentiae, mediante alia. Et secundum hunc modum, phantasticum et memorativum dicuntur passiones primi sensitivi.	Reply to Objection 3. As one power arises from the soul by means of another, as we have seen above (77, 7), so also the soul is the subject of one power through another. In this way the imagination and the memory are called passions of the "first sensitive."
Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet intellectus operatio oriatur a sensu, tamen in re apprehensa per sensum intellectus multa cognoscit quae sensus percipere non potest. Et similiter aestimativa, licet inferiori modo.	Reply to Objection 4. Although the operation of the intellect has its origin in the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. In like manner does the estimative power, though in a less perfect manner.
Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod illam eminentiam habet cogitativa et memorativa in homine, non per id quod est proprium sensitivae partis; sed per aliquam affinitatem et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, secundum quandam refluentiam. Et ideo non sunt aliae vires, sed eaedem, perfectiores quam sint in aliis animalibus.	Reply to Objection 5. The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them. Therefore they are not distinct powers, but the same, yet more perfect than in other animals.
Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod Augustinus spiritualem visionem dicit esse, quae fit per similitudines corporum in absentia corporum. Unde patet quod communis est omnibus interioribus apprehensionibus.	Reply to Objection 6. Augustine calls that vision spiritual which is effected by the images of bodies in the absence of bodies. Whence it is clear that it is common to all interior apprehensions.
Iª q. 79 pr. Deinde quaeritur de potentiis intellectivis. Circa quod quaeruntur tredecim. Primo, utrum intellectus sit potentia animae, vel eius essentia. Secundo, si est potentia, utrum sit potentia passiva. Tertio, si est potentia passiva, utrum sit ponere aliquem intellectum agentem. Quarto, utrum sit aliquid animae. Quinto, utrum intellectus agens sit unus omnium. Sexto, utrum memoria sit in intellectu. Septimo, utrum sit alia potentia ab intellectu. Octavo, utrum ratio sit alia potentia ab intellectu. Nono, utrum ratio superior et inferior sint diversae potentiae. Decimo, utrum intelligentia sit alia potentia praeter intellectum. Undecimo, utrum intellectus speculativus et practicus sint diversae potentiae. Duodecimo, utrum synderesis sit aliqua potentia intellectivae partis. Tertiodecimo, utrum conscientia sit aliqua potentia intellectivae partis.
Iª q. 79 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit aliqua potentia animae, sed sit ipsa eius essentia. Intellectus idem enim videtur esse quod mens. Sed mens non est potentia animae sed essentia, dicit enim Augustinus, IX de Trin., mens et spiritus non relative dicuntur, sed essentiam demonstrant. Ergo intellectus est ipsa essentia animae.	Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the soul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the essence; for Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 2): "Mind and spirit are not relative things, but denominate the essence." Therefore the intellect is the essence of the soul.
Iª q. 79 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, diversa genera potentiarum animae non uniuntur in aliqua potentia una, sed in sola essentia animae. Appetitivum autem et intellectivum sunt diversa genera potentiarum animae, ut dicitur in II de anima; conveniunt autem in mente, quia Augustinus, X de Trin., ponit intelligentiam et voluntatem in mente. Ergo mens et intellectus est ipsa essentia animae, et non aliqua eius potentia.	Objection 2. Further, different genera of the soul's powers are not united in some one power, but only in the essence of the soul. Now the appetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the soul's powers as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but they are united in the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) places the intelligence and will in the mind. Therefore the mind and intellect of man is of the very essence of the soul and not a power thereof.
Iª q. 79 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, secundum Gregorium, in homilia ascensionis, homo intelligit cum Angelis. Sed Angeli dicuntur mentes et intellectus. Ergo mens et intellectus hominis non est aliqua potentia animae, sed ipsa anima.	Objection 3. Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the Ascension (xxix in Ev.), "man understands with the angels." But angels are called "minds" and "intellects." Therefore the mind and intellect of man are not a power of the soul, but the soul itself.
Iª q. 79 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, ex hoc convenit alicui substantiae quod sit intellectiva, quia est immaterialis. Sed anima est immaterialis per suam essentiam. Ergo videtur quod anima per suam essentiam sit intellectiva.	Objection 4. Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact that it is immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its essence. Therefore it seems that the soul must be intellectual through its essence.
Iª q. 79 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus ponit intellectivum potentiam animae, ut patet in II de anima.	On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty as a power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3).
Iª q. 79 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere, secundum praemissa, quod intellectus sit aliqua potentia animae, et non ipsa animae essentia. Tunc enim solum immediatum principium operationis est ipsa essentia rei operantis, quando ipsa operatio est eius esse, sicut enim potentia se habet ad operationem ut ad suum actum, ita se habet essentia ad esse. In solo Deo autem idem est intelligere quod suum esse. Unde in solo Deo intellectus est eius essentia, in aliis autem creaturis intellectualibus intellectus est quaedam potentia intelligentis.	I answer that, In accordance with what has been already shown (54, 3; 77, 1) it is necessary to say that the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul. For then alone the essence of that which operates is the immediate principle of operation, when operation itself is its being: for as power is to operation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in God alone His action of understanding is His very Being. Wherefore in God alone is His intellect His essence: while in other intellectual creatures, the intellect is power.
Iª q. 79 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensus accipitur aliquando pro potentia, aliquando vero pro ipsa anima sensitiva, denominatur enim anima sensitiva nomine principalioris suae potentiae, quae est sensus. Et similiter anima intellectiva quandoque nominatur nomine intellectus, quasi a principaliori sua virtute; sicut dicitur in I de anima, quod intellectus est substantia quaedam. Et etiam hoc modo Augustinus dicit quod mens est spiritus, vel essentia.	Reply to Objection 1. Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul takes its name from its chief power, which is sense. And in like manner the intellectual soul is sometimes called intellect, as from its chief power; and thus we read (De Anima i, 4), that the "intellect is a substance." And in this sense also Augustine says that the mind is spirit and essence (De Trin. ix, 2; xiv, 16).
Iª q. 79 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod appetitivum et intellectivum sunt diversa genera potentiarum animae, secundum diversas rationes obiectorum. Sed appetitivum partim convenit cum intellectivo, et partim cum sensitivo, quantum ad modum operandi per organum corporale, vel sine huiusmodi organo, nam appetitus sequitur apprehensionem. Et secundum hoc Augustinus ponit voluntatem in mente, et philosophus in ratione.	Reply to Objection 2. The appetitive and intellectual powers are different genera of powers in the soul, by reason of the different formalities of their objects. But the appetitive power agrees partly with the intellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its mode of operation either through a corporeal organ or without it: for appetite follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine puts the will in the mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason (De Anima iii, 9).
Iª q. 79 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in Angelis non est alia vis nisi intellectiva, et voluntas, quae ad intellectum consequitur. Et propter hoc Angelus dicitur mens vel intellectus, quia tota virtus sua in hoc consistit. Anima autem habet multas alias vires, sicut sensitivas et nutritivas, et ideo non est simile.	Reply to Objection 3. In the angels there is no other power besides the intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. And for this reason an angel is called a "mind" or an "intellect"; because his whole power consists in this. But the soul has many other powers, such as the sensitive and nutritive powers, and therefore the comparison fails.
Iª q. 79 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod ipsa immaterialitas substantiae intelligentis creatae non est eius intellectus; sed ex immaterialitate habet virtutem ad intelligendum. Unde non oportet quod intellectus sit substantia animae, sed eius virtus et potentia.	Reply to Objection 4. The immateriality of the created intelligent substance is not its intellect; and through its immateriality it has the power of intelligence. Wherefore it follows not that the intellect is the substance of the soul, but that it is its virtue and power.
Iª q. 79 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit potentia passiva. Patitur enim unumquodque secundum materiam; sed agit ratione formae. Sed virtus intellectiva consequitur immaterialitatem substantiae intelligentis. Ergo videtur quod intellectus non sit potentia passiva.	Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect is not a passive power. For everything is passive by its matter, and acts by its form. But the intellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent substance. Therefore it seems that the intellect is not a passive power.
Iª q. 79 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, potentia intellectiva est incorruptibilis, ut supra dictum est. Sed intellectus si est passivus, est corruptibilis, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo potentia intellectiva non est passiva.	Objection 2. Further, the intellectual power is incorruptible, as we have said above (79, 6). But "if the intellect is passive, it is corruptible" (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore the intellectual power is not passive.
Iª q. 79 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, agens est nobilius patiente, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad Litt., et Aristoteles in III de anima. Potentiae autem vegetativae partis omnes sunt activae, quae tamen sunt infimae inter potentias animae. Ergo multo magis potentiae intellectivae, quae sunt supremae, omnes sunt activae.	Objection 3. Further, the "agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) says. But all the powers of the vegetative part are active; yet they are the lowest among the powers of the soul. Much more, therefore, all the intellectual powers, which are the highest, are active.
Iª q. 79 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intelligere est pati quoddam.	On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is in a way to be passive."
Iª q. 79 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod pati tripliciter dicitur. Uno modo, propriissime, scilicet quando aliquid removetur ab eo quod convenit sibi secundum naturam, aut secundum propriam inclinationem; sicut cum aqua frigiditatem amittit per calefactionem, et cum homo aegrotat aut tristatur. Secundo modo, minus proprie dicitur aliquis pati ex eo quod aliquid ab ipso abiicitur, sive sit ei conveniens, sive non conveniens. Et secundum hoc dicitur pati non solum qui aegrotat, sed etiam qui sanatur; non solum qui tristatur, sed etiam qui laetatur; vel quocumque modo aliquis alteretur vel moveatur. Tertio modo, dicitur aliquid pati communiter, ex hoc solo quod id quod est in potentia ad aliquid, recipit illud ad quod erat in potentia, absque hoc quod aliquid abiiciatur. Secundum quem modum, omne quod exit de potentia in actum, potest dici pati, etiam cum perficitur. Et sic intelligere nostrum est pati. Quod quidem hac ratione apparet. Intellectus enim, sicut supra dictum est, habet operationem circa ens in universali. Considerari ergo potest utrum intellectus sit in actu vel potentia, ex hoc quod consideratur quomodo intellectus se habeat ad ens universale. Invenitur enim aliquis intellectus qui ad ens universale se habet sicut actus totius entis, et talis est intellectus divinus, qui est Dei essentia, in qua originaliter et virtualiter totum ens praeexistit sicut in prima causa. Et ideo intellectus divinus non est in potentia, sed est actus purus. Nullus autem intellectus creatus potest se habere ut actus respectu totius entis universalis, quia sic oporteret quod esset ens infinitum. Unde omnis intellectus creatus, per hoc ipsum quod est, non est actus omnium intelligibilium, sed comparatur ad ipsa intelligibilia sicut potentia ad actum. Potentia autem dupliciter se habet ad actum. Est enim quaedam potentia quae semper est perfecta per actum; sicut diximus de materia corporum caelestium. Quaedam autem potentia est, quae non semper est in actu, sed de potentia procedit in actum; sicut invenitur in generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Intellectus igitur angelicus semper est in actu suorum intelligibilium, propter propinquitatem ad primum intellectum, qui est actus purus, ut supra dictum est. Intellectus autem humanus, qui est infimus in ordine intellectuum, et maxime remotus a perfectione divini intellectus, est in potentia respectu intelligibilium, et in principio est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum, ut philosophus dicit in III de anima. Quod manifeste apparet ex hoc, quod in principio sumus intelligentes solum in potentia, postmodum autem efficimur intelligentes in actu. Sic igitur patet quod intelligere nostrum est quoddam pati, secundum tertium modum passionis. Et per consequens intellectus est potentia passiva.	I answer that, To be passive may be taken in three ways. Firstly, in its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which belongs to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper inclination: as when water loses coolness by heating, and as when a man becomes ill or sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to be passive, when something, whether suitable or unsuitable, is taken away from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is said to be passive, but also he who is healed; not only he that is sad, but also he that is joyful; or whatever way he be altered or moved. Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act, may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand is to be passive. This is clear from the following reason. For the intellect, as we have seen above (78, 1), has an operation extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be in act or potentiality by observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the act of all being: and such is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence of God, in which originally and virtually, all being pre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the Divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure act. But no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole universal being; otherwise it would needs be an infinite being. Wherefore every created intellect is not the act of all things intelligible, by reason of its very existence; but is compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to act. Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is a potentiality which is always perfected by its act: as the matter of the heavenly bodies (58, 1). And there is another potentiality which is not always in act, but proceeds from potentiality to act; as we observe in things that are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the angelic intellect is always in act as regards those things which it can understand, by reason of its proximity to the first intellect, which is pure act, as we have said above. But the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). This is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to understand is "in a way to be passive"; taking passion in the third sense. And consequently the intellect is a passive power.
Iª q. 79 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de primo et secundo modo passionis, qui sunt proprii materiae primae. Tertius autem modus passionis est cuiuscumque in potentia existentis quod in actum reducitur.	Reply to Objection 1. This objection is verified of passion in the first and second senses, which belong to primary matter. But in the third sense passion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality to act.
Iª q. 79 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus passivus secundum quosdam dicitur appetitus sensitivus, in quo sunt animae passiones; qui etiam in I Ethic. dicitur rationalis per participationem, quia obedit rationi. Secundum alios autem intellectus passivus dicitur virtus cogitativa, quae nominatur ratio particularis. Et utroque modo passivum accipi potest secundum primos duos modos passionis, inquantum talis intellectus sic dictus, est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Sed intellectus qui est in potentia ad intelligibilia, quem Aristoteles ob hoc nominat intellectum possibilem, non est passivus nisi tertio modo, quia non est actus organi corporalis. Et ideo est incorruptibilis.	Reply to Objection 2. "Passive intellect" is the name given by some to the sensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul; which appetite is also called "rational by participation," because it "obeys the reason" (Ethic. i, 13). Others give the name of passive intellect to the cogitative power, which is called the "particular reason." And in each case "passive" may be taken in the two first senses; forasmuch as this so-called intellect is the act of a corporeal organ. But the intellect which is in potentiality to things intelligible, and which for this reason Aristotle calls the "possible" intellect (De Anima iii, 4) is not passive except in the third sense: for it is not an act of a corporeal organ. Hence it is incorruptible.
Iª q. 79 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod agens est nobilius patiente, si ad idem actio et passio referantur, non autem semper, si ad diversa. Intellectus autem est vis passiva respectu totius entis universalis. Vegetativum autem est activum respectu cuiusdam entis particularis, scilicet corporis coniuncti. Unde nihil prohibet huiusmodi passivum esse nobilius tali activo.	Reply to Objection 3. The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and the passion are referred to the same thing: but not always, if they refer to different things. Now the intellect is a passive power in regard to the whole universal being: while the vegetative power is active in regard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united to the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive force being nobler than such an active one.
Iª q. 79 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit ponere intellectum agentem. Sicut enim se habet sensus ad sensibilia, ita se habet intellectus noster ad intelligibilia. Sed quia sensus est in potentia ad sensibilia non ponitur sensus agens, sed sensus patiens tantum. Ergo, cum intellectus noster sit in potentia ad intelligibilia, videtur quod non debeat poni intellectus agens, sed possibilis tantum.	Objection 1. It would seem that there is no active intellect. For as the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible, the sense is not said to be active, but only passive. Therefore, since our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that we cannot say that the intellect is active, but only that it is passive.
Iª q. 79 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, si dicatur quod in sensu etiam est aliquod agens, sicut lumen, contra, lumen requiritur ad visum inquantum facit medium lucidum in actu, nam color ipse secundum se est motivus lucidi. Sed in operatione intellectus non ponitur aliquod medium quod necesse sit fieri in actu. Ergo non est necessarium ponere intellectum agentem.	Objection 2. Further, if we say that also in the senses there is something active, such as light: on the contrary, light is required for sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous; for color of its own nature moves the luminous medium. But in the operation of the intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into act. Therefore there is no necessity for an active intellect.
Iª q. 79 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, similitudo agentis recipitur in patiente secundum modum patientis. Sed intellectus possibilis est virtus immaterialis. Ergo immaterialitas eius sufficit ad hoc quod recipiantur in eo formae immaterialiter. Sed ex hoc ipso aliqua forma est intelligibilis in actu, quod est immaterialis. Ergo nulla necessitas est ponere intellectum agentem, ad hoc quod faciat species intelligibiles in actu.	Objection 3. Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the patient according to the nature of the patient. But the passive intellect is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now a form is intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial. Therefore there is no need for an active intellect to make the species actually intelligible.
Iª q. 79 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod sicut in omni natura ita et in anima est aliquid quo est omnia fieri, et aliquid quo est omnia facere. Est ergo ponere intellectum agentem.	On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), "As in every nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes all things, and something by which it makes all things." Therefore we must admit an active intellect.
Iª q. 79 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum opinionem Platonis, nulla necessitas erat ponere intellectum agentem ad faciendum intelligibilia in actu; sed forte ad praebendum lumen intelligibile intelligenti, ut infra dicetur. Posuit enim Plato formas rerum naturalium sine materia subsistere, et per consequens eas intelligibiles esse, quia ex hoc est aliquid intelligibile actu, quod est immateriale. Et huiusmodi vocabat species, sive ideas, ex quarum participatione dicebat etiam materiam corporalem formari, ad hoc quod individua naturaliter constituerentur in propriis generibus et speciebus; et intellectus nostros, ad hoc quod de generibus et speciebus rerum scientiam haberent. Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia; formae autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quod naturae seu formae rerum sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu. Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod ens actu, sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportebat igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus. Et haec est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem.	I answer that, According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need for an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible; but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to the intellect, as will be explained farther on (4). For Plato supposed that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that they are intelligible: since a thing is actually intelligible from the very fact that it is immaterial. And he called such forms "species or ideas"; from a participation of which, he said that even corporeal matter was formed, in order that individuals might be naturally established in their proper genera and species: and that our intellect was formed by such participation in order to have knowledge of the genera and species of things. But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it follows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses as made actual by what is actually sensible. We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect.
Iª q. 79 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensibilia inveniuntur actu extra animam, et ideo non oportuit ponere sensum agentem. Et sic patet quod in parte nutritiva omnes potentiae sunt activae; in parte autem sensitiva, omnes passivae; in parte vero intellectiva est aliquid activum, et aliquid passivum.	Reply to Objection 1. Sensible things are found in act outside the soul; and hence there is no need for an active sense. Wherefore it is clear that in the nutritive part all the powers are active, whereas in the sensitive part all are passive: but in the intellectual part, there is something active and something passive.
Iª q. 79 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod circa effectum luminis est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt quod lumen requiritur ad visum, ut faciat colores actu visibiles. Et secundum hoc, similiter requiritur, et propter idem, intellectus agens ad intelligendum, propter quod lumen ad videndum. Secundum alios vero, lumen requiritur ad videndum, non propter colores, ut fiant actu visibiles; sed ut medium fiat actu lucidum, ut Commentator dicit in II de anima. Et secundum hoc, similitudo qua Aristoteles assimilat intellectum agentem lumini, attenditur quantum ad hoc, quod sicut hoc est necessarium ad videndum, ita illud ad intelligendum; sed non propter idem.	Reply to Objection 2. There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For some say that light is required for sight, in order to make colors actually visible. And according to this the active intellect is required for understanding, in like manner and for the same reason as light is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is required for sight; not for the colors to become actually visible; but in order that the medium may become actually luminous, as the Commentator says on De Anima ii. And according to this, Aristotle's comparison of the active intellect to light is verified in this, that as it is required for understanding, so is light required for seeing; but not for the same reason.
Iª q. 79 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, supposito agente, bene contingit diversimode recipi eius similitudinem in diversis propter eorum dispositionem diversam. Sed si agens non praeexistit, nihil ad hoc faciet dispositio recipientis. Intelligibile autem in actu non est aliquid existens in rerum natura, quantum ad naturam rerum sensibilium, quae non subsistunt praeter materiam. Et ideo ad intelligendum non sufficeret immaterialitas intellectus possibilis, nisi adesset intellectus agens, qui faceret intelligibilia in actu per modum abstractionis.	Reply to Objection 3. If the agent pre-exist, it may well happen that its likeness is received variously into various things, on account of their dispositions. But if the agent does not pre-exist, the disposition of the recipient has nothing to do with the matter. Now the intelligible in act is not something existing in nature; if we consider the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart from matter. And therefore in order to understand them, the immaterial nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for the presence of the active intellect which makes things actually intelligible by way of abstraction.
Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus agens non sit aliquid animae nostrae. Intellectus enim agentis effectus est illuminare ad intelligendum. Sed hoc fit per aliquid quod est altius anima; secundum illud Ioan. I, erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. Ergo videtur quod intellectus agens non sit aliquid animae.	Objection 1. It would seem that the active intellect is not something in the soul. For the effect of the active intellect is to give light for the purpose of understanding. But this is done by something higher than the soul: according to Jn. 1:9, "He was the true light that enlighteneth every man coming into this world." Therefore the active intellect is not something in the soul.
Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus, in III de anima, attribuit intellectui agenti quod non aliquando intelligit et aliquando non intelligit. Sed anima nostra non semper intelligit; sed aliquando intelligit et aliquando non intelligit. Ergo intellectus agens non est aliquid animae nostrae.	Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says of the active intellect, "that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes not understand." But our soul does not always understand: sometimes it understands, sometimes it does not understand. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul.
Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, agens et patiens sufficiunt ad agendum. Si igitur intellectus possibilis est aliquid animae nostrae, qui est virtus passiva, et similiter intellectus agens, qui est virtus activa; sequitur quod homo semper poterit intelligere cum voluerit, quod patet esse falsum. Non est ergo intellectus agens aliquid animae nostrae.	Objection 3. Further, agent and patient suffice for action. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is a passive power, is something belonging to the soul; and also the active intellect, which is an active power: it follows that a man would always be able to understand when he wished, which is clearly false. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul.
Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus agens est substantia actu ens. Nihil autem est respectu eiusdem in actu et in potentia. Si ergo intellectus possibilis, qui est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, est aliquid animae nostrae; videtur impossibile quod intellectus agens sit aliquid animae nostrae.	Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says that the active intellect is a "substance in actual being." But nothing can be in potentiality and in act with regard to the same thing. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is in potentiality to all things intelligible, is something in the soul, it seems impossible for the active intellect to be also something in our soul.
Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, si intellectus agens est aliquid animae nostrae, oportet quod sit aliqua potentia. Non est enim nec passio nec habitus, nam habitus et passiones non habent rationem agentis respectu passionum animae; sed magis passio est ipsa actio potentiae passivae, habitus autem est aliquid quod ex actibus consequitur. Omnis autem potentia fluit ab essentia animae. Sequeretur ergo quod intellectus agens ab essentia animae procederet. Et sic non inesset animae per participationem ab aliquo superiori intellectu, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo intellectus agens est aliquid animae nostrae.	Objection 5. Further, if the active intellect is something in the soul, it must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor a habit; since habits and passions are not in the nature of agents in regard to the passivity of the soul; but rather passion is the very action of the passive power; while habit is something which results from acts. But every power flows from the essence of the soul. It would therefore follow that the active intellect flows from the essence of the soul. And thus it would not be in the soul by way of participation from some higher intellect: which is unfitting. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul.
Iª q. 79 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, III de anima quod necesse est in anima has esse differentias, scilicet intellectum possibilem, et agentem.	On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), that "it is necessary for these differences," namely, the passive and active intellect, "to be in the soul."
Iª q. 79 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus agens de quo philosophus loquitur, est aliquid animae. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod supra animam intellectivam humanam necesse est ponere aliquem superiorem intellectum, a quo anima virtutem intelligendi obtineat. Semper enim quod participat aliquid, et quod est mobile, et quod est imperfectum, praeexigit ante se aliquid quod est per essentiam suam tale, et quod est immobile et perfectum. Anima autem humana intellectiva dicitur per participationem intellectualis virtutis, cuius signum est, quod non tota est intellectiva, sed secundum aliquam sui partem. Pertingit etiam ad intelligentiam veritatis cum quodam discursu et motu, arguendo. Habet etiam imperfectam intelligentiam, tum quia non omnia intelligit; tum quia in his quae intelligit, de potentia procedit ad actum. Oportet ergo esse aliquem altiorem intellectum, quo anima iuvetur ad intelligendum. Posuerunt ergo quidam hunc intellectum secundum substantiam separatum, esse intellectum agentem, qui quasi illustrando phantasmata, facit ea intelligibilia actu. Sed, dato quod sit aliquis talis intellectus agens separatus, nihilominus tamen oportet ponere in ipsa anima humana aliquam virtutem ab illo intellectu superiori participatam, per quam anima humana facit intelligibilia in actu. Sicut et in aliis rebus naturalibus perfectis, praeter universales causas agentes, sunt propriae virtutes inditae singulis rebus perfectis, ab universalibus agentibus derivatae, non enim solus sol generat hominem, sed est in homine virtus generativa hominis; et similiter in aliis animalibus perfectis. Nihil autem est perfectius in inferioribus rebus anima humana. Unde oportet dicere quod in ipsa sit aliqua virtus derivata a superiori intellectu, per quam possit phantasmata illustrare. Et hoc experimento cognoscimus, dum percipimus nos abstrahere formas universales a conditionibus particularibus, quod est facere actu intelligibilia. Nulla autem actio convenit alicui rei, nisi per aliquod principium formaliter ei inhaerens; ut supra dictum est, cum de intellectu possibili ageretur. Ergo oportet virtutem quae est principium huius actionis, esse aliquid in anima. Et ideo Aristoteles comparavit intellectum agentem lumini, quod est aliquid receptum in aere. Plato autem intellectum separatum imprimentem in animas nostras, comparavit soli; ut Themistius dicit in commentario tertii de anima. Sed intellectus separatus, secundum nostrae fidei documenta, est ipse Deus, qui est creator animae, et in quo solo beatificatur, ut infra patebit. Unde ab ipso anima humana lumen intellectuale participat, secundum illud Psalmi IV, signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine.	I answer that, The active intellect, of which the Philosopher speaks, is something in the soul. In order to make this evident, we must observe that above the intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the power of understanding. For what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of something essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now the human soul is called intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual power; a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only in part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. Again it has an imperfect understanding; both because it does not understand everything, and because, in those things which it does understand, it passes from potentiality to act. Therefore there must needs be some higher intellect, by which the soul is helped to understand. Wherefore some held that this intellect, substantially separate, is the active intellect, which by lighting up the phantasms as it were, makes them to be actually intelligible. But, even supposing the existence of such a separate active intellect, it would still be necessary to assign to the human soul some power participating in that superior intellect, by which power the human soul makes things actually intelligible. Just as in other perfect natural things, besides the universal active causes, each one is endowed with its proper powers derived from those universal causes: for the sun alone does not generate man; but in man is the power of begetting man: and in like manner with other perfect animals. Now among these lower things nothing is more perfect than the human soul. Wherefore we must say that in the soul is some power derived from a higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up the phantasms. And we know this by experience, since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from their particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible. Now no action belongs to anything except through some principle formally inherent therein; as we have said above of the passive intellect (76, 1). Therefore the power which is the principle of this action must be something in the soul. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) compared the active intellect to light, which is something received into the air: while Plato compared the separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius says in his commentary on De Anima iii. But the separate intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, Who is the soul's Creator, and only beatitude; as will be shown later on (90, 3; I-II, 3, 7). Wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual light from Him, according to Ps. 4:7, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us."
Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa lux vera illuminat sicut causa universalis, a qua anima humana participat quandam particularem virtutem, ut dictum est.	Reply to Objection 1. That true light enlightens as a universal cause, from which the human soul derives a particular power, as we have explained.
Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod philosophus illa verba non dicit de intellectu agente, sed de intellectu in actu. Unde supra de ipso praemiserat, idem autem est secundum actum scientia rei. Vel, si intelligatur de intellectu agente, hoc dicitur quia non est ex parte intellectus agentis hoc quod quandoque intelligimus et quandoque non intelligimus; sed ex parte intellectus qui est in potentia.	Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher says those words not of the active intellect, but of the intellect in act: of which he had already said: "Knowledge in act is the same as the thing." Or, if we refer those words to the active intellect, then they are said because it is not owing to the active intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes we do not understand, but to the intellect which is in potentiality.
Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, si intellectus agens compararetur ad intellectum possibilem ut obiectum agens ad potentiam, sicut visibile in actu ad visum; sequeretur quod statim omnia intelligeremus, cum intellectus agens sit quo est omnia facere. Nunc autem non se habet ut obiectum, sed ut faciens obiecta in actu, ad quod requiritur, praeter praesentiam intellectus agentis, praesentia phantasmatum, et bona dispositio virium sensitivarum, et exercitium in huiusmodi opere; quia per unum intellectum fiunt etiam alia intellecta, sicut per terminos propositiones, et per prima principia conclusiones. Et quantum ad hoc, non differt utrum intellectus agens sit aliquid animae, vel aliquid separatum.	Reply to Objection 3. If the relation of the active intellect to the passive were that of the active object to a power, as, for instance, of the visible in act to the sight; it would follow that we could understand all things instantly, since the active intellect is that which makes all things (in act). But now the active intellect is not an object, rather is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act: for which, besides the presence of the active intellect, we require the presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive powers, and practice in this sort of operation; since through one thing understood, other things come to be understood, as from terms are made propositions, and from first principles, conclusions. From this point of view it matters not whether the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, or something separate from the soul.
Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod anima intellectiva est quidem actu immaterialis, sed est in potentia ad determinatas species rerum. Phantasmata autem, e converso, sunt quidem actu similitudines specierum quarundam, sed sunt potentia immaterialia. Unde nihil prohibet unam et eandem animam, inquantum est immaterialis in actu, habere aliquam virtutem per quam faciat immaterialia in actu abstrahendo a conditionibus individualis materiae, quae quidem virtus dicitur intellectus agens; et aliam virtutem receptivam huiusmodi specierum, quae dicitur intellectus possibilis, inquantum est in potentia ad huiusmodi species.	Reply to Objection 4. The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species. On the contrary, phantasms are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul, inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the conditions of individual matter: which power is called the "active intellect"; and another power, receptive of such species, which is called the "passive intellect" by reason of its being in potentiality to such species.
Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum essentia animae sit immaterialis, a supremo intellectu creata, nihil prohibet virtutem quae a supremo intellectu participatur, per quam abstrahit a materia, ab essentia ipsius procedere, sicut et alias eius potentias.	Reply to Objection 5. Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by the supreme intellect, nothing prevents that power which it derives from the supreme intellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter, flowing from the essence of the soul, in the same way as its other powers.
Iª q. 79 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus agens sit unus in omnibus. Nihil enim quod est separatum a corpore, multiplicatur secundum multiplicationem corporum. Sed intellectus agens est separatus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo non multiplicatur in multis corporibus hominum, sed est unus in omnibus.	Objection 1. It would seem that there is one active intellect in all. For what is separate from the body is not multiplied according to the number of bodies. But the active intellect is "separate," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore it is not multiplied in the many human bodies, but is one for all men.
Iª q. 79 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, intellectus agens facit universale, quod est unum in multis. Sed illud quod est causa unitatis, magis est unum. Ergo intellectus agens est unus in omnibus.	Objection 2. Further, the active intellect is the cause of the universal, which is one in many. But that which is the cause of unity is still more itself one. Therefore the active intellect is the same in all.
Iª q. 79 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, omnes homines conveniunt in primis conceptionibus intellectus. His autem assentiunt per intellectum agentem. Ergo conveniunt omnes in uno intellectu agente.	Objection 3. Further, all men agree in the first intellectual concepts. But to these they assent by the active intellect. Therefore all agree in one active intellect.
Iª q. 79 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus agens est sicut lumen. Non autem est idem lumen in diversis illuminatis. Ergo non est idem intellectus agens in diversis hominibus.	On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) that the active intellect is as a light. But light is not the same in the various things enlightened. Therefore the same active intellect is not in various men.
Iª q. 79 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod veritas huius quaestionis dependet ex praemissis. Si enim intellectus agens non esset aliquid animae, sed esset quaedam substantia separata, unus esset intellectus agens omnium hominum. Et hoc intelligunt qui ponunt unitatem intellectus agentis. Si autem intellectus agens sit aliquid animae, ut quaedam virtus ipsius, necesse est dicere quod sint plures intellectus agentes, secundum pluralitatem animarum, quae multiplicantur secundum multiplicationem hominum, ut supra dictum est. Non enim potest esse quod una et eadem virtus numero sit diversarum substantiarum.	I answer that, The truth about this question depends on what we have already said (4). For if the active intellect were not something belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance, there would be one active intellect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all. But if the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the number of men, as we have said above (76, 2). For it is impossible that one same power belong to various substances.
Iª q. 79 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus probat intellectum agentem esse separatum, per hoc quod possibilis est separatus; quia, ut ipse dicit, agens est honorabilius patiente. Intellectus autem possibilis dicitur separatus, quia non est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Et secundum hunc modum etiam intellectus agens dicitur separatus, non quasi sit aliqua substantia separata.	Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher proves that the active intellect is separate, by the fact that the passive intellect is separate: because, as he says (De Anima iii, 5), "the agent is more noble than the patient." Now the passive intellect is said to be separate, because it is not the act of any corporeal organ. And in the same sense the active intellect is also called "separate"; but not as a separate substance.
Iª q. 79 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus agens causat universale abstrahendo a materia. Ad hoc autem non requiritur quod sit unus in omnibus habentibus intellectum, sed quod sit unus in omnibus secundum habitudinem ad omnia a quibus abstrahit universale, respectu quorum universale est unum. Et hoc competit intellectui agenti inquantum est immaterialis.	Reply to Objection 2. The active intellect is the cause of the universal, by abstracting it from matter. But for this purpose it need not be the same intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one in its relationship to all those things from which it abstracts the universal, with respect to which things the universal is one. And this befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial.
Iª q. 79 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia quae sunt unius speciei, communicant in actione consequente naturam speciei, et per consequens in virtute, quae est actionis principium, non quod sit eadem numero in omnibus. Cognoscere autem prima intelligibilia est actio consequens speciem humanam. Unde oportet quod omnes homines communicent in virtute quae est principium huius actionis, et haec est virtus intellectus agentis. Non tamen oportet quod sit eadem numero in omnibus. Oportet tamen quod ab uno principio in omnibus derivetur. Et sic illa communicatio hominum in primis intelligibilibus, demonstrat unitatem intellectus separati, quem Plato comparat soli; non autem unitatem intellectus agentis, quem Aristoteles comparat lumini.	Reply to Objection 3. All things which are of one species enjoy in common the action which accompanies the nature of the species, and consequently the power which is the principle of such action; but not so as that power be identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible principles is the action belonging to the human species. Wherefore all men enjoy in common the power which is the principle of this action: and this power is the active intellect. But there is no need for it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all from one principle. And thus the possession by all men in common of the first principles proves the unity of the separate intellect, which Plato compares to the sun; but not the unity of the active intellect, which Aristotle compares to light.
Iª q. 79 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod memoria non sit in parte intellectiva animae. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Trin., quod ad partem superiorem animae pertinent quae non sunt hominibus pecoribusque communia. Sed memoria est hominibus pecoribusque communis, dicit enim ibidem quod possunt pecora sentire per corporis sensus corporalia, et ea mandare memoriae. Ergo memoria non pertinet ad partem animae intellectivam.	Objection 1. It would seem that memory is not in the intellectual part of the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that to the higher part of the soul belongs those things which are not "common to man and beast." But memory is common to man and beast, for he says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that "beasts can sense corporeal things through the senses of the body, and commit them to memory." Therefore memory does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul.
Iª q. 79 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, memoria praeteritorum est. Sed praeteritum dicitur secundum aliquod determinatum tempus. Memoria igitur est cognoscitiva alicuius sub determinato tempore; quod est cognoscere aliquid sub hic et nunc. Hoc autem non est intellectus, sed sensus. Memoria igitur non est in parte intellectiva, sed solum in parte sensitiva.	Objection 2. Further, memory is of the past. But the past is said of something with regard to a fixed time. Memory, therefore, knows a thing under a condition of a fixed time; which involves knowledge under the conditions of "here" and "now." But this is not the province of the intellect, but of the sense. Therefore memory is not in the intellectual part, but only in the sensitive.
Iª q. 79 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, in memoria conservantur species rerum quae actu non cogitantur. Sed hoc non est possibile accidere in intellectu, quia intellectus fit in actu per hoc quod informatur specie intelligibili; intellectum autem esse in actu, est ipsum intelligere in actu; et sic intellectus omnia intelligit in actu, quorum species apud se habet. Non ergo memoria est in parte intellectiva.	Objection 3. Further, in the memory are preserved the species of those things of which we are not actually thinking. But this cannot happen in the intellect, because the intellect is reduced to act by the fact that the intelligible species are received into it. Now the intellect in act implies understanding in act; and therefore the intellect actually understands all things of which it has the species. Therefore the memory is not in the intellectual part.
Iª q. 79 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una mens.	On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11) that "memory, understanding, and will are one mind."
Iª q. 79 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum de ratione memoriae sit conservare species rerum quae actu non apprehenduntur, hoc primum considerari oportet, utrum species intelligibiles sic in intellectu conservari possint. Posuit enim Avicenna hoc esse impossibile. In parte enim sensitiva dicebat hoc accidere, quantum ad aliquas potentias, inquantum sunt actus organorum corporalium, in quibus conservari possunt aliquae species absque actuali apprehensione. In intellectu autem, qui caret organo corporali, nihil existit nisi intelligibiliter. Unde oportet intelligi in actu illud cuius similitudo in intellectu existit. Sic ergo, secundum ipsum, quam cito aliquis actu desinit intelligere aliquam rem, desinit esse illius rei species in intellectu, sed oportet, si denuo vult illam rem intelligere, quod convertat se ad intellectum agentem, quem ponit substantiam separatam, ut ab illo effluant species intelligibiles in intellectum possibilem. Et ex exercitio et usu convertendi se ad intellectum agentem, relinquitur, secundum ipsum, quaedam habilitas in intellectu possibili convertendi se ad intellectum agentem, quam dicebat esse habitum scientiae. Secundum igitur hanc positionem, nihil conservatur in parte intellectiva, quod non actu intelligatur. Unde non poterit poni memoria in parte intellectiva, secundum hunc modum. Sed haec opinio manifeste repugnat dictis Aristotelis. Dicit enim, in III de anima, quod, cum intellectus possibilis sic fiat singula ut sciens, dicitur qui secundum actum; et quod hoc accidit cum possit operari per seipsum. Est quidem igitur et tunc potentia quodammodo; non tamen similiter ut ante addiscere aut invenire. Dicitur autem intellectus possibilis fieri singula, secundum quod recipit species singulorum. Ex hoc ergo quod recipit species intelligibilium, habet quod possit operari cum voluerit, non autem quod semper operetur, quia et tunc est quodammodo in potentia, licet aliter quam ante intelligere; eo scilicet modo quo sciens in habitu est in potentia ad considerandum in actu. Repugnat etiam praedicta positio rationi. Quod enim recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo secundum modum recipientis. Intellectus autem est magis stabilis naturae et immobilis, quam materia corporalis. Si ergo materia corporalis formas quas recipit, non solum tenet dum per eas agit in actu, sed etiam postquam agere per eas cessaverit; multo fortius intellectus immobiliter et inamissibiliter recipit species intelligibiles, sive a sensibilibus acceptas, sive etiam ab aliquo superiori intellectu effluxas. Sic igitur, si memoria accipiatur solum pro vi conservativa specierum, oportet dicere memoriam esse in intellectiva parte. Si vero de ratione memoriae sit quod eius obiectum sit praeteritum, ut praeteritum; memoria in parte intellectiva non erit, sed sensitiva tantum, quae est apprehensiva particularium. Praeteritum enim, ut praeteritum, cum significet esse sub determinato tempore, ad conditionem particularis pertinet.	I answer that, Since it is of the nature of the memory to preserve the species of those things which are not actually apprehended, we must first of all consider whether the intelligible species can thus be preserved in the intellect: because Avicenna held that this was impossible. For he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive part, as to some powers, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal organs, in which certain species may be preserved apart from actual apprehension. But in the intellect, which has no corporeal organ, nothing but what is intelligible exists. Wherefore every thing of which the likeness exists in the intellect must be actually understood. Thus, therefore, according to him, as soon as we cease to understand something actually, the species of that thing ceases to be in our intellect, and if we wish to understand that thing anew, we must turn to the active intellect, which he held to be a separate substance, in order that the intelligible species may thence flow again into our passive intellect. And from the practice and habit of turning to the active intellect there is formed, according to him, a certain aptitude in the passive intellect for turning to the active intellect; which aptitude he calls the habit of knowledge. According, therefore, to this supposition, nothing is preserved in the intellectual part that is not actually understood: wherefore it would not be possible to admit memory in the intellectual part. But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle. For he says (De Anima iii, 4) that, when the passive intellect "is identified with each thing as knowing it, it is said to be in act," and that "this happens when it can operate of itself. And, even then, it is in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning and discovering." Now, the passive intellect is said to be each thing, inasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. To the fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelligible things it owes its being able to operate when it wills, but not so that it be always operating: for even then is it in potentiality in a certain sense, though otherwise than before the act of understanding--namely, in the sense that whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to actual consideration. The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For what is received into something is received according to the conditions of the recipient. But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more immovable than corporeal nature. If, therefore, corporeal matter holds the forms which it receives, not only while it actually does something through them, but also after ceasing to act through them, much more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the species unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from things sensible, or derive them from some superior intellect. Thus, therefore, if we take memory only for the power of retaining species, we must say that it is in the intellectual part. But if in the notion of memory we include its object as something past, then the memory is not in the intellectual, but only in the sensitive part, which apprehends individual things. For past, as past, since it signifies being under a condition of fixed time, is something individual.
Iª q. 79 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod memoria, secundum quod est conservativa specierum, non est nobis pecoribusque communis. Species enim conservantur non in parte animae sensitiva tantum, sed magis in coniuncto; cum vis memorativa sit actus organi cuiusdam. Sed intellectus secundum seipsum est conservativus specierum, praeter concomitantiam organi corporalis. Unde philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod anima est locus specierum, non tota, sed intellectus.	Reply to Objection 1. Memory, if considered as retentive of species, is not common to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the sensitive part of the soul only, but rather in the body and soul united: since the memorative power is the act of some organ. But the intellect in itself is retentive of species, without the association of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole soul, but the intellect."
Iª q. 79 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod praeteritio potest ad duo referri, scilicet ad obiectum quod cognoscitur; et ad cognitionis actum. Quae quidem duo simul coniunguntur in parte sensitiva, quae est apprehensiva alicuius per hoc quod immutatur a praesenti sensibili, unde simul animal memoratur se prius sensisse in praeterito, et se sensisse quoddam praeteritum sensibile. Sed quantum ad partem intellectivam pertinet, praeteritio accidit, et non per se convenit, ex parte obiecti intellectus. Intelligit enim intellectus hominem, inquantum est homo, homini autem, inquantum est homo, accidit vel in praesenti vel in praeterito vel in futuro esse. Ex parte vero actus, praeteritio per se accipi potest etiam in intellectu, sicut in sensu. Quia intelligere animae nostrae est quidam particularis actus, in hoc vel in illo tempore existens, secundum quod dicitur homo intelligere nunc vel heri vel cras. Et hoc non repugnat intellectualitati, quia huiusmodi intelligere, quamvis sit quoddam particulare, tamen est immaterialis actus, ut supra de intellectu dictum est; et ideo sicut intelligit seipsum intellectus, quamvis ipse sit quidam singularis intellectus, ita intelligit suum intelligere, quod est singularis actus vel in praeterito vel in praesenti vel in futuro existens. Sic igitur salvatur ratio memoriae, quantum ad hoc quod est praeteritorum, in intellectu, secundum quod intelligit se prius intellexisse, non autem secundum quod intelligit praeteritum, prout est hic et nunc.	Reply to Objection 2. The condition of past may be referred to two things--namely, to the object which is known, and to the act of knowledge. These two are found together in the sensitive part, which apprehends something from the fact of its being immuted by a present sensible: wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have sensed before in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible thing. But as concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental, and is not in itself a part of the object of the intellect. For the intellect understands man, as man: and to man, as man, it is accidental that he exist in the present, past, or future. But on the part of the act, the condition of past, even as such, may be understood to be in the intellect, as well as in the senses. Because our soul's act of understanding is an individual act, existing in this or that time, inasmuch as a man is said to understand now, or yesterday, or tomorrow. And this is not incompatible with the intellectual nature: for such an act of understanding, though something individual, is yet an immaterial act, as we have said above of the intellect (76, 1); and therefore, as the intellect understands itself, though it be itself an individual intellect, so also it understands its act of understanding, which is an individual act, in the past, present, or future. In this way, then, the notion of memory, in as far as it regards past events, is preserved in the intellect, forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood: but not in the sense that it understands the past as something "here" and "now."
Iª q. 79 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod species intelligibilis aliquando est in intellectu in potentia tantum, et tunc dicitur intellectus esse in potentia. Aliquando autem secundum ultimam completionem actus, et tunc intelligit actu. Aliquando medio modo se habet inter potentiam et actum, et tunc dicitur esse intellectus in habitu. Et secundum hunc modum intellectus conservat species, etiam quando actu non intelligit.	Reply to Objection 3. The intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in potentiality. Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect as regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it understands in act. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state, between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species, even when it does not understand in act.
Iª q. 79 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod alia potentia sit memoria intellectiva, et alia intellectus. Augustinus enim, in X de Trin., ponit in mente memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Manifestum est autem quod memoria est alia potentia a voluntate. Ergo similiter est alia ab intellectu.	Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns to the soul memory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a distinct power from the will. Therefore it is also distinct from the intellect.
Iª q. 79 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, eadem ratio distinctionis est potentiarum sensitivae partis et intellectivae. Sed memoria in parte sensitiva est alia potentia a sensu, ut supra dictum est. Ergo memoria partis intellectivae est alia potentia ab intellectu.	Objection 2. Further, the reason of distinction among the powers in the sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part. But memory in the sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said (78, 4). Therefore memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the intellect.
Iª q. 79 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt sibi invicem aequalia, et unum eorum ab alio oritur. Hoc autem esse non posset, si memoria esset eadem potentia cum intellectu. Non est ergo eadem potentia.	Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xi, 7), memory, understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one flows from the other. But this could not be if memory and intellect were the same power. Therefore they are not the same power.
Iª q. 79 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra, de ratione memoriae est, quod sit thesaurus vel locus conservativus specierum. Hoc autem philosophus, in III de anima, attribuit intellectui, ut dictum est. Non ergo in parte intellectiva est alia potentia memoria ab intellectu.	On the contrary, From its nature the memory is the treasury or storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De Anima iii) attributes this to the intellect, as we have said (6, ad 1). Therefore the memory is not another power from the intellect.
Iª q. 79 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, potentiae animae distinguuntur secundum diversas rationes obiectorum; eo quod ratio cuiuslibet potentiae consistit in ordine ad id ad quod dicitur, quod est eius obiectum. Dictum est etiam supra quod, si aliqua potentia secundum propriam rationem ordinetur ad aliquod obiectum secundum communem rationem obiecti, non diversificabitur illa potentia secundum diversitates particularium differentiarum, sicut potentia visiva, quae respicit suum obiectum secundum rationem colorati, non diversificatur per diversitatem albi et nigri. Intellectus autem respicit suum obiectum secundum communem rationem entis; eo quod intellectus possibilis est quo est omnia fieri. Unde secundum nullam differentiam entium, diversificatur differentia intellectus possibilis. Diversificatur tamen potentia intellectus agentis, et intellectus possibilis, quia respectu eiusdem obiecti, aliud principium oportet esse potentiam activam, quae facit obiectum esse in actu; et aliud potentiam passivam, quae movetur ab obiecto in actu existente. Et sic potentia activa comparatur ad suum obiectum, ut ens in actu ad ens in potentia, potentia autem passiva comparatur ad suum obiectum e converso, ut ens in potentia ad ens in actu. Sic igitur nulla alia differentia potentiarum in intellectu esse potest, nisi possibilis et agentis. Unde patet quod memoria non est alia potentia ab intellectu, ad rationem enim potentiae passivae pertinet conservare, sicut et recipere.	I answer that, As has been said above (77, 3), the powers of the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their objects: since each power is defined in reference to that thing to which it is directed and which is its object. It has also been said above (59, 4) that if any power by its nature be directed to an object according to the common ratio of the object, that power will not be differentiated according to the individual differences of that object: just as the power of sight, which regards its object under the common ratio of color, is not differentiated by differences of black and white. Now, the intellect regards its object under the common ratio of being: since the passive intellect is that "in which all are in potentiality." Wherefore the passive intellect is not differentiated by any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the active intellect and of the passive intellect: because as regards the same object, the active power which makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the passive power, which is moved by the object existing in act. Thus the active power is compared to its object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality; whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is compared to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act. Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in the intellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect: for it belongs to the nature of a passive power to retain as well as to receive.
Iª q. 79 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis in III dist. I Sent. dicatur quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sint tres vires; tamen hoc non est secundum intentionem Augustini, qui expresse dicit in XIV de Trin., quod si accipiatur memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, secundum quod semper praesto sunt animae, sive cogitentur sive non cogitentur, ad solam memoriam pertinere videntur. Intelligentiam autem nunc dico qua intelligimus cogitantes; et eam voluntatem, sive amorem vel dilectionem, quae istam prolem parentemque coniungit. Ex quo patet quod ista tria non accipit Augustinus pro tribus potentiis; sed memoriam accipit pro habituali animae retentione, intelligentiam autem pro actu intellectus, voluntatem autem pro actu voluntatis.	Reply to Objection 1. Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1) that memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with the meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that "if we take memory, intelligence, and will as always present in the soul, whether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the memory only. And by intelligence I mean that by which we understand when actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or affection which unites the child and its parent." Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not take the above three for three powers; but by memory he understands the soul's habit of retention; by intelligence, the act of the intellect; and by will, the act of the will.
Iª q. 79 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod praeteritum et praesens possunt esse propriae differentiae potentiarum sensitivarum diversificativae; non autem potentiarum intellectivarum, ratione supra dicta.	Reply to Objection 2. Past and present may differentiate the sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers, for the reason give above.
Iª q. 79 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod intelligentia oritur ex memoria, sicut actus ex habitu. Et hoc modo etiam aequatur ei; non autem sicut potentia potentiae.	Reply to Objection 3. Intelligence arises from memory, as act from habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a power.
Iª q. 79 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio sit alia potentia ab intellectu. In libro enim de spiritu et anima dicitur, cum ab inferioribus ad superiora ascendere volumus, prius occurrit nobis sensus, deinde imaginatio, deinde ratio, deinde intellectus. Est ergo alia potentia ratio ab intellectu, sicut imaginatio a ratione.	Objection 1. It would seem that the reason is a distinct power from the intellect. For it is stated in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we wish to rise from lower things to higher, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then the intellect." Therefore the reason is distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense.
Iª q. 79 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, Boetius dicit, in libro de Consol., quod intellectus comparatur ad rationem sicut aeternitas ad tempus. Sed non est eiusdem virtutis esse in aeternitate et esse in tempore. Ergo non est eadem potentia ratio et intellectus.	Objection 2. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6), that intellect is compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong to the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason and intellect are not the same power.
Iª q. 79 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, homo communicat cum Angelis in intellectu, cum brutis vero in sensu. Sed ratio, quae est propria hominis, qua animal rationale dicitur, est alia potentia a sensu. Ergo pari ratione est alia potentia ab intellectu, qui proprie convenit Angelis, unde et intellectuales dicuntur.	Objection 3. Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and sense in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to man, whence he is called a rational animal, is a power distinct from sense. Therefore is it equally true to say that it is distinct from the intellect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they are called intellectual.
Iª q. 79 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III super Gen. ad Litt., quod illud quo homo irrationabilibus animalibus antecellit, est ratio, vel mens, vel intelligentia, vel si quo alio vocabulo commodius appellatur. Ratio ergo et intellectus et mens sunt una potentia.	On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 20) that "that in which man excels irrational animals is reason, or mind, or intelligence or whatever appropriate name we like to give it." Therefore, reason, intellect and mind are one power.
Iª q. 79 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ratio et intellectus in homine non possunt esse diversae potentiae. Quod manifeste cognoscitur, si utriusque actus consideretur. Intelligere enim est simpliciter veritatem intelligibilem apprehendere. Ratiocinari autem est procedere de uno intellecto ad aliud, ad veritatem intelligibilem cognoscendam. Et ideo Angeli, qui perfecte possident, secundum modum suae naturae, cognitionem intelligibilis veritatis, non habent necesse procedere de uno ad aliud; sed simpliciter et absque discursu veritatem rerum apprehendunt, ut Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom. Homines autem ad intelligibilem veritatem cognoscendam perveniunt, procedendo de uno ad aliud, ut ibidem dicitur, et ideo rationales dicuntur. Patet ergo quod ratiocinari comparatur ad intelligere sicut moveri ad quiescere, vel acquirere ad habere, quorum unum est perfecti, aliud autem imperfecti. Et quia motus semper ab immobili procedit, et ad aliquid quietum terminatur; inde est quod ratiocinatio humana, secundum viam inquisitionis vel inventionis, procedit a quibusdam simpliciter intellectis, quae sunt prima principia; et rursus, in via iudicii, resolvendo redit ad prima principia, ad quae inventa examinat. Manifestum est autem quod quiescere et moveri non reducuntur ad diversas potentias, sed ad unam et eandem, etiam in naturalibus rebus, quia per eandem naturam aliquid movetur ad locum, et quiescit in loco. Multo ergo magis per eandem potentiam intelligimus et ratiocinamur. Et sic patet quod in homine eadem potentia est ratio et intellectus.	I answer that, Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly if we consider their respective actions. For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so as to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another; but apprehend the truth simply and without mental discussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the imperfect. And since movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it is that human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain things simply understood--namely, the first principles; and, again, by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear that rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to one and the same, even in natural things: since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a certain place. Much more, therefore, by the same power do we understand and reason: and so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power.
Iª q. 79 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa enumeratio fit secundum ordinem actuum, non secundum distinctionem potentiarum. Quamvis liber ille non sit magnae auctoritatis.	Reply to Objection 1. That enumeration is made according to the order of actions, not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that book is not of great authority.
Iª q. 79 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum patet responsio ex dictis. Aeternitas enim comparatur ad tempus, sicut immobile ad mobile. Et ideo Boetius comparavit intellectum aeternitati, rationem vero tempori.	Reply to Objection 2. The answer is clear from what we have said. For eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus Boethius compared the intellect to eternity, and reason to time.
Iª q. 79 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod alia animalia sunt ita infra hominem, quod non possunt attingere ad cognoscendam veritatem, quam ratio inquirit. Homo vero attingit ad cognoscendam intelligibilem veritatem, quam Angeli cognoscunt; sed imperfecte. Et ideo vis cognoscitiva Angelorum non est alterius generis a vi cognoscitiva rationis, sed comparatur ad ipsam ut perfectum ad imperfectum.	Reply to Objection 3. Other animals are so much lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But man attains, although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible truth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of knowledge is not of a different genus fro that which is in the human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect.
Iª q. 79 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio superior et inferior sint diversae potentiae. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Trin., quod imago Trinitatis est in superiori parte rationis, non autem in inferiori. Sed partes animae sunt ipsae eius potentiae. Ergo duae potentiae sunt ratio superior et inferior.	Objection 1. It would seem that the higher and lower reason are distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7), that the image of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in the lower. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore the higher and lower reason are two powers.
Iª q. 79 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, nihil oritur a seipso. Sed ratio inferior oritur a superiori, et ab ea regulatur et dirigitur. Ergo ratio superior est alia potentia ab inferiori.	Objection 2. Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower reason flows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore the higher reason is another power from the lower.
Iª q. 79 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod scientificum animae quo cognoscit anima necessaria, est aliud principium et alia pars animae ab opinativo et ratiocinativo, quo cognoscit contingentia. Et hoc probat per hoc, quia ad ea quae sunt genere altera, altera genere particula animae ordinatur; contingens autem et necessarium sunt altera genere, sicut corruptibile et incorruptibile. Cum autem idem sit necessarium quod aeternum, et temporale idem quod contingens; videtur quod idem sit quod philosophus vocat scientificum, et superior pars rationis, quae secundum Augustinum intendit aeternis conspiciendis et consulendis; et quod idem sit quod philosophus vocat ratiocinativum vel opinativum, et inferior ratio, quae secundum Augustinum intendit temporalibus disponendis. Est ergo alia potentia animae ratio superior, et ratio inferior.	Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 1) that "the scientific part" of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary things, is another principle, and another part from the "opinionative" and "reasoning" part by which it knows contingent things. And he proves this from the principle that for those things which are "generically different, generically different parts of the soul are ordained." Now contingent and necessary are generically different, as corruptible and incorruptible. Since, therefore, necessary is the same as eternal, and temporal the same as contingent, it seems that what the Philosopher calls the "scientific" part must be the same as the higher reason, which, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and consultation of things eternal"; and that what the Philosopher calls the "reasoning" or "opinionative" part is the same as the lower reason, which, according to Augustine, "is intent on the disposal of temporal things." Therefore the higher reason is another power than the lower.
Iª q. 79 a. 9 arg. 4 Praeterea, Damascenus dicit quod ex imaginatione fit opinio; deinde mens, diiudicans opinionem sive vera sit sive falsa, diiudicat veritatem; unde et mens dicitur a metiendo. De quibus igitur iudicatum est iam et determinatum vere, dicitur intellectus. Sic igitur opinativum, quod est ratio inferior, est aliud a mente et intellectu, per quod potest intelligi ratio superior.	Objection 4. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "opinion rises from the imagination: then the mind by judging of the truth or error of the opinion discovers the truth: whence" men's (mind) "is derived from" metiendo [measuring]. "And therefore the intellect regards those things which are already subject to judgment and true decision." Therefore the opinionative power, which is the lower reason, is distinct from the mind and the intellect, by which we may understand the higher reason.
Iª q. 79 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., quod ratio superior et inferior non nisi per officia distinguuntur. Non ergo sunt duae potentiae.	On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "the higher and lower reason are only distinct by their functions." Therefore they are not two powers.
Iª q. 79 a. 9 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ratio superior et inferior, secundum quod ab Augustino accipiuntur, nullo modo duae potentiae animae esse possunt. Dicit enim quod ratio superior est quae intendit aeternis conspiciendis aut consulendis, conspiciendis quidem, secundum quod ea in seipsis speculatur; consulendis vero, secundum quod ex eis accipit regulas agendorum. Ratio vero inferior ab ipso dicitur, quae intendit temporalibus rebus. Haec autem duo, scilicet temporalia et aeterna, comparantur ad cognitionem nostram hoc modo, quod unum eorum est medium ad cognoscendum alterum. Nam secundum viam inventionis, per res temporales in cognitionem devenimus aeternorum, secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur, in via vero iudicii, per aeterna iam cognita de temporalibus iudicamus, et secundum rationes aeternorum temporalia disponimus. Potest autem contingere quod medium, et id ad quod per medium pervenitur, ad diversos habitus pertineant, sicut principia prima indemonstrabilia pertinent ad habitum intellectus, conclusiones vero ex his deductae ad habitum scientiae. Et ideo ex principiis geometriae contingit aliquid concludere in alia scientia, puta in perspectiva. Sed eadem potentia rationis est, ad quam pertinet et medium et ultimum. Est enim actus rationis quasi quidam motus de uno in aliud perveniens, idem autem est mobile quod pertransiens medium pertingit ad terminum. Unde una et eadem potentia rationis est ratio superior et inferior. Sed distinguuntur, secundum Augustinum, per officia actuum, et secundum diversos habitus, nam superiori rationi attribuitur sapientia, inferiori vero scientia.	I answer that, The higher and lower reason, as they are understood by Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says that "the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal": forasmuch as in contemplation it sees them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of action from them. But he calls the lower reason that which "is intent on the disposal of temporal things." Now these two--namely, eternal and temporal --are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of them is the means of knowing the other. For by way of discovery, we come through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal, according to the words of the Apostle (Romans 1:20), "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made": while by way of judgment, from eternal things already known, we judge of temporal things, and according to laws of things eternal we dispose of temporal things. But it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong to different habits: as the first indemonstrable principles belong to the habit of the intellect; whereas the conclusions which we draw from them belong to the habit of science. And so it happens that from the principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another science--for example, perspective. But the power of the reason is such that both medium and term belong to it. For the act of the reason is, as it were, a movement from one thing to another. But the same movable thing passes through the medium and reaches the end. Wherefore the higher and lower reasons are one and the same power. But according to Augustine they are distinguished by the functions of their actions, and according to their various habits: for wisdom is attributed to the higher reason, science to the lower.
Iª q. 79 a. 9 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod secundum quamcumque rationem partitionis potest pars dici. Inquantum ergo ratio dividitur secundum diversa officia, ratio superior et inferior partitiones dicuntur, et non quia sunt diversae potentiae.	Reply to Objection 1. We speak of parts, in whatever way a thing is divided. And so far as reason is divided according to its various acts, the higher and lower reason are called parts; but not because they are different powers.
Iª q. 79 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio inferior dicitur a superiori deduci, vel ab ea regulari, inquantum principia quibus utitur inferior ratio, deducuntur et diriguntur a principiis superioris rationis.	Reply to Objection 2. The lower reason is said to flow from the higher, or to be ruled by it, as far as the principles made use of by the lower reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher reason.
Iª q. 79 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod scientificum de quo philosophus loquitur non est idem quod ratio superior, nam necessaria scibilia inveniuntur etiam in rebus temporalibus, de quibus est scientia naturalis et mathematica. Opinativum autem et ratiocinativum in minus est quam ratio inferior, quia est contingentium tantum. Nec tamen est simpliciter dicendum quod sit alia potentia qua intellectus cognoscit necessaria, et alia qua cognoscit contingentia, quia utraque cognoscit secundum eandem rationem obiecti, scilicet secundum rationem entis et veri. Unde et necessaria, quae habent perfectum esse in veritate, perfecte cognoscit; utpote ad eorum quidditatem pertingens, per quam propria accidentia de his demonstrat. Contingentia vero imperfecte cognoscit; sicut et habent imperfectum esse et veritatem. Perfectum autem et imperfectum in actu non diversificant potentiam; sed diversificant actus quantum ad modum agendi, et per consequens principia actuum et ipsos habitus. Et ideo philosophus posuit duas particulas animae, scientificum et ratiocinativum, non quia sunt duae potentiae; sed quia distinguuntur secundum diversam aptitudinem ad recipiendum diversos habitus, quorum diversitatem ibi inquirere intendit. Contingentia enim et necessaria, etsi differant secundum propria genera, conveniunt tamen in communi ratione entis, quam respicit intellectus, ad quam diversimode se habent secundum perfectum et imperfectum.	Reply to Objection 3. The "scientific" part, of which the Philosopher speaks, is not the same as the higher reason: for necessary truths are found even among temporal things, of which natural science and mathematics treat. And the "opinionative" and "ratiocinative" part is more limited than the lower reason; for it regards only things contingent. Neither must we say, without any qualification, that a power, by which the intellect knows necessary things, is distinct from a power by which it knows contingent things: because it knows both under the same objective aspect--namely, under the aspect of being and truth. Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect being in truth; since it penetrates to their very essence, from which it demonstrates their proper accidents. On the other hand, it knows contingent things, but imperfectly; forasmuch as they have but imperfect being and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do not vary the power, but they vary the actions as to the mode of acting, and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits themselves. And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts of the soul--namely, the "scientific" and the "ratiocinative," not because they are two powers, but because they are distinct according to a different aptitude for receiving various habits, concerning the variety of which he inquires. For contingent and necessary, though differing according to their proper genera, nevertheless agree in the common aspect of being, which the intellect considers, and to which they are variously compared as perfect and imperfect.
Iª q. 79 a. 9 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod illa distinctio Damasceni est secundum diversitatem actuum, non secundum diversitatem potentiarum. Opinio enim significat actum intellectus qui fertur in unam partem contradictionis cum formidine alterius. Diiudicare vero, vel mensurare, est actus intellectus applicantis principia certa ad examinationem propositorum. Et ex hoc sumitur nomen mentis. Intelligere autem est cum quadam approbatione diiudicatis inhaerere.	Reply to Objection 4. That distinction given by Damascene is according to the variety of acts, not according to the variety of powers. For "opinion" signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side of a contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to "judge" or "measure" [mensurare] is an act of the intellect, applying certain principles to examine propositions. From this is taken the word "mens" [mind]. Lastly, to "understand" is to adhere to the formed judgment with approval.
Iª q. 79 a. 10 arg. 1 Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intelligentia sit alia potentia ab intellectu. Dicitur enim in libro de spiritu et anima, quod cum ab inferioribus ad superiora ascendere volumus, prius occurrit nobis sensus, deinde imaginatio, deinde ratio, postea intellectus, et postea intelligentia. Sed imaginatio et sensus sunt diversae potentiae. Ergo et intellectus et intelligentia.	Objection 1. It would seem that the intelligence is another power than the intellect. For we read in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we wish to rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then intellect, and afterwards intelligence." But imagination and sense are distinct powers. Therefore also intellect and intelligence are distinct.
Iª q. 79 a. 10 arg. 2 Praeterea, Boetius dicit, in V de Consol., quod ipsum hominem aliter sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intelligentia intuetur. Sed intellectus est eadem potentia cum ratione. Ergo videtur quod intelligentia sit alia potentia quam intellectus; sicut ratio est alia potentia quam imaginatio et sensus.	Objection 2. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) that "sense considers man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another, intelligence in another." But intellect is the same power as reason. Therefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power from intellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense.
Iª q. 79 a. 10 arg. 3 Praeterea, actus sunt praevii potentiis, ut dicitur in II de anima. Sed intelligentia est quidam actus ab aliis actibus qui attribuuntur intellectui divisus. Dicit enim Damascenus quod primus motus intelligentia dicitur; quae vero circa aliquid est intelligentia, intentio vocatur; quae permanens et figurans animam ad id quod intelligitur, excogitatio dicitur; excogitatio vero in eodem manens, et seipsam examinans et diiudicans, phronesis dicitur (idest sapientia); phronesis autem dilatata facit cogitationem, idest interius dispositum sermonem; ex quo aiunt provenire sermonem per linguam enarratum. Ergo videtur quod intelligentia sit quaedam specialis potentia.	Objection 3. Further, "actions came before powers," as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). But intelligence is an act separate from others attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the first movement is called intelligence; but that intelligence which is about a certain thing is called intention; that which remains and conforms the soul to that which is understood is called invention, and invention when it remains in the same man, examining and judging of itself, is called phronesis [that is, wisdom], and phronesis if dilated makes thought, that is, orderly internal speech; from which, they say, comes speech expressed by the tongue." Therefore it seems that intelligence is some special power.
Iª q. 79 a. 10 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intelligentia indivisibilium est, in quibus non est falsum. Sed huiusmodi cognoscere pertinet ad intellectum. Ergo intelligentia non est alia potentia praeter intellectum.	On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 6) that "intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing false." But the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect. Therefore intelligence is not another power than the intellect.
Iª q. 79 a. 10 co. Respondeo dicendum quod hoc nomen intelligentia proprie significat ipsum actum intellectus qui est intelligere. In quibusdam tamen libris de Arabico translatis, substantiae separatae quas nos Angelos dicimus, intelligentiae vocantur; forte propter hoc, quod huiusmodi substantiae semper actu intelligunt. In libris tamen de Graeco translatis, dicuntur intellectus seu mentes. Sic ergo intelligentia ab intellectu non distinguitur sicut potentia a potentia; sed sicut actus a potentia. Invenitur enim talis divisio etiam a philosophis. Quandoque enim ponunt quatuor intellectus, scilicet intellectum agentem, possibilem, et in habitu, et adeptum. Quorum quatuor intellectus agens et possibilis sunt diversae potentiae; sicut et in omnibus est alia potentia activa, et alia passiva. Alia vero tria distinguuntur secundum tres status intellectus possibilis, qui quandoque est in potentia tantum, et sic dicitur possibilis; quandoque autem in actu primo, qui est scientia, et sic dicitur intellectus in habitu; quandoque autem in actu secundo, qui est considerare, et sic dicitur intellectus in actu, sive intellectus adeptus.	I answer that, This word "intelligence" properly signifies the intellect's very act, which is to understand. However, in some works translated from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call angels are called "intelligences," and perhaps for this reason, that such substances are always actually understanding. But in works translated from the Greek, they are called "intellects" or "minds." Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from power; but as act is from power. And such a division is recognized even by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four intellects--namely, the "active" and "passive" intellects, the intellect "in habit," and the "actual" intellect. Of which four the active and passive intellects are different powers; just as in all things the active power is distinct from the passive. But three of these are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is called passive; sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is called intellect in habit; and sometimes it is in the second act, which is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or actual intellect.
Iª q. 79 a. 10 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si recipi debet illa auctoritas, intelligentia ponitur pro actu intellectus. Et sic dividitur contra intellectum, sicut actus contra potentiam.	Reply to Objection 1. If this authority is accepted, intelligence there means the act of the intellect. And thus it is divided against intellect as act against power.
Iª q. 79 a. 10 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Boetius accipit intelligentiam pro actu intellectus qui transcendit actum rationis. Unde ibidem dicit quod ratio tantum humani generis est, sicut intelligentia sola divini, proprium enim Dei est quod absque omni investigatione omnia intelligat.	Reply to Objection 2. Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things without any investigation.
Iª q. 79 a. 10 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omnes illi actus quos Damascenus enumerat, sunt unius potentiae, scilicet intellectivae. Quae primo quidem simpliciter aliquid apprehendit, et hic actus dicitur intelligentia. Secundo vero, id quod apprehendit, ordinat ad aliquid aliud cognoscendum vel operandum, et hic vocatur intentio. Dum vero persistit in inquisitione illius quod intendit, vocatur excogitatio. Dum vero id quod est excogitatum examinat ad aliqua certa, dicitur scire vel sapere; quod est phronesis, vel sapientiae, nam sapientiae est iudicare, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Ex quo autem habet aliquid pro certo, quasi examinatum, cogitat quomodo possit illud aliis manifestare, et haec est dispositio interioris sermonis; ex qua procedit exterior locutio. Non enim omnis differentia actuum potentias diversificat; sed solum illa quae non potest reduci in idem principium, ut supra dictum est.	Reply to Objection 3. All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one power--namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all only apprehends something; and this act is called "intelligence." Secondly, it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of something else, or to some operation; and this is called "intention." And when it goes on in search of what it "intends," it is called "invention." When, by reference to something known for certain, it examines what it has found, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to "phronesis" or "wisdom"; for "it belongs to the wise man to judge," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). And when once it has obtained something for certain, as being fully examined, it thinks about the means of making it known to others; and this is the ordering of "interior speech," from which proceeds "external speech." For every difference of acts does not make the powers vary, but only what cannot be reduced to the one same principle, as we have said above (78, 4).
Iª q. 79 a. 11 arg. 1 Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus speculativus et practicus sint diversae potentiae. Apprehensivum enim et motivum sunt diversa genera potentiarum, ut patet in II de anima. Sed intellectus speculativus est apprehensivus tantum, intellectus autem practicus est motivus. Ergo sunt diversae potentiae.	Objection 1. It would seem that the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are different kinds of powers, as is clear from De Anima ii, 3. But the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power; while the practical intellect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct powers.
Iª q. 79 a. 11 arg. 2 Praeterea, diversa ratio obiecti diversificat potentiam. Sed obiectum speculativi intellectus est verum, practici autem bonum; quae differunt ratione. Ergo intellectus speculativus et practicus sunt diversae potentiae.	Objection 2. Further, the different nature of the object differentiates the power. But the object of the speculative intellect is "truth," and of the practical is "good"; which differ in nature. Therefore the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers.
Iª q. 79 a. 11 arg. 3 Praeterea, in parte intellectiva intellectus practicus comparatur ad speculativum, sicut aestimativa ad imaginativam in parte sensitiva. Sed aestimativa differt ab imaginativa sicut potentia a potentia, ut supra dictum est. Ergo et intellectus practicus a speculativo.	Objection 3. Further, in the intellectual part, the practical intellect is compared to the speculative, as the estimative is to the imaginative power in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs from the imaginative, as power form power, as we have said above (78, 4). Therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the practical.
Iª q. 79 a. 11 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in III de anima, quod intellectus speculativus per extensionem fit practicus. Una autem potentia non mutatur in aliam. Ergo intellectus speculativus et practicus non sunt diversae potentiae.	On the contrary, The speculative intellect by extension becomes practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power is not changed into another. Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers.
Iª q. 79 a. 11 co. Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus practicus et speculativus non sunt diversae potentiae. Cuius ratio est quia, ut supra dictum est, id quod accidentaliter se habet ad obiecti rationem quam respicit aliqua potentia, non diversificat potentiam, accidit enim colorato quod sit homo, aut magnum aut parvum; unde omnia huiusmodi eadem visiva potentia apprehenduntur. Accidit autem alicui apprehenso per intellectum, quod ordinetur ad opus, vel non ordinetur. Secundum hoc autem differunt intellectus speculativus et practicus. Nam intellectus speculativus est, qui quod apprehendit, non ordinat ad opus, sed ad solam veritatis considerationem, practicus vero intellectus dicitur, qui hoc quod apprehendit, ordinat ad opus. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in III de anima, quod speculativus differt a practico, fine. Unde et a fine denominatur uterque, hic quidem speculativus, ille vero practicus, idest operativus.	I answer that, The speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as we have said above (77, 3), what is accidental to the nature of the object of a power, does not differentiate that power; for it is accidental to a thing colored to be man, or to be great or small; hence all such things are apprehended by the same power of sight. Now, to a thing apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be directed to operation or not, and according to this the speculative and practical intellects differ. For it is the speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10); that "the speculative differs from the practical in its end." Whence each is named from its end: the one speculative, the other practical--i.e. operative.
Iª q. 79 a. 11 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus practicus est motivus, non quasi exequens motum, sed quasi dirigens ad motum. Quod convenit ei secundum modum suae apprehensionis.	Reply to Objection 1. The practical intellect is a motive power, not as executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to it according to its mode of apprehension.
Iª q. 79 a. 11 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod verum et bonum se invicem includunt, nam verum est quoddam bonum, alioquin non esset appetibile; et bonum est quoddam verum, alioquin non esset intelligibile. Sicut igitur obiectum appetitus potest esse verum, inquantum habet rationem boni, sicut cum aliquis appetit veritatem cognoscere; ita obiectum intellectus practici est bonum ordinabile ad opus, sub ratione veri. Intellectus enim practicus veritatem cognoscit, sicut et speculativus; sed veritatem cognitam ordinat ad opus.	Reply to Objection 2. Truth and good include one another; for truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the aspect of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth; so the object of the practical intellect is good directed to the operation, and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth to operation.
Iª q. 79 a. 11 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod multae differentiae diversificant sensitivas potentias, quae non diversificant potentias intellectivas, ut supra dictum est.	Reply to Objection 3. Many differences differentiate the sensitive powers, which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have said above (7 , ad 2; 77, 3, ad 4).
Iª q. 79 a. 12 arg. 1 Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod synderesis sit quaedam specialis potentia ab aliis distincta. Ea enim quae cadunt sub una divisione, videntur esse unius generis. Sed in Glossa Hieronymi Ezech. I, dividitur synderesis contra irascibilem et concupiscibilem et rationalem; quae sunt quaedam potentiae. Ergo synderesis est quaedam potentia.	Objection 1. It would seem that "synderesis" is a special power, distinct from the others. For those things which fall under one division, seem to be of the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome on Ezech. 1:6, "synderesis" is divided against the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational, which are powers. Therefore "synderesis" is a power.
Iª q. 79 a. 12 arg. 2 Praeterea, opposita sunt unius generis. Sed synderesis et sensualitas opponi videntur, quia synderesis semper inclinat ad bonum, sensualitas autem semper ad malum; unde per serpentem significatur, ut patet per Augustinum, XII de Trin. Videtur ergo quod synderesis sit potentia, sicut et sensualitas.	Objection 2. Further, opposite things are of the same genus. But "synderesis" and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because "synderesis" always incites to good; while sensuality always incites to evil: whence it is signified by the serpent, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13). It seems, therefore, that 'synderesis' is a power just as sensuality is.
Iª q. 79 a. 12 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod in naturali iudicatorio adsunt quaedam regulae et semina virtutum et vera et incommutabilia, haec autem dicimus synderesim. Cum ergo regulae incommutabiles quibus iudicamus, pertineant ad rationem secundum sui superiorem partem, ut Augustinus dicit XII de Trin.; videtur quod synderesis sit idem quod ratio. Et ita est quaedam potentia.	Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 10) that in the natural power of judgment there are certain "rules and seeds of virtue, both true and unchangeable." And this is what we call synderesis. Since, therefore, the unchangeable rules which guide our judgment belong to the reason as to its higher part, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2), it seems that "synderesis" is the same as reason: and thus it is a power.
Iª q. 79 a. 12 s. c. Sed contra, potentiae rationales se habent ad opposita, secundum philosophum. Synderesis autem non se habet ad opposita, sed ad bonum tantum inclinat. Ergo synderesis non est potentia. Si enim esset potentia, oporteret quod esset rationalis potentia, non enim invenitur in brutis.	On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), "rational powers regard opposite things." But "synderesis" does not regard opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore "synderesis" is not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational power, since it is not found in brute animals.
Iª q. 79 a. 12 co. Respondeo dicendum quod synderesis non est potentia, sed habitus, licet quidam posuerint synderesim esse quandam potentiam ratione altiorem; quidam vero dixerint eam esse ipsam rationem, non ut est ratio, sed ut est natura. Ad huius autem evidentiam, considerandum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, ratiocinatio hominis, cum sit quidam motus, ab intellectu progreditur aliquorum, scilicet naturaliter notorum absque investigatione rationis, sicut a quodam principio immobili, et ad intellectum etiam terminatur, inquantum iudicamus per principia per se naturaliter nota, de his quae ratiocinando invenimus. Constat autem quod, sicut ratio speculativa ratiocinatur de speculativis, ita ratio practica ratiocinatur de operabilibus. Oportet igitur naturaliter nobis esse indita, sicut principia speculabilium, ita et principia operabilium. Prima autem principia speculabilium nobis naturaliter indita, non pertinent ad aliquam specialem potentiam; sed ad quendam specialem habitum, qui dicitur intellectus principiorum, ut patet in VI Ethic. Unde et principia operabilium nobis naturaliter indita, non pertinent ad specialem potentiam; sed ad specialem habitum naturalem, quem dicimus synderesim. Unde et synderesis dicitur instigare ad bonum, et murmurare de malo, inquantum per prima principia procedimus ad inveniendum, et iudicamus inventa. Patet ergo quod synderesis non est potentia, sed habitus naturalis.	I answer that, "Synderesis" is not a power but a habit; though some held that it is a power higher than reason; while others [Cf. Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. II, 73] said that it is reason itself, not as reason, but as a nature. In order to make this clear we must observe that, as we have said above (8), man's act of reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain things--namely, those which are naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable principle--and ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things which we have discovered by reasoning. Now it is clear that, as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that practical reason argues about practical things. Therefore we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which is called "the understanding of principles," as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we call "synderesis." Whence "synderesis" is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear that "synderesis" is not a power, but a natural habit.
Iª q. 79 a. 12 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa divisio Hieronymi attenditur secundum diversitatem actuum, non secundum diversitatem potentiarum. Diversi autem actus possunt esse unius potentiae.	Reply to Objection 1. The division given by Jerome is taken from the variety of acts, and not from the variety of powers; and various acts can belong to one power.
Iª q. 79 a. 12 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod similiter oppositio sensualitatis et synderesis attenditur secundum oppositionem actuum; non sicut diversarum specierum unius generis.	Reply to Objection 2. In like manner, the opposition of sensuality to "syneresis" is an opposition of acts, and not of the different species of one genus.
Iª q. 79 a. 12 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod huiusmodi incommutabiles rationes sunt prima principia operabilium, circa quae non contingit errare; et attribuuntur rationi sicut potentiae, et synderesi sicut habitui. Unde et utroque, scilicet ratione et synderesi, naturaliter iudicamus.	Reply to Objection 3. Those unchangeable notions are the first practical principles, concerning which no one errs; and they are attributed to reason as to a power, and to "synderesis" as to a habit. Wherefore we judge naturally both by our reason and by "synderesis."
Iª q. 79 a. 13 arg. 1 Ad tertiumdecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod conscientia sit quaedam potentia. Dicit enim Origenes quod conscientia est spiritus corrector et paedagogus animae sociatus, quo separatur a malis et adhaeret bonis. Sed spiritus in anima nominat potentiam aliquam, vel ipsam mentem, secundum illud Ephes. IV, renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae; vel ipsam imaginationem; unde et imaginaria visio spiritualis vocatur, ut patet per Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt. Est ergo conscientia quaedam potentia.	Objection 1. It would seem that conscience is a power; for Origen says [Commentary on Rm. 2:15 that "conscience is a correcting and guiding spirit accompanying the soul, by which it is led away from evil and made to cling to good." But in the soul, spirit designates a power--either the mind itself, according to the text (Ephesians 4:13), "Be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind"--or the imagination, whence imaginary vision is called spiritual, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24). Therefore conscience is a power.
Iª q. 79 a. 13 arg. 2 Praeterea, nihil est peccati subiectum nisi potentia animae. Sed conscientia est subiectum peccati, dicitur enim ad Tit. I, de quibusdam, quod inquinatae sunt eorum mens et conscientia. Ergo videtur quod conscientia sit potentia.	Objection 2. Further, nothing is a subject of sin, except a power of the soul. But conscience is a subject of sin; for it is said of some that "their mind and conscience are defiled" (Titus 1:15). Therefore it seems that conscience is a power.
Iª q. 79 a. 13 arg. 3 Praeterea, necesse est quod conscientia sit vel actus, vel habitus, vel potentia. Sed non est actus, quia non semper maneret in homine. Nec est habitus, non enim esset unum quid conscientia, sed multa; per multos enim habitus cognoscitivos dirigimur in agendis. Ergo conscientia est potentia.	Objection 3. Further, conscience must of necessity be either an act, a habit, or a power. But it is not an act; for thus it would not always exist in man. Nor is it a habit; for conscience is not one thing but many, since we are directed in our actions by many habits of knowledge. Therefore conscience is a power.
Iª q. 79 a. 13 s. c. Sed contra, conscientia deponi potest, non autem potentia. Ergo conscientia non est potentia.	On the contrary, Conscience can be laid aside. But a power cannot be laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a power.
Iª q. 79 a. 13 co. Respondeo dicendum quod conscientia, proprie loquendo, non est potentia, sed actus. Et hoc patet tum ex ratione nominis, tum etiam ex his quae secundum communem usum loquendi, conscientiae attribuuntur. Conscientia enim, secundum proprietatem vocabuli, importat ordinem scientiae ad aliquid, nam conscientia dicitur cum alio scientia. Applicatio autem scientiae ad aliquid fit per aliquem actum. Unde ex ista ratione nominis patet quod conscientia sit actus. Idem autem apparet ex his quae conscientiae attribuuntur. Dicitur enim conscientia testificari, ligare vel instigare, et etiam accusare vel remordere sive reprehendere. Et haec omnia consequuntur applicationem alicuius nostrae cognitionis vel scientiae ad ea quae agimus. Quae quidem applicatio fit tripliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod recognoscimus aliquid nos fecisse vel non fecisse, secundum illud Eccle. VII, scit conscientia tua te crebro maledixisse aliis, et secundum hoc, conscientia dicitur testificari. Alio modo applicatur secundum quod per nostram conscientiam iudicamus aliquid esse faciendum vel non faciendum, et secundum hoc, dicitur conscientia instigare vel ligare. Tertio modo applicatur secundum quod per conscientiam iudicamus quod aliquid quod est factum, sit bene factum vel non bene factum, et secundum hoc, conscientia dicitur excusare vel accusare, seu remordere. Patet autem quod omnia haec consequuntur actualem applicationem scientiae ad ea quae agimus. Unde proprie loquendo, conscientia nominat actum. Quia tamen habitus est principium actus, quandoque nomen conscientiae attribuitur primo habitui naturali, scilicet synderesi, sicut Hieronymus, in Glossa Ezech. I, synderesim conscientiam nominat; et Basilius naturale iudicatorium; et Damascenus dicit quod est lex intellectus nostri. Consuetum enim est quod causae et effectus per invicem nominentur.	I answer that, Properly speaking, conscience is not a power, but an act. This is evident both from the very name and from those things which in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience. For conscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies the relation of knowledge to something: for conscience may be resolved into "cum alio scientia," i.e. knowledge applied to an individual case. But the application of knowledge to something is done by some act. Wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an act. The same is manifest from those things which are attributed to conscience. For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And all these follow the application of knowledge or science to what we do: which application is made in three ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have done or not done something; "Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast often spoken evil of others" (Ecclesiastes 7:23), and according to this, conscience is said to witness. In another way, so far as through the conscience we judge that something should be done or not done; and in this sense, conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way, so far as by conscience we judge that something done is well done or ill done, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or torment. Now, it is clear that all these things follow the actual application of knowledge to what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking, conscience denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act, sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural habit--namely, 'synderesis': thus Jerome calls 'synderesis' conscience (Gloss. Ezech. 1:6); Basil [Hom. in princ. Proverb.], the "natural power of judgment," and Damascene [De Fide Orth. iv. 22 says that it is the "law of our intellect." For it is customary for causes and effects to be called after one another.
Iª q. 79 a. 13 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod conscientia dicitur spiritus, secundum quod spiritus pro mente ponitur, quia est quoddam mentis dictamen.	Reply to Objection 1. Conscience is called a spirit, so far as spirit is the same as mind; because conscience is a certain pronouncement of the mind.
Iª q. 79 a. 13 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod inquinatio dicitur esse in conscientia, non sicut in subiecto, sed sicut cognitum in cognitione, inquantum scilicet aliquis scit se esse inquinatum.	Reply to Objection 2. The conscience is said to be defiled, not as a subject, but as the thing known is in knowledge; so far as someone knows he is defiled.
Iª q. 79 a. 13 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod actus, etsi non semper maneat in se, semper tamen manet in sua causa, quae est potentia et habitus. Habitus autem ex quibus conscientia informatur, etsi multi sint, omnes tamen efficaciam habent ab uno primo, scilicet ab habitu primorum principiorum, qui dicitur synderesis. Unde specialiter hic habitus interdum conscientia nominatur, ut supra dictum est.	Reply to Objection 3. Although an act does not always remain in itself, yet it always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all the habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless have their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first principles, which is called "synderesis." And for this special reason, this habit is sometimes called conscience, as we have said above.

Directory:Logic Museum/Aquinas Summa-I-77-79

Navigation menu

Page actions

Page actions

Personal tools

Navigation

semantic

Site statistics

Tools

Search