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BOETHIUS OF DACIA: IS EVERY MAN OF NECESSITY AN ANIMAL?

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Introduction

This is a new translation of the Sophisma 'Every Man Is of Necessity an Animal', by the thirteenth century philosoher Boethius of Dacia. It is one of a series of translations and discussions to do with the question of whether a per se proposition (one whose predicate is included in the subject, such as 'every man is an animal') is true when the subject does not exist. Other texts from the late thirteenth century which include work by Duns Scotus (link to follow), <a href="sigerquaestio22.htm">Siger of Brabant, <a href="simonfavnullohomine.htm">Simon of Faversham, <a href="brito-quaestiones.htm">Radulphus Brito and others.

Two of the four questions are included here. Question I is whether Every man is 'of necessity' an animal. Boethius denies the question in the sense that the proposition is necessarily true. This is because (according to him) an affirmative proposition asserts the combination of subject and predicate ('man' and 'animal'), and is therefore true only when such a combination exists in reality.

For if it is asked of you, wherefore the proposition 'Socrates is not running' is false, with Socrates running,

you will reply that it is because there is a composition in reality, which is opposed to a division of speech, [which] verifies it,

and if you do not reply thus, then you cannot reply.

Thus when no man or no animal exists there is no such combination, and the proposition 'every man is an animal' is false. This is a point of disagreement with other Modists (including Duns Scotus, whose early work in the 1290's shows the influence by Modist thought). Scotus argued, for example, that a per se proposition must be true in virtue of how it is understood, i.e. a man as understood (ut intelligitur), is an animal. Thus 'a man is a man' is true, even when there are no men (Question VIII, determination - link to follow). Composition in the understanding is sufficient for the truth of a proposition, where the subject does not exist, as is clear from propositions such as 'a chimaera is a chimaera' (Question VIII ad N3 - link to follow).

Question III is whether, when the thing signified by a term ceases to exist, the terms loses its signification. Boethius argues, in common with all the other modists, that the signifying of an utterance does not depend on real being, and the being of a thing, and its being signified by an utterance are different. Like other modists, he distinguished between the word 'is' predicated as a copula (i.e. signifying being something, and predicated absolutely (signifying being).

Boethius of Dacia

Little is known about Boethius. He was a Dane who was master of Arts at the university of Paris in the 1270's, and a contemporary of Siger of Brabant. He was a leading member of the Latin Averroists (radical Aristotelians), also a member of a group now known as the Modists- a circle of grammarians who flourished in Paris from about 1270 to 1310.

Summary of the question

The structure of the question is somewhat more complicated than the standard medieval form. The standard form consists of a set of positive and negative arguments, followed by a reply (a 'solution' or 'determination') on either the positive side (followed by objections to the negative arguments), or the negative side (followed by objections to the positive arguments). In this question, there are two replies, one by the master, one by the bachelor. The bachelor replies by affirming the question, and objects to the two negative arguments. The master replies by denying the question, and objects to the three negative arguments.

Positive argument 1. Aristotle says that per se propositions are necessary (a per se or essential proposition being one where the predicate is included in the definition of the subject). 'Every man is an animal' is per se ('man' being defined as 'rational animal'). Therefore this proposition is necessary. Positive argument 2 By a syllogism based on opposite [i.e. contradictory] propositions, every animal is a substance, some man is not a substance, ergo some man is not an animal. But according to Aristotle (Prior Analytics II, 64b7-10) the the conclusion of such a proposition is not possible, and so its contradictory, namely 'every man is an animal' is necessary. (A similar argument is mentioned by Scotus [link here] in his Questions on Aristotle's De Interpretatione). Positive argument 3 If 'Every man is an animal' were not necessary, it could be false. But then 'a man is a man' could be false, and thus 'a man is not a man' could be true. But that is impossible, because an opposite is stated of an opposite. Positive argument 4. Moreover, Aristotle says that if a species can lose what is assigned as a genus, then what is assigned is not a genus. But animal is the genus of man. Therefore, the subject 'man' cannot lose the predicate 'animal'.

Negative argument 1. There are three sorts of composition. Composition in reality, composition in thought, composition in discourse. In every case, the truth of one composition derives from composition that is prior, i.e. no true composition in discourse unless composition in thought, and there is no true composition in thought unless there is composition in reality. Negative argument 2. Moreover, necessity is 'immoveable truth'. But in nothing that can change, is it possible to find immoveable truth. But both man and animal are changeable (since they can be destroyed).

Determination for the positive arguments. 'Every man is an animal' is necessarily true, because being and non being are accidental properties, and so whether a man exists or not, the essence of man always remains. Since a man or an animal make a proposition of this kind true through their essence and not through the accident of being or non being, the assertion will be true whether a man exists or not. To the first negative argument, it is replied that there are certainly three kinds of composition, in discourse, in the understandings in the soul, and in reality. But the composition of discourse is only true because the composition of the understanding is true, whereas for the composition of the understanding to be true, there does not have to be a similar composition in reality. To the second negative argument, it is agreed that necessity is immutable truth, and that there is no such truth in mutable things. Man and animal are not immutable in respect of their existence, but they are with respect to their essence, and it is the essence which makes the proposition true.Therefore 'a man is animal' is both necessary and an immutable truth.

Determination. Denying the question. The essence of man is destroyed after the destruction of man, thus the essence of man cannot verify the proposition 'a man is an animal'. Nor is being an accidental property of essence, otherwise the being of a man could be removed from him while he exists, and so he would exist and not exist, which is impossible. And if being is something added to essence, then a simple thing, in which no accident and no thing is added to it, would have being, which is impossible.

Against the solution of the first negative argument, it is false that composition in the understanding does not need a composition in reality. Otherwise a composition of the understanding can be true, which compounds things which are in reality divided, e.g. man and donkey, which is impossible. Against the solution of the second negative argument, if the essence of a thing did remain after its destruction, it would remain either in the material or the form. Not in the material, because when a man has perished the material of which he is made takes on another form. Not in the soul, otherwise at any time we conceived a form and a thing in the soul, it would be true that one was a composition with the other, even if the opposite were the case in reality.

Boethius now considers a fifth positive argument, that the proposition is true, because a man can neither be, nor be understood, unless he is understood to be an animal. He replies that since it is not necessary either for a man to be, or to be understood to be, but it is impossible for a man to be unless he is understood to be an animal, and for that reason it is not true. Thus the proposition that every man is of necessity an animal, is false, whether a man exists or not. Truth is caused by reality, eternal truth is caused by eternal things, changeable things can only cause changeable truth (i.e. true propositions which could become false).

Against the first positive argument, essential predication (such as animal of man) is only necessary when the subject exists, for the predicate has its cause in the subject only when the subject remains in existence. When the subject is destroyed, this is no longer the case, and the proposition neither necessary, nor per se, nor true. Against the second positive argument, Aristotle only claims that the conclusion of a proposition based on opposed premisses is contrary to fact, not that it is impossible. On the contrary: its conclusion can be true, when it divides things that are divided in reality. Against the third positive argument (that 'a man is a man' cannot be false), it is false when no man exists, just as 'a man is not a man' is true. For when no man exists, the composition asserted by 'a man is a man' does not exist. It is a composition of speech, to which no composition in reality answers, and so it is false. And 'a man is not a man' is then true, because when no man exists, the division of speech has no composition in reality.

Against the fourth positive argument, it is true that a species cannot lose its genus so long as the species exists, otherwise there would be times when the genus was in the species, and other times when it was not, and it would be an accident, not a genus. But that the species should lose its genus as a result of the destruction of the substance itself, is not impossible, indeed it is necessary. If a donkey has the genus animal on the basis of its essence alone, and it loses its essence as a result of destruction, it is necessary that it lose the genus of animal also.

If you object that the form of donkey existed before the donkey existed, it cannot have been separate from the matter, like one of Plato's forms, for Aristotle says that forms are not separable from matter. If you object that the essence remains in the soul, then by equal reasoning if one were to conceive in one's soul of Socrates and of a white thing, it would be true that the one was compounded with the other even in reality it were opposite, which is absurd. It is not enough that the essence be in the soul, it must be in matter.

In conclusion, 'every man is of necessity an animal' is false, whether not not a man exists. For, just as truth is caused by reality (citing Aristotle Meta 10 51a34-52a11), so eternal truth is caused by eternal things and untransmutable truth by untransmutable things. By contrast, truth that is transmutable and not necessary is caused by real things that are not necessary and which can be destroyed.

Question III is whether, when the thing signified by a term is destroyed it is necessary that the terms loses its signification. Positive argument 1 is that, according to Boethius if the thing does not exist the utterance ceases to be designative. Positive argument 2 is that the thing understood and the signification of the utterance are one and the same. Therefore if the thing ceases to exist, so does the signification. The negative argument is that it is not the thing which is in the soul, but its 'species'. These are different, and the existence of one does not depend on the existence of the other.

Determination. The question is denied. The signifying of an utterance does not depend on real being, and the being of a thing, and its being signified by an utterance are different. Therefore a thing may not be, and yet may still be signified.

To positive argument 1, if the word 'is' is predicated as a copula, the proposition is true, and Boethius (the Roman) understands it in that way, i.e. as meaning that so if the thing is not a substance of the signifying utterance, as it is signified, its being designative ceases. But if it is predicated absolutely [secundo adiacens], then the proposition is false, as it means that if the thing is not a thing, the utterance ceases to be designative. To positive argument 2, it is true that the thing and what is understood, and the signification of the utterance are the same. However, being understood, being the significate of the utterance, and being a thing, are not the same. Thus when the material thing is destroyed, as a material thing, it does not have to be destroyed as the signification of an utterance.

References

• c. 1270. Boethius of Dacia, Omnis homo de necessitate est animal; ed M.Grabmann, in Die sophismataliteratur des 12 und 13 Jahrhunderts mit Textausgabe eines Sophisma des Boethius von Dacien, BeitrGPhThMa, 36 / 1 (1940) pp. 77-95 (transcription of Cod. Plut. XII sin. fol. 62r-63r der Biblioteca Laurenziana in Florenz).

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Latin	Latin
Quaestio I Omnis homo de necessitate est animal	'Every man of necessity is an animal'
Circa istud sophisma quattuor quaeruntur. Primum est de veritate huius: utrum si vera nullo homine existente.	Concerning this sophism four [questions] are asked. The first concerns the truth of the [question] with no man existing.
	Arguments for the question
I. A1 De primo autem sic quod sit vera. Per se et necessarium idem sunt ut vult Aristoteles primo Posteriorum. Sed hoc est per se. Nam sicut tota diffinitio praedicatur de diffinito, sic quaelibet pars diffinitionis praedicatur de diffinito. Ergo est necessaria. Ergo est vera per locum a specie ad genus. Responsio	1. Concerning the first, [I argue] thus that it is true. Per se and necessary are the same, as the Philosopher would have it in the first [book] of the Posterior Analytics. But this [proposition] is per se. For just as the whole definition is predicated of the thing defined, so each part of the definition is predicated of the thing defined. Therefore it is necessary. Therefore it is true by argument [per locum] from species to genus.
A2 Ad idem autem per syllogismum ex oppositis. Omne animal est substantia. Quidam homo non est substantia. Ergo quidam man non animal. Sed secundum Aristotelem secundo Posteriorum conclusio syllogismi ex oppositis non est possibilis. Est enim contrarius rei, ut ibi dicitur. Ergo haec erit impossibilis: quidam homo non est animal. Ergo sua contradictoria erit necessaria, haec scilicet omnis homo est animal. Ergo haec propositio est vera nullo homine existente. Responsio	2. To the same [conclusion] by means of a syllogism from opposites: Every animal is a substance, a certain man is not a substance, therefore a certain man is not an animal. But according to Aristotle (the second of the Posterior Analytics), the conclusion of a syllogism from opposites is not possible, for it is opposed to reality, as is said there. Therefore 'a certain man is not an animal' will be impossible, [and] therefore its contradictory will be necessary. Therefore the proposition is true when no man exists.
Item haec propositio: omnis homo est animal aut est necessaria aut non. Si sic habeo propositum, si non potest esse falsa. Sed si haec est falsa: homo est animal, haec posset esse falsa: homo est homo. Cuius ratio est, quia si falso enuntiatur aliquod consequens de aliquo enuntiabili, falso enuntiatur de eodem quodlibet antecedens. Sed si haec potest esse falsa: homo est homo, etiam haec potest esse vera: homo non est homo vel homo est non homo. Ergo nec ista potest esse falsa homo est homo et sic est necessaria. Et si homo de necessitate est homo, de necessitate est animal, quare prima vera. Responsio	3. Likewise, the proposition 'every man is an animal' either is necessary or not. If so, I have what was proposed. If not, it can be false. But if 'every man is an animal' is false, 'a man is a man' could be false. The reason of this is because if some consequent is falsely asserted of something assertable, any antecedent is falsely asserted of the same thing. But if 'a man is a man' can be false, also 'a man is not a man' can be true, or 'a man is a non man'. [But that is impossible, because in those propositions one opposite is stated of the other opposite]. Therefore neither can 'a man is a man' be false, and thus it is necessary. And if a man of necessity is a man, of necessity he is an animal, wherefore the first [proposition] is true.
Respondet Aristoteles quarto Topicorum, quod si aliquid ponatur esse genus alicuius, considerandum, si species cui assignatur illud genus possit amittere illud genus, quia si potest amittere illud quod assignatum est pro genere non est genus. Si animal est genus hominis, ergo hoc subiectum homo non potest amittere hoc praedicatum animal. Ergo est necessaria, quia hoc significat. Responsio	4. Aristotle replies in the fourth book of the Topics, that if something is supposed to be the genus of something, it is to be considered, if the species to which that genus is assigned can lose that genus, because if it can lose that which is assigned as a genus, it is not a genus. If animal is the genus of man, then the subject 'man' cannot lose the predicate 'animal'. Therefore it is necessary, because it signifies this.
	Arguments against the question.
Ad oppositum. Sic autem triplex invenitur compositio, Scilicet compositio, quae est in re ipsa, compositio, quae est in intellectu, et compositio, quae est apud sermonem.	1. On the opposing side. Now composition is found in three ways. Namely, composition which is in the thing itself, composition which is in the understanding, and composition, which is in discourse.
Itaque in istis semper veritas ex priorum compositione et ex veritate primae compositionis tamquam ex causa sua, quae non potest facere veram compositionem apud sermonem nisi sit vera compositio apud intellectum, ex quo est compositio sermonis et non erit compositio vera apud intellectum nisi consimilis sit compositio in re. Si enim sit in re divisio et apud intellectum compositio, erit falsa compositio intellectus.	Accordingly, truth in these things is always in the prior composition, and from the truth of the first sort of composition, so as to be its cause, which cannot make a composition true in discourse, unless the composition in the understanding is true, from which the composition of discourse is [true], and the composition in the understanding will not be true unless a similar composition is in the thing. For if there is division in the thing and in the understanding, the composition in the understanding will be false
Ex hoc autem sic. Sicut se habet compositio sermonis ad compositionem intellectus, sic se habet compositio intellectus ad compositionem rerum. Sed compositio sermonis non potest esse vera, nisi sit vera compositio intellectus, ex qua ipsa est. Ergo nec potest esse vera compositio intellectus nisi sit talis compositio in re. Sed nullo homine existente animal homini non componitur. Ergo nec intellectus nec sermo componens animal homini potest esse verus, cum deficiat compositio, quae est in re quae est fundamentum et causa cuiuslibet veritatis posterioris scilicet intellectus et sermonis. Et per hoc patet, quod quidam minus quam necessarium dicebant, salva tamen pace eorum dicentes, quod licet omni homine corrupto et omni animali corrupto animal et homo non id quod prius erant, non tamen idem significant, quod prius significabant et omnino dicunt, quod propositio est vera. Sed hoc non est causa veritatis. Nam Aristoteles docens, quae enuntiatio sit vera et quae falsa, dicit, quod ab eo, quod res est vel non est, dicitur oratio vera vel falsa, et non ab eo, quod non idem significant sermones ita componens veritas.	But from this as follows. Just as the composition of discourse stands [habet se] to the composition of the understanding, so the composition of the understanding stands to the composition of things. But the composition of discourse cannot be true, unless there is a true composition of the understanding, from which it comes [est]. Therefore, neither can there be a true composition of the understanding unless there is such a composition in the thing. But with no man existing, animal is not compounded with man. Therefore neither the understanding nor the discourse compounding animal with man can be true, since the composition is lacking which is in the thing which is the foundation and cause of the posterior, i.e. of the intellect and of discourse. And through this it is clear, that certain persons were saying less than [was] necessary, yet with their peace preserved, saying that although with every man destroyed, and every animal destroyed, and animal and man not what they were before, nonetheless they signify the same that they signified before, and altogether they say, that the proposition is true. But this is not the cause of truth. For Aristotle, teaching which assertion is true and which [is] false, says that an assertion is called true or false, in respect of a thing being the case, or not being the case, not in respect of the expressions, that compose the truth, signifying the same.
Item necessitas est veritas fixa. Sed in nulla re transmutabili secundum quod transmutabilis est invenitur veritas fixa. Ergo nec necessitas huius. Sed homo et animal sunt res transmutabiles, quia sunt res materiales et materia in unoquoque est illud, quo potest res esse et non esse secundum quod comparata est ad privationem ut dicitur septimo Metaphyicae. Ergo prima falsa sicut prius.	2. Likewise, necessity is immoveable truth. But in no transmutable thing, according as it is transmutable, do we find immoveable truth, therefore neither its necessity. But man and animal are transmutable, because they are material things, and material in each thing is that, by which a thing can be and not be, according as it is compared to privation, as is said in 7 Metaphysics. Therefore the first [proposition] is false, as before.
	Reply in support of the positive arguments
Ad quaestionem respondetur, quod ipsa est vera et ratio huius est, quia esse et non esse accidunt rei et ideo sive homo sit sive non semper manet hominis essentia. Cum ergo homo et animal verificent huiusmodi propositionem per suam essentiam et non per hoc accidens, quod est esse et non esse, oratio erit vera sive homo sit sive non sit. Et similiter animal. Unde videtur, quod poni potest simile. Sortes per suam essentiam verificat hanc locutionem: Sortes est substantia, non per hoc accidens, quod est albus. Ideo sublato hoc accidente adhuc erit oratio vera. Responsio	To the question it is answered, that it is true, and the reason of this is, that being and non being are accidents of a thing, and for that reason - whether a man exists or not - the essence of man always remains. Therefore, since a man or an animal verify a proposition of this kind through their essence and not through the accident of being or non being, the assertion will be true whether a man exists or not. And similarly animal. Wherefore it seems that it can be given in a similar way. Through his essence, Socrates verifies the proposition 'Socrates is a substance, not through the accident of being white. For that reason, with the accident taken away, the assertion will still be true.
	Reply against the negative arguments
Ad rationes respondetur. Cum dicitur, quod triplex est compositio scilicet significatorum apud sermonem, intellectorum apud animam et tertia compositio rerum, concessit bachelarius et dixit etiam, quod compositio sermonis non sit vera nisi quia compositio intellectus est vera, a quo est compositio sermonis. Sed ad hoc, quod compositio intellectus sit vera, non oportet consimilem compositionem esse in re, ut dicebat. Responsio	To the arguments [against] it is replied [thus]. 1. When it is said that there are three kinds of composition, i.e. of the significant [parts] in discourse, of the understandings in the soul, and third, composition of things, the bachelor allowed [this] and said also, that the composition of discourse is not true unless it is because the composition of the understanding is true, from which there is the composition of discourse. But, as he [the batchelor] said, for the composition of the understanding to be true, there does not have to be a similar composition in the thing.
Ad secundum rationem respondit. Cum dicebatur, quod necessitas est veritas fixa, concessit et etiam in rebus transmutabilibus, secundum quod transmutabiles sunt, nihil est fixum, hominem et animal dixit esse res transmutabiles penes esse et non {esse} quae dixit accidentia horum, sed intransmutabiles sunt penes essentias, per quas verificant orationem. Unde et hominem esse animal necessitas est et veritas fixa. Responsio	2. To the second argument he replied [thus]. When it was said that necessity is immoveable truth, he allowed this, and also [that] in transmutable things, according as they are transmutable, nothing is immoveable. He said that man and animal were were transmutable things within [i.e. in respect of] being and non being, which he said were accidents of them, but intransmutable things within their essences, through which they verify an assertion. Wherefore that a man is animal is both necessary and an immoveable truth.
Contra solutionem arguitur.	Arguments against these resolutions [of the arguments]
Cum dicit, quod homo et animal per suas essentias verificant locutionem post suam corruptionem, contra: essentia hominis non plus est post suam corruptionem quam esset ante suam generationem. Per suas essentias non verificant hanc orationem: homo est animal, cum essentiae horum nihil erant nec verificabunt post corruptionem. Sed essentia hominis ante suam generationem nihil erat nisi in potentia passiva materiae etiam in potentia activa agentis sicut omnis forma materialis sicut homo et animal ante suam generationem.	Against this resolution it is argued [as follows]. When he says that after their destruction a man and animal verify a locution by their essences, against this: the essence of man is no more after his destruction than it was before his generation. Man and animal do not verify the assertion 'a man is an animal' by their essences, when their essences were nothing, nor will they verify it after [their] destruction. But the essence of man was nothing before his generation except in the passive potentiality of material, also in the active potentiality of an agent, just as every material form, e.g. man an animal, before their generation.
De hoc autem quod dicit, quod essentiae accidit esse arguitur. Aut enim accidens separabile aut inseparabile. Si sit separabile accidens, ergo essentia hominis hoc non existente ab eo poterat removeri et sic simul poterit esse et non esse, quod est impossibile. Si autem sit accidens inseparabile, ergo corrupto homine quantum ad suum esse corrumpitur quantum ad suam essentiam, cuius contrarium dicebat.	But of what he says, that being is accidental to essence, is argued [as follows]. For an accident is either separable or inseparable. If it is a separable accident, then the being [reading esse] of a man could be removed from him with the man existing [reading existente for non existente], and thus at the same time he could be and not be, which is impossible. But if it is an inseparable accident, then with the man destroyed, so far as his existence is destroyed, by so much is his essence destroyed - the contrary of which was said.
Item si esse sit aliqua res addita essentiae, non haberet tunc esse simplex, in quo nullum accidens et nulla res addita sibi esse non haberet si accidens et intellectus, quod est impossibile. Nam esse aeternum est causa omnium generabilium sicut dicitur quinto Metaphysicae et secundo eiusdem et in libro de causis.	Likewise, if being is some thing added to essence, then a simple thing, in which no accident and no thing is added to it, would have being, which is impossible. For eternal being is the cause of all generable things, just as is said in Metaphysics V, and the second of the same, and in the book of causes.
Contra solutionem rationum arguitur.	Against the resolution of the arguments, is argued [as follows].
Cum dicit, quod compositio intellectus non exigit compositionem in re sibi similem, contra: quicquid res de necessitate in re non requirit, eius oppositum secum patitur. Si ergo compositio apud intellectum non requirit compositionem in re sibi similem, ergo secum in re compatitur divisionem. Ergo compositio intellectus potest esse vera, quae componit ea, quae divisa sunt ut homo et asinus quod impossibile est.	When he says that a composition in the understanding does not need a composition in the thing, similar to it, on the contrary. Whatever a thing does not require of necessity in reality, the opposite of it [which is not required] is compatible with it. Therefore, if composition in the understanding does not require composition in reality, similar to it, therefore division in reality is compatible with it. Therefore a composition of the understanding can be true, which compounds things which are divided, e.g. man and donkey, which is impossible.
Contra solutionem secundi argumenti arguitur. Si in omni homine et omni animali corrupto maneret essentia hominis et animalis, aut ergo in materia aut in forma. Non in materia, quia corrupto homine materia hominis est sub forma opposita, quia corruptio unius est generatio alterius. Si ergo simul in eadem materia esset essentia hominis, tunc oppositio esset in eodem nec etiam homo post suam corruptionem esse corruptus, quia essentia hominis in materia existens constituit hominem. Non in anima, quia ad hoc, quod essentia rerum naturalium verificet orationes, non sufficit esse in anima, sed oportet, quod sit in materia. Aliquando enim concipiendo formam et illum in anima verum esset in alteri compositionem etsi oppositum esset in re. Et iterum omni animali corrupto et omni homine corrupto non est aliqua anima, in qua posset remanere essentia hominis. Licet intellectus possit separari a corpore, ipse separatus non est anima secundum Aristotelem 2є De anima. Substantia enim est corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis et secundum Alfarabium super de causis de proprietate animae vivificare corpus.	Against the resolution of the second argument it is argued as follows. If in every man every animal that has perished, there were to remain the essence of man and animal, therefore [it would remain] either in the material or the form Not in the material, because when a man has perished the material of man is under an opposite form, because the perishing of one is the generation of another. Therefore, if at the same time, in the same material there were the essence of man, then there would be opposition in the same thing, and also the man would not have perished after his perishing, because the essence of man in existing material is what constitutes a man. Not in the soul, because for the essence of natural things to verify discourse, being in the soul is not sufficient, but it must be that it exists [sit] in material. For at any time by conceiving a form and a thing in the soul, it would be true that one was a composition with the other, even if the opposite were the case in reality. And again, with every animal perished, and every man, there is not some soul in which there could remain the essence of man. Although the understanding can be separated from the body, according to Aristotle that is not the soul (II de Anima). For substance is the potentiality of a physical organic body of having life, and according to Alfarabi (liber de Causis), of the property of the soul to make a body living.
Hiis sic improbatis aliter respondent quidam ad quaestionem, quod prima non est vera [/falsa]. Et ratio eorum est, quod homo nec esse nec intelligi potest nisi sic intelligatur animal. Quod cum nec hominem esse nec intelligi est necessarium, quod impossibile est esse nisi sic intelligatur animal, ideo haec non erit vera, sed dicendum, quod haec scilicet omnis homo de necessitate sit animal est falsa sive homo sit sive non sit. Nam secundum Aristotelem 9 Metaphysicae sicut [fol. 62rb] veritas a re causatur, sic veritas aeterna a rebus aeternis et intransmutabilia ab intransmutabilibus quae sunt semper in una dispositione veritatis. Transmutabilia et non necessaria causantur a rebus non necessariis et corruptibilibus. Cum ergo homo et animal sint res transmutabiles et corruptibiles et non sit in eis incorruptibile nisi materia prima, quae est penitus incorruptibilis, ut probatum est in libro Physicorum, secundum quam materiam non verificatur haec propositio: homo de necessitate est animal, sequitur, quod ex hiis rebus homo animal nulla causatur veritas intransmutabilis nec etiam necessaria.	With these things disproved thus, certain persons reply in another way to the question, that the first [proposition] is not false. And their reason is, that a man can neither be, nor be understood, unless he is understood to be an animal. But, since it is not necessary either for a man to be, or to be understood to be, but it is impossible [for a man] to be unless he is understood to be an animal, for that reason it is not true. We have to say instead that the proposition, i.e. that every man is of necessity an animal, is false, whether a man exists or not. For, according to Aristotle (9 Metaphysics), just as truth is caused by reality, so eternal truth is caused by eternal things, and intransmutable truth by intransmutable things, which are always in one disposition of the truth. Transmutable and non necessary [truths] are caused by things that are not necessary and are corruptible. Therefore since man and animal are transmutable and corruptible things, are there is nothing incorruptible in them except primary material (which is altogether indestructible, as proved in the Physics) according to which [primary] material the proposition 'man is of necessity an animal' is not verified, [it follows] that from these things - man and animal - no intransmutable or necessary truth is caused.
Item homo est animal, quia materia hominis transformata est ad formam animalis. Sic ergo cum materia transmutabilis est ex omni forma, ad quam ipsa est transmutabilis, sicut ignis est ignis quia materia ignis transmutata est ad formam ignis, sic homo est animal, quia forma hominis est transmutata ad formam animalis homo erit non animal, quia materia hominis transmutata est ex forma animalis. Sed illud non necessario est animal, quod est non animal. Quare &c.	Likewise, a man is an animal because the material of man is transformed to the form of an animal. Therefore, since transmutable material is dispossessed of every form, to which it is transmutable, just as fire is fire because the material of fire is transmutated to the form of fire, so man is an animal, because the form of man is transmutated to the form of an animal, man will be a non animal, because the material of man is transmutated from the form of an animal. But that is not necessarily an animal, because it is a non animal. Wherefore &c
Item omne corruptibile secundum suam formam substantialem et secundum omnem suam dispositionem hoc est corruptibile quantum ad praedicatum sibi inhaerens sive essentialiter sive accidentaliter. Homo est corruptibilis secundum suam formam substantialem et secundum omnem suam dispositionem. Ergo est corruptibilis secundum omne praedicatum sibi inhaerens. Nullum ergo praedicatum sibi inhaeret necessario. Ergo prima falsa. Non ideo fiat obiectio contra hoc, quod dico hominem esse corruptibilem secundum suam formam substantialem, quia licet intellectus sit aeterna substantia, non tamen est aeterna forma. Ratio autem non semper informat materiam Sortis. Si autem intellectus non sit forma, obiectio non habet locum. Rationes probantes hanc esse falsam concedo.	Likewise every thing that is perishable according to its form, and according to every one of its dispositions, can perish as regards predicate inhering in it, either essentially or accidentally. Man is perishable according to his substantial form, and according to every one of his dispositions. Therefore he is perishable according to every disposition inhering in him. Therefore no predicate inheres in him necessarily. [And] therefore the first [proposition] is false. And for that reason let there be no objection against what I say, that a man is perishable according to his substantial form, because although understanding is an eternal, yet it is not an eternal form. But reason does not always inform the material of Socrates. But if the understanding is not a form, the objection has no ground. I allow the reasonings proving that this is false.
Ad rationes in oppositum respondeo.	To the reasonings on the opposite side I reply.
Cum dicitur necessarium et per se idem sicut et haec propositio: homo est animal est per se, ergo est necessaria, dicendum, quod sicut contingens est illa, cuius praedicatum potest variari circa subiectum subiecto manente, sic necessaria inhaerentia est illa, cuius praedicatum non potest variari circa subiectum subiecto manente et tale necessarium et per se idem sunt. Habet enim tale praedicatum causam in subiecto manente subiecto, sed ipso corrupto praedicatum in subiecto causam non habet. Causa autem, per quam subiectum orationem verificabit, essentia subiecti erat. Homine autem corrupto non est essentia hominis plus quam erat ante suam generationem. Et hoc solum est essentia hominis in potentia. Ideo homine corrupto propositio non necessaria nec per se nec vero.	1. When it is said that necessary and per se are the same, and that the proposition 'man is an animal' is per se, therefore it is necessary, it must be said, that just as contingent [inherence] is that whose predicate can be varied concerning the subject, with the subject remaining, thus necessary inherence is that whose predicate cannot be varied concerning the subject, with the subject remaining, and (in this way) necessary and per se are the same. For such a predicate has a cause in the subject, when it remains the subject. But when the subject has perished, it does not have [such] a cause. But the cause, by which a subject verifies an utterance, was of the essence of the subject. But with man perished, the essence of man is no more than it was than before his generation. And this alone is the essence of man: in potentiality. For that reason, with man perished, the proposition is not necessary, nor per se, nor true.
Alio modo dicitur necessarium illud, in cuius natura est, ut ipsum et non sit alio modo nec possit aliter se habere. Et tale necessarium non invenitur in illis entibus, quae non habent in se principia transmutationis scilicet in separatis a materia. Non est enim transmutatio subiecti. Quare ad hoc, quod propositio sit per se, non oportet, quod sit necessaria hoc modo. Et quod ista non sit vera: homo necessario est animal nullo homine existente, apparet ex hoc, quod veritas sermonis complexi est significatio eius, a qua ipse efficitur similis rei. Nunc autem nullo homine existente veritas huius sermonis non est similis rei, cum nec homo sit nec animal sibi inest in compositione rei, sed solum in compositione sermonis. Ergo nullo homo existente significatio huius sermonis non est veritas.	In another way 'necessary' is said to be that in whose nature it is to be itself, and not to be in another way, or could hold itself in another way. And such a necessary thing is not found in those beings, which do not have in themselves principles of transmutation, i.e. in things separated from material. For it is not a transmutation of the subject. Wherefore to the [objection] that the proposition is per se, is does not have to be necessary in this way. And that the proposition 'a man is necessarily an animal' is not true with no man existing, is apparent from the fact that the truth of a complex discourse is its signification, from which it is made similar to reality. But now, with no man existing, the truth of this discourse is not similar to reality, since man does not exist and animal is not in him in a composition in reality, but only a composition in discourse. Therefore, with no man existing, the signification of this discourse is not the truth.
Item Aristoteles 6є Metaphysicae probat veritatem in altera parte contradictionis et arguit sic. Affirmativa significat compositionem entis ad ens, negativa non significat divisionem eiusdem entis ab eo, sed impossibile est idem ens simul alicui esse componi et ab eodem dividi. Ergo si affirmativa est vera propter compositionem entis ad ens, quam significat, negativa erit falsa propter divisionem entis ab ente. Et si negativa erit vera propter divisionem entis ab ente, affirmitiva erit falsa propter {compositionem}, quam significat entis ad ens.	Likewise, Aristotle (6 Metaphysics) proves that truth is one or the other side [parte] of a contradiction, and argues as follows. An affirmative signifies the composition of a being to a being, a negative signifies division of the same being from the [being]. But it is impossible for the same being to be compounded with something, and at the same time to be divided from the same thing. Therefore, if an affirmative is true on account of the composition of a being to a being, the negative will be false on account of the division of being from being [that it signifies]. And if the negative is true on account of the division of being from being, the affirmative will be false on account of the composition which it signifies, of being to being.
Item sciendum, quod Aristoteles ex nullo probat veritatem sermonis affirmativi et negativi nisi ex re alteri composita vel ab eodem divisa. Nullo autem homine existente et nullo animali feras intellectum tuum in rem et videas, si essentia hominis et essentia animalis sit aliquid in natura {materia} secundum quod erant ante suam generationem. Tunc autem nihil erant nec erat homo nec animal sibi inhaerebat. Ergo nec nunc cum non sint plus quam erant tunc.	Likewise, it is to be known that Aristotle proves that the truth of an affirmative discourse (or of a negative) arises from nothing except one thing being compounded with another (or divided from it). But with no man existing, and no animal, you may bring your understanding into reality, and you may see, if the essence of man and the essence of animal is something in nature, according as they were before their generation. But then they were nothing, nor was there a man, nor was animal inhering in him. Therefore it is not the case now, since they are not more [now] than they were then.
Ad secundum rationem.	[In reply] to the second argument.
Cum dicitur esse animal est substantia, quidam homo non est substantia, ergo quidam homo non est animal, hic syllogismus est ex oppositis et eius conclusio debet esse impossibilis ergo haec est impossibilis: quidam homo non est animal, ergo eius contradictoria est necessaria scilicet omnis homo est animal. Dicendum, quod Aristoteles dicit in secundo Priorum, quod syllogismus ex oppositis est contrarius rei scilicet quando conclusio removet idem a seipso. Nam omnis conclusio syllogismi ex oppositis est negativa nec dicit, quod eius conclusio debet esse impossibilis, immo eius conclusio potest esse vera, quando dividit ea in sermone {quae} in re divisa, sicut in proposito. Omni enim homine corrupto homo et animal in re non sunt composita. Unde licet altera praemissarum syllogismi ex oppositis necessario sit falsa cum arguitur ex contrariis, sed dato quod utraque sit falsa sicut quandoque cum arguitur ex contrario, tunc conclusio eius potest esse vera scilicet illa, quae significat illa esse divisa, quae in re sunt divisa. Potest enim sequi verum ex falsis.	2. When it is said that an animal is a substance, a certain man is not a substance, therefore a certain man is not an animal, this syllogism is from opposites, and its conclusion ought to be impossible, therefore 'a certain man is not an animal' is impossible, and therefore its contradictory (every man is an animal) is necessary. It must be said that Aristotle (Prior Analytics II) says that a syllogism from opposites is contrary to reality, i.e. when the conclusion removes the same thing from itself. For every conclusion of a syllogism from opposites is negative, nor does he say that its conclusion ought to be impossible. Indeed, its conclusion can be true, when it divides those things in discourse which are divided in reality, just as is given here. For with every man perished, man and animal are not composed in reality. Wherefore, although necessarily one or the other of the premisses of a syllogism from opposites is false, when the argument is from contraries, but given both are false, e.g. when it is argued from a contrary, then its conclusion can be true, namely that which signifies that things are divided, which in reality are divided. For something true can follow from what are false.
Ad tertium argumentum cum dicitur: homo est animal aut haec propositio est necessaria aut non, dico quod non est necessaria. Cum dicis: ergo prima potest esse falsa, concedo et cum dicis ulterius: ergo haec potest esse falsa homo est homo nullo homine existente quia de quo falso enuntiatur consequens de eodem enuntiatur falso antedecens, dico quod ista est falsa: homo est homo nullo existente, quia haec est solum compositio sermonis, cui nulla in re respondet compositio. Et cum dicitur ulterius: ergo haec potest esse vera: homo non est homo, dico, quod nullo homine existente haec est vera, quia divisio sermonis in re nullam habet compositionem, quae sibi opponitur. Si enim quaeretur a te, quare Sorte currente haec propositio: Sortes non currit est falsa, respondebis, quod hoc est, quia in re est compositio, quae opponitur divisioni sermonis, verificat et si sic non respondeas tunc non potes respondere.	To the third argument when it is said: the proposition 'a man is an animal' is either necessary or not, I say that it is not necessary. When you say: therefore the first can be false, I allow [this], and when you say 'a man is a man' can be false, with no man existing, because of whatever the consequent is falsely asserted, the antecedent is falsely stated of the same thing, I say that 'a man is a man' is false, with no man existing, because it is only a composition of speech, to which no composition in reality answers. And when it is further said: therefore 'a man is not a man' can be true, I say that with no man existing, it is true, because a division of speech has no composition in reality, which is opposed to it. For if it is asked of you, wherefore the proposition 'Socrates is not running' is false, with Socrates running, you will reply that it is because there is a composition in reality, which is opposed to a division of speech, [which] verifies it, and if you do not reply thus, then you cannot reply.
Ad Quartum rationem cum tu dicis: species non potest amittere suum genus, verum est specie existente. Hoc est impossibile, quod circa ipsam existentem varietur suum genus. Non enim amittit suum genus, quia tunc specie existente quandoque inesset sibi quandoque non et tunc non esset genus, sed accidens. Sed quod species per suae substantiae corruptionem amittat genus, non est impossibile, sed necessario. Vide enim si homo per corruptionem suam amittit substantiam suam, quia quod acquiritur per generationem amittitur per corruptionem. Si ergo asinus non habeat huiusmodi genus, quod est animal nisi per suam essentiam causaliter, cum amittat suam essentiam per corruptionem, necesse est, quod amittat hoc genus, quod est genus animal, et omnia quae sibi inhaerent causaliter propter suam essentiam. Si autem tu vis dicere, quod essentia et forma speciei asini non acquiritur per generationem, ergo forma asini erat ante generationem suam aut ergo separata a materia aut non: separata a materia non quia tunc fuisset tamquam ydea Platonis et verum formae materiales non sunt separabiles a materia secundum Aristotelem. Si tu dicas, quod forma asini est actu in materia ante generationem asini, hoc non est possibile, quia nihil transmutatur ad id quod habet actu. Si ergo in generatione asini materia transformatur ad formam asini, tunc essentia asini vel forma non erat in materia in actu ante generationem asini.	To the fourth reasoning, when you say: a species cannot lose its genus, it is true with the species existing. This is impossible, that concerning an existing thing its genus is varied. For it does not lose its genus, because then with the species existing [the genus] would sometimes be in it and sometimes not, and then it would not be a genus but an accident. But that a species, by the perishing of its substance, loses its genus, is not impossible but necessary. For you see that if a man by perishing loses his substance, that what is acquired by generation is lost by perishing. Therefore, if a donkey does not have a genus of this sort, i.e. animal, except causally, by its essence, when it loses its essence by perishing, it is necessary that it loses this genus, i.e. the genus animal, and all the things which inhere in it causally on account of its essence. But if you want to say that the essence and form of the species of donkey are not acquired by generation, therefore the form of a donkey existed before its generation, either therefore [the form] is separated from the material [of the donkey] or not. Not separated from the material, because then there would exist something like the Idea of Plato. But material forms are not separable from material, according to Aristotle. If you say that the form of the donkey is actually in the material before the generation of the donkey, this is not possible, because nothing is transmutated to that which it actually has. Therefore, if in the generation of the donkey material was transformed to the form of a donkey, then the essence of the donkey, or the form, was not in actuality in the material, before the generation of the donkey.
Item cum dicis, quod essentia asini non acquiritur per generationem, tunc quaero a te: quid acquiritur per generationem. Constat, quod non materia, quia ipsa est ante esse generati et post esse corrupti.	Likewise, when you say that the essence of the donkey was not acquired by generation, then I ask of you, what is acquired through generation? It is plain, that it is not material, since that exists before the being of what is generated, and after the being of what has perished
Si tu dicis, quod compositum est, quod per se generatur et acquiritur per generationem sicut dicit Aristoteles XI Metaphysicae et Albertus libro eodem, ergo et forma quae est altera pars compositi per generationem acquiritur licet per accidens. Nonne vis tu dicere, quod essentia rerum generabilium sit aeterna non cadens sub corruptione nec sub generatione? Sic enim dicere est ignorare quid est quod dicitur per nomen.	If you say that it is a composite [of matter and form], which is generated per se and is acquired by generation, just as Aristotle says (XI Metaphysics)] and Albert, on the same book], therefore also the form, which is the other part of the composite is acquired by generation, although accidentally. You don't want to say that the essence of generable things is eternal, not falling under perishing or generation, do you? For to speak thus is to be ignorant of what it is that is expressed by the name ['essence'].
Quaestio III	<b|Question III
Tertio quaerebatur, utrum rebus corruptis necesse sit terminos cadere a suis significatis. Et arguitur, quod sic. Boetius dicit, quod si res non sit vox designativa esse desistit. Rebus autem corruptis res non sunt. Ergo vox designativa esse desistit. Responsio	Third, it was asked whether with things destroyed it is necessary that terms 'fall away from' [i.e. lose their connection with] their significates. 1. And it is argued that they do. Boethius says that if the thing does not exist [sit] the utterance ceases to be designative. But with the things destroyed, the things do not exist. Therefore the utterance ceases to be designative.
Item res intellectiva et vocis significatio penitus idem sunt. Nam res ipsa quae intelligitur et quod intelligitur per vocem significantur. Sed cum res est corrupta, manifestum est, quod ipsa non est. Ergo nec intellectiva vocis significatio. Sed si vocis significatio non sit, oportet voces cadere a suis significatis. Responsio	2. Likewise, the thing understood and the signification of the utterance are wholly the same. For the thing itself which is understood, and what is understood through the utterance, are what are signified. But when the thing is destroyed, it is manifest that it does not exist. Therefore neither the signification understood of the utterance. But if the signification of the utterance does not exist, the utterances must fall away from their significates.
Ad oppositum. Forma rei generabilis ipsa est in materia per essentiam. Lapis enim non est in anima, sed species lapidis sicut dicit Aristoteles in IIIє de Anima et est in voce per significationem et esse rei in materia et esse eius in anima et esse eius in voce significante ipsam sunt diversa et unum ipsorum non dependet ab aliis vel ab alio.	On the opposite side. The generable form of a thing is in material through essence. For a stone is not in the soul, but the species of the stone, as Aristotle says in III de Anima, and is in the utterance through signification and the being of the thing in material, and its being in the soul and its being in an utterance signifying it are diverse and one of these does not depend on one or on the other.
Ex hoc arguitur sic. Cuicunque inesse debentur plura esse, quorum unum non dependet ab alio ipsa destructa quantum ad unum illorum non oportet ipsam corrumpi quantum ad aliud, sed quoniam rei generabili plura debentur esse, quorum unum ab alio non dependet ut esse reale in materia et intellectum in anima esse significatum in voce, ergo rei essentia corrupta quantum ad suum esse in materia non oportet ipsam corrumpi quantum ad suum esse in anima vel quantum ad suum esse significatum in voce.	From this we argue as follows. To any kind of inbeing [inesse], there are several [kinds of] being owed, one of which does not depend on the other, when the other is destroyed -regarding one of them, it does not have to be destroyed as far as the other [is]. But since several kinds of being are owed to a generable thing, of which one of these is not dependent as being real in material, and understood in the soul, and being signified in an utterance, therefore with the essence of the thing destroyed regarding its being in material, it does not have to be destroyed regarding its being signified in the utterance.
Maior patet, quum Sortem esse et ipsum esse album sunt diversa esse, quorum unum non dependet ex alio. Ideo Sorte corrupto quantum ad esse album non oportet ipsum corrumpi quantum ad esse simpliciter. Minor etiam patet, quoniam quamvis res post suam corruptionem non sit idem quod prius, possum tamen idem intelligere et ymaginari quod prius, ergo et significare per vocem. Quicquid enim potest intelligi, potest per vocem significari.	The major premiss is clear, since Socrates' being and his being white are diverse beings, one of which is not dependent on the other. For that reason, with Socrates destroyed regarding his being white, he does not have to be destroyed regarding his being in an unqualified sense. The minor is also clear, since although the thing is not the same after its destruction as before, nonetheless I can understand it and imagine it as before, therefore also signify [it] by an utterance. For whatever can be understood, can be signified by an utterance.
Ad quaestionem breviter est dicendum, quod rebus corruptis non est necesse cadere terminos a suis significatis. Causa tamen huius non quia necesse sit post suam corruptionem per vocem significari, sed hoc sibi accidit. Nec etiam causa huius est, quare necesse sit per vocem aliquam rem significare. Vox enim sicut nulli rei repugnat, sic ad significatum nullam rem sibi determinat, sed corruptis rebus non oportet terminos cadere a suis significatis. Et causa huius est, quia significare vocis non pendet ab esse reali. Quare quod ab alio non dependet illo non existente possibile est id esse a quo non dependet. Ideo &c.	To the question it must briefly be said, that with the things destroyed it is not necessary for the terms to fall away from their significates. Nonetheless the reason of this is not because after the thing's destruction it is necessary for it to be signified, but rather this is an accidental property. Nor also is the reason that it is necessary for an utterance to signify some thing. For just as an utterance is not repugnant to [signifying] any thing, so [it may be] that it is determined to signify no thing. But with things destroyed, the terms do not have to fall away from their significates. And the reason is, that the signifying of an utterance does not depend on real being. Wherefore, what does not depend on another thing with that thing not existing, it is possible for that to be from that which it does not depend on. Therefore &c.
Quod autem significare vocem non dependet ab esse rei manifestum est ex hoc. Esse et non esse respectu eiusdem rei opponitur significari et non significari respectu eiusdem rei opponitur. Sed sicut esse rei et non significari per vocem non opponitur multa enim sunt quae tamen per vocem non significantur ergo &c., non esse et non per vocem significari non opponitur circa idem. Videmus tamen quod Sortes non significat illud quod substantia est post suam corruptionem, quoniam cum forma substantialis Sortis nihil sit post suam corruptionem, tunc ista vox Sortes nichil significaret, sed post corruptionem Sortis Sortes significat tale ens quod unquam fuit Sortes, licet tale ens non sit Sortes in re.	But for an utterance to signify does not depend on the being of the thing is manifest as follows. Being and non being are opposed in respect of the same thing, [and] being signified and not being signified are opposed in respect of the same thing. But just as being of a thing, and not being signified by an utterance are not opposed (for nonetheless there many things which are not signified by an utterance therefore &c), not being and not being signified by an utterance are not opposed, in respect of the same thing. Nonetheless we see that 'Socrates' does not signify that which is a substance after his destruction, since when the substantial form of Socrates is nothing after his destruction, then the utterance 'Socrates' would signify nothing. But after the destruction of Socrates, 'Socrates' signifies such a being as Socrates was once, although such a being is not Socrates in reality.
Item quod est possibile apud intellectum in intelligendo, possibile est apud voces significando. Nam quod potest esse intellectum potest esse vocis significatum et illo modo. Sed re corrupta possibilis est apud intellectum conceptio illius rei, sicut prius. Res enim post sui corruptionem possibilis est intelligi. Ergo et per vocem significari sicut prius.	Likewise, what it is possible in the understanding, in understanding, is possible in utterances in signifying. For what can be understood can be the significate of an utterance, and in that manner. But with the thing destroyed, it is possible in the understanding [for there to be] a conception of the thing, just as before. For the thing, after its destruction, is able to be understood. Therefore also to be signified by the utterance, just as before.
Item quod nulli significato repugnat potest rem significare sive ipsa res sit sive non sit. Vox nulli significato repugnat sicut nec aliquid significatum sibi determinat. Ergo vox potest rem significare sive res sit sive non sit.	Likewise, what is repugnant to no significate, can signify a thing, whether that thing exists or does not exist. An utterance is repugnant to no significate, just as neither does it determine any [particular] thing to it as its significate. Therefore an utterance can signify a thing whether the thing exists, or whether it does not.
Ad rationes in oppositum dicendum. Cum dicis si res substantia non sit vox &c. dico, quod si hoc verbum est praedicatur tertio adiacens propositio est vera et sic eam intelligit Boetius, ut sit sensus: si res non sit substantia voci significanti ut significetur eius designativa esse desistit, sed si praedicatur secundo adiacens tunc propositio est falsa ut sit sensus: si res non sit res vox designativa esse desistit, sicut dicitur communiter. Aliter potest dici: si res non sit ita quod nullum esse habeat nec in materia per suam essentiam nec in anima per cognitionem nec in voce per significationem, vox designativa esse desistit. Hoc est verum. Si tamen res non sit ita, quod non habeat esse in materia, non oportet, quod vox desistat esse designativa. Non enim habendo esse in materia potest habere esse in anima et in voce significante, ut visum est.	To the opposing arguments it must be said: when you say that if the thing is not a substance, the utterance &c, I say that if the word 'is' is predicated as a copula [tertio adiacens], the proposition is true, and Boethius understands it in that way, so that its sense is as follows: if the thing is not a substance of the signifying utterance, as it is signified, its being designative ceases. But if it is predicated absolutely [secundo adiacens], then the proposition is false, as [its] sense is: if the thing is not a thing, the utterance ceases to be designative, just as is commonly said. Otherwise it can be said: if the thing does not exist so that it has no material being through its essence, nor in the soul through cognition, nor in utterance through signification, it ceases to be a designative utterance. This is true. Nonetheless, if the thing is not thus, that it does not have material being, it does not have to be that the utterance ceases to be designative. For in not having material being can it have being in the soul, and in the signifying utterance, as we saw.
Ad secundam rationem cum dicit, quod idem est penitus res et intellectum et vocis significatum verum est, quod idem in numero est res in materia et intellectum et vocis significatum, esse tamen aliud et aliud. Non enim idem est ipsam intellectam esse et ipsam esse vocis significatam et ipsam esse rem. Ideo ipsa corrupta inquantum ipsa est res in materia non oportet ipsam corrumpi inquantum ipsa est vocis significatum.	To the second argument, when he says that the thing and what is understood, and the significate of the utterance are the same, it is true, that the material thing, and the thing understood, and the signficate of the utterance are the same in number, but the being is one thing and another. For the thing being understood, and the thing being the significate of the utterance, and the thing being a thing, are not the same. For that reason, when it is destroyed, insofar as it is a material thing, it does not have to be destroyed insofar as it is the significate of an utterance.